This appendix recodes the constraint-on-the-executive (XCONST) variable from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005). They used this variable to measure how institutions interacted with Atlantic trade to drive the “little divergence” in Europe from 1500 to 1800. The variable is recoded here for all 26 countries in their dataset. The recoding draws on specialist studies and three cross-country sources:
The XCONST scale comes from the Polity Project of the Center for Systemic Peace:
The even-numbered scores (2, 4, 6) are intermediate. The standard is the operative constraint rather than the formal one. Scoring rests on what actually restrained the executive. A suspended constitution or a powerless assembly does not count as a constraint.
A few rows carry the code -88. This is Polity’s marker for a transition year, in which one regime gave way to another and no settled constitutional order yet held. Each such row identifies the transition it covers.
It should be noted that the recodings do not always match Polity itself. They nevertheless seem to be the correct application of Polity’s own criteria.
Restoration Spain is an example. From 1876 the country had a written constitution, a bicameral Cortes, and the turno pacífico, the agreed alternation of Conservatives and Liberals in office. Polity scores executive constraints there at its maximum of 7. But the alternation was not produced by elections. Indeed, in The Development of Modern Spain: An Economic History of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Gabriel Tortella (2000, 27, 29) writes that the Restoration “achieved only a nominal success ... because it was thwarted by the corrupt and abusive practices of caciquismo (bossism) and pucherazo (election-rigging),” and that the alternation “was not the result of honest elections; the cynical Cánovas never attempted to hold them.” It was therefore a parliament whose composition was fixed by the government, which suggests that the executive was not fully subordinate, leading to a score of 4 here. Greece is the same story. Polity scores the post-1864 kingdom at 7, whereas here it is given 4, rising to 5 after the dedilomeni convention of 1875. The 1864 constitution was genuinely liberal, but in Modern Greece Thomas W. Gallant records that “[T]he difficulty was that King George had the power to appoint or dismiss ministers, and so he could create or collapse administrations at will” (2001, 47), and in A Concise History of Greece, Richard Clogg observes that under the early constitution “Laws ... were there essentially to be got round rather than obeyed” (2014, 61). Consequently, 4 rather than 5 seems more appropriate. And so on. The recoding for the nineteenth century entails many corrections to Polity itself.
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1478 | 1 | Pre-Ottoman and gradual Ottoman conquest. No institutional constraint on any executive. Successive Byzantine, Bulgarian, Serbian, Venetian, and local Albanian feudal rulers faced no representative institutions. The northern highlands used the fis/bajrak system for customary self-government via tribal assemblies. Skendi notes how “assemblies of tribesmen were held under the presidency of elders, using their unwritten customary law” (1967, 14–15). The assemblies resolved communal disputes but did not limit the ruler. The Ottoman conquest of Albanian territory started at the battle of Voissa (1385) and finished with the fall of Krujë (1478) and Shkodër (1479). Score 1: no formal accountability group constrained any executive governing Albanian territory. |
| 1478–1876 | 1 | Ottoman absolutism. The sultan had unlimited authority. Henriques et al. (2026) find “no formal constraint on the Ottoman executive until the late nineteenth century. There was no parliament or other legislative body that could limit the Sultan’s decisions.” Highland customary self-government (fis/bajrak) continued under Ottoman rule. The Mountain Committee of Shkodër (1856–1858) coordinated tribes with the vali but was an appointed body (Skendi 1967, 15–16). The Bushati and Ali Pasha pashaliks (c. 1760–1831) functioned as personal fiefs. Bushati was “behaving more like an independent prince” (Vickers 1999, 18). Ali Pasha “controlled the whole of southern Albania, Epirus and Thessaly… maintained at vast expense by means of tributes and bribes” (Vickers 1999, 23). They did not establish institutional constraints. The Porte crushed both domains by 1831. The Tanzimat reforms (1839–1876) centralized power. “The primary aim of the Tanzimat reforms of 1839 was to create a strong modern apparatus with which to govern the empire” (Vickers 1999, 25). The 1865 vilayet reform formed administrative councils composed of Albanian notables alongside the local governments (Skendi 1967, 26–27). Score 1: the Ottoman sultan held absolute power with no institutional limits. |
| 1876–1878 | 1 | First Ottoman Constitutional Era. A parliament on paper only. The 1876 Ottoman constitution formed a parliament. Abdulhamid II “had a Constitution proclaimed shortly after his accession, but soon suspended it amid the turmoil. An increasingly autocratic government was established” (Clayer 2007, 242). Skendi (1967), Vickers (1999), and Clayer (2007) provide no evidence that this brief parliament affected Albanian territory governance. Score 1: the parliament was too short and weak to constrain the executive. |
| 1878–1908 | 1 | Hamidian absolutism. Constitution suspended and centralization increased. “The Hamidian regime was characterized by a strengthening of the Sultan’s power, increased centralization, bureaucracy, and police surveillance” (Clayer 2007, 242). The League of Prizren (1878–1881) was a political and military resistance movement, not a governing body. A British agent noted in June 1880 that “The Albanian League is in fact only a high-sounding name… and has no force and vitality apart from that which comes from the government itself” (quoted in Clayer 2007, 257). The League temporarily expelled Ottoman officials from Kosovo (December 1880 to April 1881) and “functioned as the only authority” (Skendi 1967, 97–98). This was a rebellion against Ottoman rule and not an institutional constraint on the state. Dervish Pasha put down the rebellion with 10,000 troops. By April 1881, Assim Pasha stated he “had completely broken the influence of the League and had restored Turkish authority in the whole of Albania” (quoted in Skendi 1967, 106). Albanian cultural societies like Bashkimi, Agimi, and Dituria in the 1880s to 1900s were educational and literary associations. Score 1: no formal accountability group constrained the executive. |
| 1908–1912 | 1 | Second Constitutional Era (Young Turk). Formal parliament with no operative constraint. The 1908 revolution restored the Ottoman constitution and parliament. Twenty-six deputies represented the four Albanian vilayets in the chamber (Skendi 1967, 361). The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) “permanently constituted an occult or semi-occult pressure group… its structure eventually came to duplicate the provincial administration network” (Clayer 2007, 615). In April 1910, “in vain the Albanian deputies protested… The government refused to give explanations even in the parliament” (Skendi 1967, 406). The CUP suppressed Albanian institutions from spring 1910 by shutting down clubs and schools and jailing local leaders (Clayer 2007, 633–634). The executive dissolved parliament in January 1912 and rigged the April 1912 election. Skendi notes how “so absolute was the majority of the Young Turks in the chamber that they occupied 215 out of 222 seats” (1967, 426–427). The 1912 Albanian revolt led to a September 1912 autonomy agreement recognizing “the ‘Albanian’ character of a region” (Clayer 2007, 701). The First Balkan War broke out before anyone could implement this agreement. Score 1: the formal constitution failed to limit an executive that closed parliament and rigged elections to suppress opposition. |
| 1912–1914 | 1 | Independence, provisional government, and Prince Wied. State without effective institutions. Ismail Qemali declared independence at Vlorë on 28 November 1912 and formed a provisional government with a senate. At the same time, “the authority of the new government barely extended beyond the limits of the sandjak of Berat. In central Albania, Esad Pasha took the reins of a ‘Senate,’ while other regions experienced various occupations” (Clayer 2007, 705). Prince Wilhelm of Wied arrived in March 1914. “No constitution ever saw the light, and Prince Wied himself, though he began by forming a cabinet, never governed outside Durres… During his hapless reign he barely ventured outside the town of Durres, and remained there as a virtual prisoner” (Vickers 1999, 83). He left in September 1914. Score 1: no functioning state existed to be constrained by an accountability group. |
| 1914–1920 | 1 | World War I, foreign occupation, and post-war instability. No functioning central state. “After Wied had gone, Albania reverted to its prewar state of political dissension and chaos. There was no united opposition to foreign interventions” (Vickers 1999, 86). “Throughout the duration of the war Albania found herself in a condition of political anarchy, as supporters of the various rebel groups fought among themselves for political influence” (Vickers 1999, 86–87). Several foreign powers occupied the territory during and after the war (Vickers 1999, 86–94). The post-war Durrës government operated as “little more than a puppet regime, reduced to a mere outpost of Italian colonial administration” (Vickers 1999, 94). Score 1: no functioning central state existed to be constrained by an accountability group. |
| 1920 | 2 | Lushnjë constitution and parliamentary period. Formal legislative institutions with weak operative constraint. The Congress of Lushnjë (January 1920) created a four-member regency (High Council of State) and a National Legislative Assembly. The Congress appointed “a cabinet responsible not to the regency but to a 37-man senate, which was given principal power in the state” (Vickers 1999, 94). Even so, “power was left in the hands of the few leaders who had organized the system”. The system’s weakness showed in the years beyond the coded series: the first national elections in April 1921 returned two parties with roughly equal seats. This parity led to “a bitter struggle between the two, causing an endless succession of governmental crises” (Vickers 1999, 101). The opposition routinely denied the legislative quorum. For example, “The opposition accused the government of incompetence and withdrew 44 deputies from the Assembly, which was consequently reduced to constitutional impotence, being deprived of the quorum necessary for the purpose of passing legislation” (Vickers 1999, 110). Ahmed Zogu “controlled the government” even when he was not the premier (Vickers 1999, 109). In December 1921, “no less than five ministries were formed, the last being installed by a coup d’état” (Vickers 1999, 104–105). Score 2 rather than 1: a cabinet responsible to the senate and an opposition able to paralyze the legislature exceeds unlimited authority. Score 2 rather than 3: executive power relied on personal networks instead of institutional channels, and extra-legal coups installed governments. The arrangement collapsed when Zogu assumed presidential power on 31 January 1925. The constitution then gave him “unrestricted power of veto over any laws” (Vickers 1999, 117–118). |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1156 | 1 | Babenberg margraviate. No representative institutions. The march established in 976 was a frontier territory under Bavarian and imperial suzerainty. The Privilegium Minus (1156) elevated Austria to a hereditary duchy. It fixed Babenberg succession and jurisdiction but placed no limits on the duke’s authority. No central diet existed. The joint Generallandtag recorded zero meetings in this period (van Zanden et al. 2012). Score 1: no accountability group of any kind. |
| 1156–1278 | 1 | Babenberg duchy and post-Babenberg interregnum. The Babenberg dukes ruled until their male line died out in 1246. The resulting contested succession ended at the Battle of Marchfeld in 1278, when Rudolf I of Habsburg defeated Ottokar II. “A duchy since 1156, Austria was ruled along with Styria by the Babenberg family whose last member Frederick... died in 1246” (Kontler 2002, 81). No diet or estates body constrained the duke, and the provincial Landstände had not yet emerged. Score 1. |
| 1278–1490 | 2 | Habsburg rule. Provincial estates emerge as a constraint. Rudolf I acquired Austria in 1278. Over the next two centuries, provincial estates (Landstände) formed in each hereditary land. “Real power resided with the estates themselves. Individual diets enjoyed a genuine right to negotiate with the governor over the crown’s requests. More often they simply set their own legislative agenda” (Ingrao 2000, 9). The estates wrote and collected their own taxes. They also maintained a bureaucracy that “invariably equaled or outnumbered the crown’s until well into the eighteenth century” (Ingrao 2000, 9). The joint Generallandtag of all the lands rarely convened (van Zanden et al. 2012). The constraint instead worked through the separate provincial Landtage. Score 2 rather than 1: the estates held a right to negotiate and an independent legislative agenda. Score 2 rather than 3: the fragmented provincial structure lacked a central parliament, so the estates could not block legislation across the entire monarchy. |
| 1490–1620 | 2 | Composite monarchy. Provincial estates retain power. Maximilian I reunited the Habsburg lands in 1490. Ferdinand I acquired Bohemia and Hungary in 1526. The Austrian hereditary lands became part of a composite monarchy. These territories “retained a separate identity, as well as substantial control over the making and local enforcement of the law” (Ingrao 2000, 6). The crown required cooperation because the estates “still controlled the financial means necessary to raise a large army” (Ingrao 2000, 20). The same fiscal leverage applied in the Bohemian crownlands. “Estates politicians were well aware of the dependence of the ruler on tax revenues, and so they jealously guarded their rights to set their extent and tried to keep their collection in the hands of region and land officers” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 216). The Generallandtag met about five times in the sixteenth century (van Zanden et al. 2012). Score 2: the estates exercised consent over taxation and local administration, but lacked a central parliament to initiate or block legislation. |
| 1620–1740 | 2 | Post-White Mountain. The hereditary estates keep their privileges while Bohemia is subjugated. The crown crushed the Bohemian estates after White Mountain. It reduced their power via the Renewed Land Ordinance of 1627, “issued without the Estates’ co-operation, solely through the sovereign’s authority,” after which “the diets were left with only a passive role” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 256–258). The Austrian hereditary estates did not join the revolt and kept their privileges. Ferdinand “made no attempt to infringe their various other liberties” (Ingrao 2000, 36). Ferdinand III and Leopold I “preferred to work closely with the estates even to the point of accepting somewhat lower revenues than they wanted, so long as they could be sure of their loyalty to the crown” (Ingrao 2000, 60). The Bohemian estates alone “met no fewer than fifty-nine times in the half century between 1648 and 1698”. Score 2: the hereditary estates kept their institutional privileges and negotiated taxation, unlike the absolutism imposed on Bohemia. |
| 1740–1848 | 1 | Enlightened absolutism and the Metternich reaction. Estates marginalized. The Theresian reforms (from 1748) centralized tax collection and bypassed the estates for the military Contribution. Where a consensus was not possible, “such as in Hungary,” Maria Theresa relented (Ingrao 2000, 169). Of Joseph II, Ingrao (2000, 198) writes: “Nor was he deterred by any corporate constitutional powers, which he dismissed as mere instruments of privilege.” Metternich muzzled the press. “[A]ll state employees — even members of the royal family — were obliged to swear that they did not belong to a secret society” (Ingrao 2000, 231). The Generallandtag met only twice in the eighteenth century (van Zanden et al. 2012). Score 1 rather than 2: centralization under Maria Theresa and Joseph II removed constraints on the executive. The crown reduced the estates to a consultative status and bypassed them by decree. |
| 1848 | 3 | Constitutional experiment. The Kremsier Reichstag. The March 1848 revolution produced a Constituent Reichstag elected on a broad franchise. It sat in Vienna and then Kremsier (Kroměříž). Its draft “made the emperor absolute only in foreign policy; in all other respects his power was to be restricted. His ministers were to be responsible not only to him but also to the parliament” (Deák 2001, 251). The assembly “was busy completing its constitutional project” (Deák 2001, 251) when Franz Joseph “dissolved the Kremsier Reichstag and promulgated the new constitution” on 4 March 1849 (Deák 2001, 251). Score 3 rather than 1: the Reichstag was a constitutional legislature with majority control over its draft. Score 3 rather than 4: the emperor retained command of the army and the power of dissolution. He used that power, and the project never took effect. |
| 1849–1861 | 1 | Neo-absolutism (the Bach system). The crown suspended the Stadion Constitution of March 1849 before implementing it. It gave the monarch “an absolute veto” and the authority “to dissolve the Reichstag at any time,” with cabinet members “responsible to the emperor alone” (Deák 2001, 251). The Silvester Patent (31 December 1851) formally revoked the constitution. The Bach system then governed through a centralized bureaucracy. The provincial estates lost their consultative role. Score 1: no representative or constitutional constraint on the executive. |
| 1861–1918 | 3 | Constitutional monarchy. The Reichsrat acquires legislative powers. The October Diploma (1860) and February Patent (1861) established a bicameral Reichsrat. The December Constitution (1867) limited “the ruler’s decision-making power by requiring counter-signatures by the pertinent ministers” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 370). It included basic laws on civic rights, judicial independence, and ministerial responsibility. The Reichsrat now became “a true co-decision-making body” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 370). Under the first of the five December laws, the “legislative powers of parliament were wider than in the narrow enumeration in the February Patent. Parliamentary immunity was fully granted” (Kann 1974, 339). Direct elections followed in 1873, and universal male suffrage in 1907. However, the emperor kept a veto, the power to dissolve the chamber, ministerial appointment powers, and emergency decree authority (Article 14) to govern when parliament was out of session. Score 3: the Reichsrat held legislative and budgetary powers, but the emperor regularly used substantial reserve powers. |
| 1918–1920 | 5 | Republic established. The Habsburg monarchy collapsed in October and November 1918. “The Republic of ‘German Austria’ was founded on 12 November 1918, by an assembly of the Reichsrat’s German members” (Beller 2006, 198). “The election of the Constituent National Assembly on 16 February 1919 was the first in Austrian history in which women had the right to vote” (Beller 2006, 204). The federal constitution was enacted in October 1920. Score 5: the Constituent Assembly held sovereign authority. This raised the score above the imperial-era 3. However, it governed under provisional arrangements until the 1920 constitution took effect. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1301 | 1 | Feudal principalities under the Empire. The territories that became Belgium formed a patchwork of feudal counties (Flanders, Hainaut), duchies (Brabant, Limburg), and bishoprics (Liège) within the Holy Roman Empire. Feudal councils of nobles and clergy ruled these areas. The aldermen’s courts in Flanders functioned as instruments of comital authority rather than representative bodies (Nicholas 1992, 85). The communal liberties in the ‘little charters’ of 1127–8 were privileges granted by the count (Nicholas 1992, 64–65, 85). Estates proper did not appear until 1384 (Marongiu 1968). Score 1: accountability groups did not constrain the executive before the Battle of the Golden Spurs in 1302. |
| 1302–1384 | 3 | Three Members of Flanders. The Three Cities dominated Flanders. The Flemish urban militias defeated the French royal army at the Battle of the Golden Spurs on 11 July 1302. This victory established the autonomy of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres, known as the “Three Members of Flanders,” and they “at times even ruled the county autonomously, as in 1339” (Van Bavel 2010, 114). In Brabant, the Walloon Charter (1314) established a norm of consultation, “serv[ing] for many years as a standard for the relations between the dukes of Brabant and the representative institutions” (Stein 2017, 54). The Joyous Entry of Brabant (1356) was “a document composed in discussion with the States of Brabant—in some instances dictated by them” (Stein 2017, 77). The Flemish aldermen “had advised the prince chiefly on domestic issues and had generally stayed out of foreign policy” (Nicholas 1992, 211). Score 3: the towns and states imposed concrete, case-by-case limits on comital authority. |
| 1384–1476 | 4 | Burgundian Four Members. Under the Burgundian dukes, the Four Members of Flanders (Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, and the Franc of Bruges) operated as the formal representative body. “The Members met 3359 times between 1384 and 1506” (Nicholas 1992, 335), usually at their own initiative. “In 1391 Philip the Bold forbade them orally to meet in the future without his permission or in his absence, but this was disregarded” (Nicholas 1992, 332). Their legislative scope covered “subjects as minute as the kind of nets fishermen could use” (Nicholas 1992, 336). In Brabant, during the minority of Duke John IV, “the three orders that were acting as regents... exercising governmental authority on his behalf” (Stein 2017, 57). Score 4: this system of consultation was highly developed for northwestern Europe. The estates held self-convening power and broad legislative scope without functioning as a sovereign parliament. The prince kept the initiative on war and foreign policy. |
| 1477–1554 | 3 | Habsburg States-General. Charles the Bold died at Nancy in 1477. This prompted the Grand Privilege, where Mary of Burgundy granted the States-General the right to assemble without summons and to consent to taxation and war. Maximilian of Habsburg quickly reversed this practice (Israel 1995, 28–29). The States-General met roughly 160 times between 1464 and 1566 (van Zanden et al. 2012). The Habsburgs controlled convocation and the agenda. The Four Members declined in power because “the aldermen of each of the Four Members had to use the Council of Flanders as judicial head” (Nicholas 1992, 332). Score 3: the States-General retained fiscal-consent functions while the executive controlled the agenda and bypassed the estates. |
| 1555–1713 | 2 | Spanish Habsburg rule. Philip II inherited the Netherlands in 1555. The resulting Dutch Revolt split the Low Countries. In the south, the States-General almost completely stopped meeting and gathered roughly ten times in the seventeenth century (van Zanden et al. 2012). The provincial estates of Flanders, Brabant, and Hainaut exercised fiscal-consent powers. The sovereign remained in Madrid, and a governor-general managed the territory after 1621. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701 to 1714) suspended institutions entirely. Score 2: provincial institutions nominally survived under an unconstrained external executive. |
| 1713–1794 | 2 | Austrian Habsburg rule. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) transferred the territory to the Austrian Habsburgs. Under their rule, the provincial estates kept their fiscal-consent rights. Maria Theresa respected the Joyous Entry privileges of Brabant. Joseph II introduced administrative and ecclesiastical reforms starting in 1780 that violated those privileges and provoked the Brabant Revolution in 1789. The resulting United States of Belgium (1790) operated as a brief confederal republic. It collapsed following the Austrian restoration and the French invasion in 1794. Score 2: the provincial estates could negotiate taxation, with the sovereign in Vienna and modest operative constraint. |
| 1795–1814 | 1 | French annexation. Revolutionary armies conquered the Austrian Netherlands in 1794. Formal annexation followed in 1795. Paris divided the territory into nine départements under French prefects, centralized fiscal administration (Dincecco 2009), and abolished all representative institutions of the ancien régime. Score 1: operative constraints were absent at all levels. |
| 1815–1830 | 2 | United Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Congress of Vienna (1815) united the southern and northern Netherlands under Willem I. His constitution “granted absolutist powers” to the king (Dincecco 2009, 54). The States-General existed, but its budget authority “came at ten-year intervals” and “was rendered ineffective”. Ministers answered to the king alone. Indirect elections filled the chamber from “a taxpayers’ elite of some 3.5 percent of the relevant age-group” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 88). Article 73 stated simply, “Le Roi décide seul” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 86). Score 2: Parliament held a theoretical decadal budget right and lacked operative constraints on executive action. |
| 1831–1847 | 5 | Belgian Constitution of 1831. The Belgian Revolution (1830) produced a constitution that was “the immediate political result of the revolution” (Witte et al. 2009, 24). It established “the institutional balance of power between the legislative, executive and judicial branches, the principles of ministerial accountability towards the legislators and the co-signing by ministers of laws and royal decrees” (Witte et al. 2009, 25). Fiscal centralization and limited government began in 1831 (Dincecco 2009). The constraint was substantial yet incomplete. Leopold I “tried to expand his constitutional role as much as possible — though not always successfully — and diminish that of parliament” (Witte et al. 2009, 46–47). Additionally, “over a third of parliamentary seats were held by appointed officials” (Witte et al. 2009, 47). Score 5: a substantial constitutional constraint. The score falls short of full subordination due to the king’s active influence, the narrow franchise, and the absence of disciplined party government. |
| 1847–1918 | 6 | Parliamentary party government. The Liberal victory of 1847 produced the first single-party cabinet. Leopold I was “forced to accept... headed by Rogier, a man he personally disliked” (Witte et al. 2009, 53). The School War (1879 to 1884) demonstrated competitive elections. The Catholic Party defeated the Liberal secularization program at the ballot box and “would remain in power until the First World War” (Witte et al. 2009, 91). The constitution operated as designed. A parliament controlling legislation and budgets constrained the executive. The king kept practical powers in foreign policy (Leopold II held the Congo as a personal possession from 1885 to 1908) and in ministerial selection. Score 6: the executive answered directly to parliament. The score deducts one point for residual royal powers and the restricted franchise. |
| 1919–1920 | 7 | Universal male suffrage. The introduction of universal single male suffrage in 1919, part of the post-war Loppem settlement, completed the democratization of parliamentary control. “The parties adapted themselves to a more democratic parliament after the introduction of the single vote for men in 1919. ... The role of the monarch and his relationship with parliament changed” (Witte et al. 2009, 12). Score 7: universal suffrage and full parliamentary control achieved executive subordination. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1184 | 1 | Byzantine conquest of Bulgaria. The First Bulgarian Empire collapsed in 1018 after Basil II conquered the territory. Before 1018, Bulgarian tsars ruled through the boyar council (sinklit), which was an advisory body rather than an institutional constraint. “[T]he kingdom was always heavily influenced by Byzantium and by Byzantine practices. The Bulgarian aristocracy aped that of its southern neighbour; the state and church administrations were similar to those of the empire” (Crampton 2005, 21). After 1018, Byzantium incorporated Bulgaria as a province. No body with standing authority constrained the Byzantine emperor over Bulgarian territory. The Ohrid patriarchate was a religious institution, not a political one. Sporadic revolts, such as the Petar Delyan uprising of 1040, were rebellions against worsening conditions rather than efforts to create permanent institutional limits. Crampton (2005, 22) characterizes the Delyan uprising as a social protest. Score 1: no representative institutions existed, and the Byzantine emperor ruled as an unconstrained executive. |
| 1185–1392 | 1 | Second Bulgarian Empire. The Asenid revolt of 1185 established an independent Bulgarian tsardom. Madgearu (2017) notes the Second Bulgarian Empire copied the Byzantine autocratic model. The tsar ruled without institutional constraint. Tsars Kaloyan (1197–1207), Ivan Asen II (1218–1241), and Ivan Alexander (1331–1371) ruled as autokrators. The boyar council was a group of aristocratic advisors, not an institutional constraint on the tsar. The 1211 church council at Tarnovo condemned Bogomilism as an ecclesiastical assembly rather than a political body. Under Ivan Alexander, “the costs of [his] wars were high and taxes had to be raised. At the same time his preoccupation with external affairs meant that the tsar could not check the seepage of political power from the centre to the landowning aristocracy. Once again the main victims were the peasantry” (Crampton 2005, 27). This describes weakening central authority instead of an emerging institutional constraint. The Ottomans conquered Tarnovo in July 1393 and Vidin in 1396. Score 1: no accountability group existed, and specialist sources confirm an autocratic tsardom. |
| 1393–1877 | 1 | Ottoman eyalet rule. Bulgaria ceased to exist as a state between 1396 and 1878. The empire administered the territory as Ottoman eyalets under the timar system. “There was no formal constraint on the Ottoman executive until the late nineteenth century. There was no parliament or other legislative body that could limit the Sultan’s decisions” (Henriques et al. 2026). Henriques et al. code the Ottoman executive as unconstrained at every 50-year benchmark between 1400 and 1800. “There was no legislative or representative body to limit the Sultan’s power” (Henriques et al. 2026). The millet system “was basically a minority home-rule policy based on religious affiliation” (Sugar 1977, 5). This provided ecclesiastical and personal-status autonomy but no political constraint. The Bulgarian Exarchate (1870) was a church institution within the millet framework that provided cultural and religious autonomy rather than political constraint (Daskalov 2004). Score 1: no Bulgarian polity existed, and the Ottoman sultan ruled as an unconstrained executive. |
| 1878 | 1 | Russian Provisional Administration. The Treaty of Berlin (July 1878) created the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria under Ottoman suzerainty. This treaty reduced the borders compared to the larger San Stefano Bulgaria. A Russian Provisional Administration under Prince Dondukov-Korsakov governed until leaders could draft a constitution. St Petersburg appointed and controlled this administration, while the Ottoman sultan remained suzerain. Score 1: no constitutional framework existed in force. An appointed foreign administration exercised executive authority. |
| 1879–1880 | 4 | Tarnovo Constitution. The Constituent Assembly at Tarnovo (February–April 1879) adopted a highly liberal nineteenth-century constitution. Key provisions included universal male suffrage for sane men over 21 and a single-chamber parliament (Sobranie) that met annually on three-year terms (Crampton 2005, 88–89). A Grand National Assembly managed constitutional changes and head-of-state selection. The prince held executive power but exercised it through a council of ministers chosen from the assembly. He could appoint and dismiss ministers and prorogue the Sobranie. The prince dissolved the first Sobranie, elected in September 1879, but the new elections of early 1880 returned the same liberal majority, which demonstrates the constitutional constraint operated in practice. The liberals won both early elections, and the prince had little choice but to nominate the Liberal leader, Dragan Tsankov, as prime minister (Crampton 2005, 89–90). Tension between the liberal assembly and the conservative prince drove Alexander to stage a coup in 1881. His need for a coup to break the deadlock shows the constitution genuinely constrained him. Score 4 rather than 5: the constitution provided substantial constraint through universal male suffrage, a sovereign parliament, and ministers drawn from the assembly. The dissolution power of the prince and the resulting political deadlock prevent a higher score. |
| 1881–1882 | 1 | Alexander’s coup d’état. After two dissolved Sobranies failed to produce a cooperative assembly, Alexander dismissed the Karavelov government in May 1881. He convoked a Grand National Assembly at Svishtov in July 1881. Russian military assistance and pro-Battenberg intimidation secured the election results. The Svishtov GNA passed the authoritarian proposals of Alexander in under two hours. These changes introduced a state council and made the franchise indirect. They also reduced the size of the Sobranie and restricted civil liberties. “Prince Alexander had in effect carried out a coup d’etat” (Crampton 2005, 91). He suspended the Tarnovo Constitution. Alexander then ruled through appointed conservatives and Russian generals (Sobolev and Kaulbars), while Liberals fled into exile. Score 1: the prince suspended the constitution and exercised unlimited authority. |
| 1883–1885 | 4 | Tarnovo Constitution restored. Russian generals Sobolev and Kaulbars departed in September 1883. Tsankov then formed a coalition government, and conservatives accepted a return to the Tarnovo Constitution. The assembly passed a constitutional reform bill in December 1883 “by very dubious means” (Crampton 2005, 93) but repealed it in 1884 before implementation. Karavelov’s government fully restored the Tarnovo Constitution. It pushed major legislation through the assembly to create a national bank and nationalize railways. “By the end of 1884 most of the constitutional issues raised in 1879 had been settled. The prince’s political wings had been clipped after his too rapid ascent in 1881”. The union with Eastern Rumelia in September 1885 and the war with Serbia in November 1885 expanded executive discretion. They did not suspend the constitutional framework. Score 4: the Tarnovo Constitution operated as a genuine constraint on the prince. His position weakened as the regime imposed by his 1881 coup was dismantled in 1883–84. |
| 1886–1893 | 1 | Stambolovshtina. Army officers deposed Alexander in August 1886. He returned briefly but abdicated on 7 September. A regency of Karavelov, Stambolov, and Mutkurov then governed under a state of siege. Crampton (2005, 102) details Russian interference via General Kaulbars. He also notes the regime suppressed the Silistra military conspiracy with “great brutality” as they shot eight leaders and forced soldiers to execute one in twenty men from disaffected regiments. Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha arrived in July 1887 and appointed Stambolov prime minister. The Stambolovshtina (1887–1894) was an authoritarian regime. The Tarnovo Constitution survived on paper, but police-state methods eliminated any operative constraint. Stambolov greatly expanded the secret police network after the Panitsa plot in 1890. He “prevented a meeting of the holy synod and adjusted clerical salaries — downwards” in 1886 (Crampton 2005, 107). Later, he “closed a meeting of the holy synod” using gendarmes to escort bishops back to their sees in January 1889. The regime managed elections to guarantee reliable majorities. Stambolov forced an 1893 constitutional amendment through a GNA to allow the Catholic marriage of Ferdinand. Stambolov “had in effect fulfilled his function: he had brought Ferdinand to Bulgaria and established him on his throne”. Score 1: police-state methods erased all operative constraints despite the constitution surviving on paper. |
| 1894–1895 | 3 | Stoilov ministry. Ferdinand forced Stambolov to resign in May 1894 after taking control of the war ministry in 1893. Crampton (2005, 110) notes Stoilov relaxed the strict controls of Stambolov. He allowed Macedonian organizations to operate again and dismantled the police state. Stoilov also passed an encouragement of industry bill in 1894 (Crampton 2005, 117). Ferdinand already controlled the war and foreign ministries. Score 3: the restored Sobranie provided moderate constraint during this transition. Ferdinand kept executive independence, and his control of key ministries prevents a score of 4. |
| 1896–1911 | 2 | Ferdinand’s personal rule. After Ferdinand gained international recognition in February 1896, he consolidated his dominance over Bulgarian politics. “By 1900 it was the prince who determined when the composition of a government should be changed and an election held” (Crampton 2005, 121). Ferdinand controlled the war ministry from 1893 onward, along with the foreign ministry. “[W]hen he considered it time to change government he simply had to instruct one or both of these dependent ministers to resign and the incumbent cabinet would be paralysed and forced out of office”. “Ferdinand simply operated the existing system to construct his personal rule”. He used administrative pressure to manage elections, “carried out simply to provide a newly appointed cabinet with a dependable majority in the assembly”. The 1911 Grand National Assembly at Tarnovo strengthened Ferdinand further. A constitutional amendment allowed the king and cabinet to conclude foreign treaties without parliamentary approval. This formalized his control of foreign policy and enabled the secret diplomacy that “was soon to produce dramatic results” (Crampton 2005, 131): the Balkan Wars. In contrast, the Malinov government (1908–1911) introduced proportional representation, which made electoral manipulation harder. Score 2: Ferdinand never suspended the Tarnovo Constitution, and the Sobranie continued to pass legislation. His systematic control of ministerial appointments and elections reduced the operative constraint well below the constitutional text. |
| 1912–1917 | 1 | Balkan Wars and WWI emergency. The First Balkan War (October 1912) triggered a period of almost continuous warfare. “Two days later the king and cabinet decided upon war” in September 1912 (Crampton 2005, 132–133). The government declared a state of emergency in 1914 and kept it in place through the entry of Bulgaria into WWI in October 1915. The 1911 constitutional amendment had already removed parliamentary oversight for foreign treaties. The Radoslavov government (1913–1918) relied on manufactured majorities. It manipulated the April 1914 election when it blocked opposition parties from campaigning in the new territories. Score 1: the wartime emergency suspended the already-weakened constitutional constraint. Bulgaria surrendered in September 1918. Ferdinand abdicated on 3 October 1918 and ended his personal regime. |
| 1918–1920 | 4 | Postwar parliamentary government. Ferdinand abdicated in October 1918. A coalition government under Malinov, and later Stamboliiski’s Bulgarian Agrarian National Union from 1919, governed through the Sobranie. They restored the Tarnovo Constitution and reasserted parliamentary legislative and budget authority. The post-war period established genuine parliamentary government. This system featured universal male suffrage and competitive elections alongside parliamentary oversight. The November 1919 elections returned a mixed assembly with 28 Agrarian deputies. The abdication of Ferdinand removed the architect of the personal-rule system. This weakened the monarchy and made the Sobranie the main locus of political authority. The Treaty of Neuilly imposed external constraints such as reparations and territorial losses, along with army limits. These restricted Bulgarian sovereignty but did not reduce internal parliamentary authority. Score 4: a functioning parliamentary system where the executive answered to an elected legislature under the fully operative Tarnovo Constitution. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1188 | 1 | Duchy of Bohemia. Přemyslid princely era, no institutionalized parliamentary constraint. The prince was “the sole governor. Not only was he the head of the state but the state itself” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 92). In practice, leaders elected the prince from the Přemyslid line. The magnates exercised decisive electoral leverage, and princes reigned only twelve years on average. Regular colloquia met twice yearly on the feasts of St Vitus and St Wenceslas. These functioned as gatherings of magnates and clergy without third-estate representation. Wolverton (2001, 1–3) notes freemen “assured that the duke governed according to their interests by threatening or carrying out deposition and revolt.” This operated through dynastic politics, not parliamentary procedure. The Bohemian Diet had not yet formed. The twelfth-century Bohemian parliament recorded zero meetings (van Zanden et al. 2012). Kalhous (2012, 2–3) notes the bureaucratic apparatus produced only fifteen charters before 1120. The lack of regular limitations on the executive’s actions results in a score of 1. |
| 1189–1211 | 2 | Statute of Conrad Otto (1189), the initial written constitutional limitation on ducal power. Immediately after his accession, Conrad Otto issued the Statute. It “favoured the emergent aristocracy, guaranteeing the peaceful possession of its farmlands, and establishing a judiciary” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 95). Klapště (2012, 43) confirms the principle “quod autem mea ecclesia hodie habet, auferendi dux potestatem non habet” (what my church holds today, the duke has no power to take away) emerged in this period. The magnates still held electoral power over the prince. The twelfth-century Bohemian parliament recorded zero meetings (van Zanden et al. 2012). The Statute introduced a genuine written constitutional limitation. The period also marked the transition from prince to king. Přemysl Otakar I secured a hereditary royal title in 1198, though full confirmation did not occur until the Golden Bull of 1212. A formal written constraint existed without a regular Diet holding legislative powers, resulting in a score of 2. |
| 1212–1310 | 1 | Golden Bull of Sicily (1212), hereditary kingdom confirmed and king made independent of magnate election. The Golden Bull (26 September 1212) confirmed the hereditary royal title. It recognized the election of the Bohemian ruler as an internal matter. “Ecclesiastical anointment and coronation made of the ruler the lord designated by God’s will and emphasised the sacred aspect of his person. The ruler thus became independent of his magnates and chiefs. The old Bohemian electoral diet came to an end” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 102). The event marked “a step of fundamental constitutional significance”. A landed aristocracy emerged as an independent social force from around the middle of the twelfth century (Klapště 2012, 57–58). That development represented a social-structural change rather than an institutional constraint. The thirteenth-century Bohemian parliament recorded zero meetings (van Zanden et al. 2012). The Generallandtag with third-estate representation did not yet exist. The old electoral system had constrained the prince, but the new king’s formal power lacked those limits, resulting in a score of 1. |
| 1311–1419 | 3 | Inaugural diplomas of 1311, with Estates binding powers codified. John of Luxemburg’s inaugural diplomas formed a binding compact between the king and the Estates. “The aristocracy would retain the right to elect the king and decide in the matter of extraordinary taxation, as well as the heritable right to their property and the right to choose freely whether to offer military support to the king in foreign wars. ... Royal powers were also to be restricted insofar as the king could no longer appoint foreigners to high office” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 128). The Domažlice reconciliation (1318) entrenched “the dualism of the Estates, to the division of government between the ruler and the aristocracy in the country” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 130). Charles IV attempted to codify royal prerogative in the Maiestas Carolina (1355). He withdrew the document when “Charles saw that his proposal would not fly” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 138), confirming the Estates’ legislative veto. The Generallandtag emerged with third-estate representation. “Representatives of all the Estates sat at the Land Diets, which were the most important organ of Estates’ power. Diets took place in each land and their decrees became law” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 193). The Bohemian Diet met about nine times in the fourteenth century (van Zanden et al. 2012). The constitutional framework remained stronger than the meeting count implies. The Diet controlled royal elections, taxation, military commitments, and high appointments. The constitution secured the Diet’s power over those fundamentals. The king retained the power to convoke the Diet and set the agenda, and meetings occurred far less frequently than those of comparable bodies in Castile or England. A score of 3 is appropriate. |
| 1419–1434 | 2 | Hussite Wars, Diet disrupted by civil war. The Hussite Revolution (1419 to 1434) scattered normal institutions. Wenceslas IV died in 1419, triggering a succession crisis and religious war that split the kingdom. The Land Diet met, notably at Čáslav in June 1421. Members declared the Four Articles of Prague constitutional and deposed Sigismund. The Diet functioned intermittently while rival military factions contested its authority. Pánek and Tůma (2019, 157) characterize the Hussite period by its “interregnums” and the division of the kingdom into warring camps. The moderate Utraquist nobility maintained governance structures in parts of the kingdom. The Diet’s authority remained intermittent and contested, but it still functioned in areas with recognized political authority. The situation merits a score of 2. |
| 1435–1471 | 3 | Post-Hussite restoration, Diet consolidates noble governance. The moderate Utraquist and Catholic nobility reached a settlement after the Battle of Lipany (1434). Pánek and Tůma (2019, 174) note: “As well as a poor Church it had a poor king, bound by conditions regarding succession. The combined interests of the Bohemian nobility had become an obstacle to attempts by the council and King Sigismund of total restoration of the pre-Hussite state of affairs.” Sigismund had to negotiate with the Estates to take the throne. His successor, George of Poděbrady (1458 to 1471), was an elected Hussite king bound by conditions set by the Diet. The Bohemian Diet met about nine times in the fifteenth century (van Zanden et al. 2012). Despite infrequent meetings, the Diet controlled royal elections, taxation, and religious matters. The conditions support a score of 3. |
| 1471–1526 | 3 | Jagiellon period, continued Estates dualism. The Bohemian Crown Lands shared a personal union with Hungary under Vladislav II (1471 to 1516) and Louis (1516 to 1526). Pánek and Tůma (2019, 193) note that “Representatives of all the Estates sat at the Land Diets, which were the most important organ of Estates’ power. Diets took place in each land and their decrees became law.” The 1500 Land Ordinance (Vladislavské zřízení zemské) codified noble privileges and established the Land Court. The Diet controlled taxation, legislation, and Land official appointments. Van Zanden et al. (2012) record nine fifteenth-century and thirteen sixteenth-century meetings for the Bohemian parliament. The constitutional reality outpaced the low meeting count. The Diet exercised slight to moderate executive limitation by controlling legislation, taxation, and Land offices. The king kept formal supremacy, and the Diet met rarely compared to bodies coded 4 to 5 elsewhere in Europe, resulting in a score of 3. |
| 1526–1608 | 2 | Habsburg dualism. The Diet met but centralization reduced its independence. The Bohemian Diet elected Ferdinand I king in 1526, imposing conditions to preserve Estates powers. The Habsburgs centralized systematically regardless. They defeated the 1547 Estates revolt. Ferdinand I executed rebel leaders and stripped towns of representation (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 219–220). Evans (1979, vii) notes: “[T]he consolidation of the Habsburg state rested essentially on a series of bilateral agreements between the rulers and their mightier subjects.” Nobles kept leverage while towns lost their independent voice. The 1575 Diet secured a verbal declaration of religious freedom from Maximilian II, but this “stance was not constitutionally binding” (Evans 1979, 7). The 1547 crackdown and later Habsburg patronage politics reduced the Diet from a co-governing body to a consultative assembly holding fiscal bargaining power. Van Zanden et al. (2012) report thirteen sixteenth-century meetings. The 1547 defeat broke the Diet’s initiative capacity, though the body kept formal fiscal veto rights and met regularly. A score of 2 applies. |
| 1609–1620 | 4 | Letter of Majesty (1609), Estates at peak power. The Estates extracted the Letter of Majesty from Rudolf II in exchange for backing him against his brother Matthias. The document granted formal constitutional protection for Protestant worship and established elected Defensors to enforce it. Evans (1979, 7) notes that at the stormy 1575 diet Maximilian “promised not to disturb their worship,” but his concession “was not constitutionally binding”; the 1609 Letter made it binding. Following the 1618 Defenestration of Prague, a 1619 general diet passed the Bohemian Confederation constitution. Pánek and Tůma (2019, 244): “The guiding idea of the confederation was the dominance of the Estates over the ruler, who was to be freely elected at a general diet by the representatives of all the confederate countries and whose executive power would remain under the control of representative Estates bodies.” The constitution, “in one hundred articles, its conceptions close to Western European anti-absolutist Monarchomachism, ranks among the most significant creations of Czech legal thinking in the early Modern Era”. The Estates wielded effective sovereignty and constrained the executive heavily. The eleven-year period proved too short and the regime too embattled to fully institutionalize the confederation’s formal rules, making a score of 5 inappropriate. The Estates held formal rights to elect the king, approve taxation, and manage military foreign policy, leading to a score of 4. |
| 1620–1627 | 1 | Post-White Mountain transition. The Estates rebellion ended, leading to absolutist rule. The Battle of White Mountain (8 November 1620) decisively concluded the Estates rebellion: “The Battle of White Mountain put an end to the Bohemian Estates rebellion. The demoralized Estates army fell into disorder during the battle” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 255). The Crown executed twenty-seven opposition leaders in the Old Town Square on 21 June 1621. Over 150 people lost all their property, and partial confiscation affected more than 500 noblemen. Ferdinand II appointed Karl I of Liechtenstein as royal proconsul to govern the kingdom by decree. The Diet stopped meeting. Proconsular government eliminated representative institutions entirely. The complete lack of institutional constraint on the executive leads to a score of 1. |
| 1627–1848 | 1 | Verneuerte Landesordnung (Renewed Land Ordinances, 1627) and Habsburg absolutism institutionalized for 221 years. The Crown issued the Renewed Ordinances for Bohemia in 1627 and Moravia in 1628. These “were issued without the Estates’ co-operation, solely through the sovereign’s authority” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 256). “The ruler strengthened his legislative power and the diets were left with only a passive role,” keeping the right to approve tax demands but finding that “their other rights were severely curtailed”. The Crown stripped the burgher Estate of any role, leaving it “completely robbed of the possibility of participation in the political life of the Estates society”. Land offices became strictly royal institutions answering to the Habsburg central administration. Eighteenth-century Theresian and Josephine reforms drove centralization further: “the importance of Land Diets was markedly diminished, not even being assembled to approve Land taxes and state contributions during the reign of Emperor Joseph II. Gubernia”, the Bohemian and Moravian-Silesian central administrative boards, “gained considerable superiority over the diets” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 317–318). The post-1792 era maintained “bureaucratic absolutism” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 313) where “high politics became the exclusive domain of a very narrow ruling class”. The Estates “retained their exclusive political, tax and police power over their latifundia”. This involved local seigneurial power rather than imperial executive constraint. The entire absolutist period warrants a score of 1. |
| 1848–1849 | -88 | Transition year. A revolution occurred, followed by constitutional reversal. The March 1848 Revolution forced Emperor Ferdinand I to dismiss Metternich, promise a constitution, convene a Reichstag, and resolve the subject-labor question (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 345). The 8 April 1848 imperial rescript met Czech national demands, promising a regularly elected Land Diet and a Land government. The Reichstag gathered in Vienna, then Kroměříž (Kremsier), to draft a liberal constitution. The imposed 4 March 1849 Stadion constitution promised a constitutional monarchy featuring a two-chamber parliament and extensive civil rights. The army dissolved the Reichstag on 7 March 1849 before members could pass the Kroměříž constitution. The Stadion constitution failed to take root: “because of the continuing wars it never came into effect”. The Bohemian Diet never convened. The emperor kept all real power. The -88 transition code captures this brief, failed constitutional opening. The regime shifted toward a constrained executive (score 2) but reverted to absolutism before locking in formal constraints. Both pre-transition and post-transition scores are 1. |
| 1850–1860 | 1 | Neo-absolutism, the Bach system. The New Year’s Eve Patent (31 December 1851) formally revoked the imposed constitution and restored absolute government. Pánek and Tůma (2019, 356): “The political system of an absolute monarchy was visibly renewed.” Minister of the Interior Alexander Bach ran “a perfect centralized machine” of police and bureaucratic control (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 358). Pánek and Tůma (2019, 357–358): “Czech liberal politics lost its legal platform. The liberal opposition press was silenced and all political and cultural activities were systematically repressed.” The emperor “believed in his absolute powers and the favour of divine Providence”. The Crown never meaningfully summoned the Land Diets. A score of 1 applies. |
| 1861–1917 | 3 | December Constitution monarchy. Constitutional monarchy under the February Patent (1861) and December Constitution (1867). The October Diploma (1860) promised Land Diets and a Reichstag. The February Patent (1861) created a bicameral Reichsrat with legislative authority (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 366). The December Constitution (1867) established conditions “limiting the ruler’s decision-making power by requiring counter-signatures by the pertinent ministers” (Pánek and Tůma 2019, 370). This included six basic constitutional laws covering general civic rights, court independence, and ministerial responsibility to govern “in accordance with the passed laws”. The Reichsrat functioned as “a true co-decision-making body”. The state introduced direct Reichsrat elections in 1873 and universal male suffrage in 1907. The emperor kept his veto, the right to dissolve the Reichsrat, control over ministerial appointments, and Article 14 emergency decree authority. The curial electoral system restricted democratic representation until 1907, and Czech-German national conflicts frequently stalled the Reichsrat. Parliament held legislative and budgetary power, but the emperor actively used substantial reserve authorities. The emperor routinely used these reserve powers and national conflict reduced the Reichsrat’s effectiveness, leading to a score of 3. |
| 1918 | 5 | Czechoslovak independence. Czechoslovak independence declared 28 October 1918. Czechoslovakia declared independence. A provisional National Committee (Národní výbor) took power, issuing Law No. 11/1918 to establish a provisional constitutional framework and vest legislative power in the National Assembly. Pánek and Tůma (2019, 437–438) describe the new state as a democratic republic from day one. The provisional institutions were not fully operational at that time. The National Assembly held its first full session on 14 November 1918, and the February 1920 provisional constitution was not yet in force. A score of 5 captures the substantial but incomplete legislative constraint on the executive during the transition to independence. |
| 1919–1920 | 7 | Independent Czechoslovakia. Parliamentary democracy became fully established. By 1919, the National Assembly met regularly with full legislative authority. The February 1920 constitution created a fully democratic system involving an elected two-chamber parliament, an independent judiciary, proportional representation, and broad civil rights. A fully sovereign parliamentary democracy enjoying effective legislative supremacy warrants a score of 7. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1079 | 1 | Early elective monarchy. Early elective monarchy operated without formal institutional constraints. Provincial things (landsting) elected or acclaimed kings but did not constrain royal authority. Jespersen (2004, 32): “According to the constitution, Denmark was an elective monarchy, and the state council of higher nobles had the right to appoint the new king.” This appointment right served as a theoretical limit. In practice, rulers came from the dominant dynasty and no institutional mechanism controlled royal action. Bagge (2014, 50–68) notes that early Scandinavian kingdoms were rudimentary states with little administrative capacity. Kinship networks and the threat of rebellion checked royal power rather than formal institutions. The system lacked a representative body and a fiscal consent mechanism. The score is 1 instead of 2 because Jespersen and Bagge identify the constraints as dynastic and kin-based rather than institutional. |
| 1080–1168 | 2 | Magnate and ecclesiastical resistance. Magnate and ecclesiastical resistance constrained the executive without formal institutions. Jespersen (2004, 33): “the leaders of the Catholic Church were, until their arrest, the most prominent and powerful faction in the state council, which, alongside the king, formed the true political leadership of the country.” The state council lacked defined powers, yet archbishops and magnates formed a power center capable of checking the king. The system lacked formal institutions for royal consultation and regular fiscal consent. The score is 2 instead of 1 because Jespersen describes the church and magnate faction as co-equal to the king in “the true political leadership of the country,” which places the system above zero accountability. The score is 2 instead of 3 because no formalized assembly or written charter constrained the executive. |
| 1169–1281 | 3 | Rise of the Danehof. The Danehof emerged as a periodic assembly with limited influence. Valdemar I (reigned 1157 to 1182) consolidated rule in 1169 and began calling the Danehof as a consultative assembly of magnates and clergy. Jespersen (2004, 32): “According to the constitution, Denmark was an elective monarchy, and the state council of higher nobles had the right to appoint the new king.” Valdemar formalized this appointment function, which raises the score above 2. Riis (1977, 8): “une fonction importante de ces assemblées fut d’élire un nouveau roi.” The assemblies elected kings, which established a structural constitutional role. The Danehof held judicial power and influenced taxation (Riis 1977). Bagge (2014, 149): “In Denmark, King Erik V Klipping had to issue the first håndfæstning (originally: ‘written obligation’) in Scandinavian history, in which he promised to respect the rights of the ‘people,’ in practice meaning the aristocracy.” This action foreshadowed the 1282 charter and confirmed the Danehof’s expanding constitutional role. A score of 3 reflects a working consultative body with limited influence. The score is 3 instead of 2 because Riis verifies the king-electing function as a structural constraint. The score is 3 instead of 5 because the assembly did not meet annually and no written charter bound the executive. |
| 1282–1294 | 5 | Erik V Klipping’s håndfæstning. Erik V Klipping’s håndfæstning created an institutionally constrained executive. Bain (1905, 6): “In 1282 the nobles extorted from King Eric Glipping the first Haandfastung or charter, which made the Danehof, or Great Council, a regular and legitimate branch of the administration.” Riis (1977, 10, 219) notes that the 1282 charter forced the king to convene parliament every year. The charter established fiscal and judicial rules. The king needed Danehof consent to levy taxes and pass laws. The constitution mandated annual meetings. The score is 5 instead of 4 because the written charter required annual meetings, fiscal consent, and judicial authority. The score is 5 instead of 7 because the assembly lacked independent legislative initiative and ministers were not accountable to it. |
| 1295–1319 | 4 | Rigsråd ascendancy. The Danehof declined as the Rigsråd became a permanent corporate constraint. Skovgaard-Petersen (2003, 363–364): “From the end of the 1280s it ceased to meet annually, and was of little importance in Erik’s later years, whereas the royal council, which can be regarded as the most influential part of the Danehof, became an increasingly important political corporation.” The Rigsråd (royal council of nobles) functioned as a permanent corporate body that spoke for the realm. It lacked the strict annual meeting rule of the 1282 charter, and its membership was smaller than the full Danehof. The score is 4 instead of 5 because the shift to the narrower Rigsråd reduced the scope and regularity of constraint compared to the charter-mandated Danehof. The score is 4 instead of 3 because the Rigsråd operated as a permanent institution authorized to speak for the realm. |
| 1320–1439 | 4 | Election charters and a divided fourteenth century. Christoffer II’s håndfæstning (1320) made election charters a binding condition for taking the throne. Bagge (2014, 149): “monarchy became elective in Denmark and Sweden from the early fourteenth century... the council in practice became the elective body.” The charter regime did not yet deliver continuous conciliar government. The dynastic upheavals that followed were driven by the king’s German mortgagees, who controlled most of the country during the interregnum of 1332 to 1340 (Bagge 2014, 163), and Valdemar IV then spent two decades “transforming his nominal rule over the country into a real kingship” (Bagge 2014, 243), recovering royal lands that members of the aristocracy had appropriated (Bagge 2014, 250). Bagge (2014, 271–272) dates the definitive institutionalization of conciliar government to just after the rebellion against Erik of Pomerania in the 1430s: “From the mid-fifteenth century, the councils in all three countries consisted of members of the top aristocracy and the bishops, and they took over the decision-making functions of the larger assemblies.” The score is 4 instead of 5 because the elective monarchy and binding charters were real constraints, but the fourteenth-century council could not sustain continuous control of taxation, war, and legislation against a reasserting king. The score is 4 instead of 3 because the charter requirement and the council’s elective role were institutionalized and recognized. |
| 1440–1659 | 5 | Aristocratic council monarchy. From the deposition of Erik of Pomerania, the Rigsråd controlled taxation, war, legislation, and royal succession. Bagge (2014, 235): “The later Middle Ages is the age of aristocracy... the council of the realm is at the height of its power.” The formalization of conciliar government “took place after the deposition of Erik of Pomerania in 1439–1442”, and “[a] country’s council now became the aristocracy’s main tool for limiting the king’s power” (Bagge 2014, 272). Kouri and Olesen (2016, 7): “In Denmark the aristocracy was victorious and the power of the council increased as an institution keeping royal power under control.” Before Christian II took power in 1513, Ylikangas (2016, 105) notes: “the council declared itself the true ruler of the country. It rejected the very suggestion of a hereditary monarchy.” During the later phase of the Kalmar Union, the Rigsråd defended Danish sovereignty against union kings. Christian III arrested the Catholic bishops and seized church lands in 1536 but left the Rigsråd intact. The post-Reformation settlement formed an aristocratic “dyarchy” (Jespersen 2004, 35) where the king and secular councilors shared sovereignty. Van Zanden et al. (2012) set 1468 as the start date for Denmark in their parliamentary meetings series, which marks the first Rigsdag with a third estate. This event widened representation but left the constraint level unchanged because the Rigsråd remained the primary check on power. The score is 5 because the Rigsråd controlled taxation, war, and legislation, the monarchy remained formally elective, and the king could not rule against the wishes of the council. The score is 5 instead of 7 because the system lacked ministerial accountability to an elected assembly. |
| 1660–1830 | 1 | Danish absolutism. The Crown installed a hereditary monarchy, abolished the Rigsråd, and assumed unlimited power. The 1660 transition centralized authority. Jespersen (2004, 41): “Using loyal troops, he blockaded Copenhagen and made it clear to the confined representatives of the nobles that they had no choice but to agree to the proposal. In other words, he virtually staged a coup.” The Crown ended the elective monarchy and voided the 1648 constitution. The Lex Regia (Kongelov, 14 November 1665) “confirmed that the king had unlimited powers” (Jespersen 2004, 42). The king disbanded the Rigsråd, leaving only an advisory privy council (Gehejmekonseil). Jespersen: “Uniquely in the history of European absolutism, just five years later... the king issued a special Lex Regia... [which] served as the absolutist constitution right up to the demise of absolutism in 1848.” Kouri and Olesen (2016, 13): “Denmark’s government was more centralised due to its ‘bureaucratic absolutism’. The Danish realm... did not offer its subjects much in the way of opportunities for political influence.” The 1784 to 1801 agrarian reforms “actually prolonged Danish absolutism by 60 years” (Jespersen 2004, 57). The regime met reform demands and relieved revolutionary pressure without creating institutional constraints. The score is 1 because there was no legislative assembly, no accountability, and the king ruled by decree with only an advisory council. |
| 1831–1848 | 2 | Provincial estate assemblies. The advisory stænderforsamlinger functioned as consultative bodies. The Crown convened four provincial advisory assemblies of the estates in 1834. Jespersen (2004, 63): “even though the government tried to keep these assemblies on a tight rein, they soon became meeting points for the opposition.” These assemblies were consultative. They petitioned and advised the crown. They lacked legislative power, a tax veto, and mechanisms to force the government’s hand. Jespersen: “The last 15–20 years of absolutism were a long rearguard action.” The score is 2 instead of 1 because formal consultative assemblies provided a forum for political expression. The score is 2 instead of 3 because the assemblies lacked legislative power, held no veto, and could not bind the executive. |
| 1849–1865 | 6 | June Constitution. The June Constitution established a bicameral Rigsdag, universal male suffrage, and separation of powers. The March 1848 revolution ended absolutism. The June Constitution (5 June 1849) created a “restricted monarchy” (Jespersen 2004, 61). Jespersen: “power was shared between the executive (the king), the legislature (the parliament) and the judiciary (the courts)... the three components of state were intended to complement each other through a system of checks and balances.” The framework featured a bicameral parliament (Folketing and Landsting) with legislative and taxation power. It included universal male suffrage, an independent judiciary, and a requirement for ministerial countersignatures on executive acts. The king retained the power to appoint ministers regardless of the parliamentary majority, though those ministers answered to parliament. Jespersen: “Compared to the constitutions of many other countries, that of Denmark was very democratic, not least in terms of the extent of franchise.” The score is 6 instead of 5 because the constitution established separation of powers with an independent judiciary and universal suffrage for the Folketing. The score is 6 instead of 7 because the king retained the right to name ministers against the Folketing majority, so full parliamentary government was not realized in 1849. |
| 1866–1900 | 4 | Estrup-era Landsting veto. The revised constitution strengthened the Landsting and established a conservative veto over the Folketing. The 1866 constitutional revision “transformed the Landsting into a genuinely conservative political force” (Jespersen 2004, 66). The king appointed twelve Landsting members. The remaining 54 were indirectly elected, with the largest taxpayers controlling half the seats. This setup let landowners “effectively block any progressive proposals from the Folketing”. Jansson (2016, 915): “the constitutional amendments of 1866 produced a situation in which the folketing was unable to achieve anything.” During the Estrup era (1875 to 1894), the conservative Prime Minister ran the state on provisional budgets to bypass Folketing approval. Jespersen (2004, 67): “The Prime Minister thus clearly demonstrated that he was ready to give as good as he got, and would not hesitate to use every power the constitution allowed him to fight for the king’s right to freely appoint his ministers.” The score is 4 instead of 6 because the Landsting could veto reform and the government bypassed the Folketing on budgets. The score is 4 instead of 3 because the constitutional framework (separation of powers, ministerial countersignature, and an independent judiciary) remained intact, and the Folketing survived as an opposition forum. |
| 1901–1914 | 6 | The Systemskifte. The Systemskifte established a parliamentary government backed by a Folketing majority. The 1901 election defeated the Conservative party (Højre) and left them with 8 out of 114 Folketing seats. King Christian IX accepted the result and appointed the first Venstre (Liberal) government led by a Folketing majority on 24 July 1901. Jespersen (2004, 70): “From that point on, parliamentarianism was adopted as political practice in Denmark, and, with one serious exception, it has been respected ever since, even though it was not made formal until the constitutional amendment of 1953.” The king’s right to name ministers freely ended in practice. This right had been the core dispute of a constitutional fight from 1865 to 1901. The score is 6 instead of 4 because the government answered directly to the elected Folketing majority. The score is 6 instead of 7 because this parliamentary practice lacked legal codification, and the conservative veto of the Landsting remained on paper until 1953. |
| 1915–1920 | 7 | Easter Crisis. The 1920 Easter Crisis confirmed universal suffrage and parliamentary supremacy. The 1915 constitutional revision introduced universal male and female suffrage and completed the democratization of the 1849 constitution. The 1920 Easter Crisis demonstrated parliamentary supremacy. King Christian X dismissed the government “on his own initiative,” and named a replacement without parliamentary support. This “provoked such widespread political and popular unrest that he immediately had to pull in his horns and put together a government which matched the majority in the Folketing” (Jespersen 2004, 70). Jespersen: the monarchy’s role then shifted to “being an institution of mainly symbolic function and a figurehead of state.” The score is 7 because the system featured universal suffrage, parliamentary accountability, and democratic pushback that defeated the executive’s attempt to exercise independent authority. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1187 | 2 | Anglo-Saxon and Norman kingship. Anglo-Saxon and Norman kingship featured advisory assemblies without enforceable constraints. The witan advised and consented but lacked the power to routinely block the king. Maddicott (2010, 33–34): “Could the assembly act independently to restrain the king? … the limitations on kingship … were no more than moral and admonitory in substance.” Crisis episodes (thegns imposing terms on Æthelred’s return in 1014; Edward the Confessor swearing to maintain Cnut’s laws in 1041) were “conceivable only in extremis” (Maddicott, 37). Following the Conquest, assemblies kept a consensual character. Maddicott (101–102) notes: “That permanent changes in the law required the collective consent of the baronage, given in council, is the nearest we come to a constitutional rule in the twelfth century.” Coronation charters established written promises but lacked an enforcement mechanism. According to Maddicott (101), “once the king was established, electoral promises could be ignored.” Score 2 instead of 1 because the king was not formally absolute. Law-making, taxation and war required conciliar participation, and the assembly retained the ability to act in a crisis. |
| 1188–1214 | 3 | Angevin consent to taxation. Taxation became tied to consent. The Saladin Tithe (1188) was the first general tax “authorized by common counsel” (Maddicott, 104). Richard I’s ransom levy (1193–1194) gained approval “by common assent” (Diceto, in Maddicott, 120). The bishops of Lincoln and Salisbury refused to approve Richard’s military aid at the 1197 Oxford council. This marked “the first clear case of the refusal of a money grant demanded directly by the crown” (Stubbs, in Maddicott, 121). By 1200, “it had become established quite rapidly, though as yet only as a matter of convention, that consent should be sought for national taxes” (Maddicott, 120). Score 3. A defined action category (taxation) required assembly consent, though the assembly lacked institutional permanence and the constraint covered only extraordinary levies. |
| 1215–1294 | 3 | Magna Carta settlement. Magna Carta codified consent and parliament took institutional form. Magna Carta (1215) formalized this rule: the crown could levy no general aid without common counsel (caps. 12, 14). A papal bull annulled the 1215 charter within months (Holt 2015, 9), but the principle survived through reissues. By the 1225 great council, “direct taxation had come to depend irrevocably on conciliar consent” (Maddicott, 119). The 1225 fifteenth was “a parliamentary grant in all but name.” The fiscal consent principle was rooted by the mid-thirteenth century. The Commons remained marginal. Burgesses were called only to “listen or reply” (Marongiu 1968, 91). Score 3 holds throughout. A firm constraint applied to taxation, but the assembly had not yet become a permanent institution with broad legislative power. |
| 1295–1326 | 4 | Model Parliament to Edward II’s deposition. Edward I’s 1295 parliament called knights and burgesses from every shire, and in his later parliaments Edward saw to it that they carried plenipotentiary powers (Myers 1975, 57). Confirmatio Cartarum (1297) legally bound the king to secure parliamentary consent for taxation. The Ordinances (1311) forced the king to obtain baronial assent to appoint ministers, launch wars and mount royal expeditions. Harriss (1975, 77) notes that “the opposition sought to make parliament the principal agency for fettering the King’s authority.” The 1322 Statute of York codified that the state must settle matters in parliament with community consent. Parliament deposed Edward II in 1327. Maddicott (vii) describes “the parliamentary commons, the knights from the shires and the burgesses from the towns, fully engaged for the first time in a great national act of state.” Score 4. Parliament secured constraints across taxation, legislation, war and ministerial appointments, enforcing them by deposing a king. The score caps at 4 because the Commons remained in a petitioner role without legislative initiative, and the Crown retained the power to call and dissolve sessions. |
| 1327–1398 | 4 | The fourteenth-century high-medieval parliament. Van Zanden et al. clock 78 meetings per century, the highest frequency in Europe at the time. The 1340 crisis formally tied tax grants to the redress of grievances. This established the Commons as an independent political force. By mid-century, “the most formal royal legislative acts, known as statutes, could only be made in, and with the assent of, Parliament” (Ormrod 1999, 20). The Good Parliament (1376) and Merciless Parliament (1388) impeached ministers and secured concessions. “What touched all required the approval of all. Only a full parliament could provide the form of central assent which would be accepted as authoritative and binding” (Harriss 1975, 93). From the 1360s, “the superiority of statutes over ordinances by the king and council, and their universal authority over all men in the realm” relied on the legal consensus that parliament “represents the body of the realm” (Harriss 2005, 71). The score caps at 4. The Commons remained subordinate to the Lords, and the Crown still called and dismissed parliament at will. Richard II spent the era building an independent royal authority model, and his success in the 1390s demonstrates that parliamentary constraint was not permanent. |
| 1399–1412 | 5 | Lancastrian usurpation. Early Lancastrian parliament created a king. The 1399 deposition of Richard II transferred the crown strictly by parliamentary authority. Henry IV’s title rested on the institution that crowned him, giving parliament unprecedented leverage over the executive. The Commons secured concessions on supply. The Lancastrian settlement formalized the rule that the redress of grievances must precede any grant. Van Zanden et al.’s fifteenth-century count of 67 meetings places England near the top by European standards. Henriques et al. code 1400=5 and 1450=5, noting parliament “influenced decisions on foreign politics, had a legislative role and approved extraordinary taxation.” Score 5 reflects a parliament whose consent was foundational. The king could not govern without it, even though the Crown retained executive initiative. |
| 1413–1460 | 4 | Later Lancastrian period. Henry V (1413–1422) used parliament for war finance, reducing its independence. During Henry VI’s reign (1422–1461, with the king medically unfit from 1453), parliaments met regularly, but magnate factions increasingly controlled them. The Wars of the Roses (starting in 1455) left parliament intact but removed its independent constraint as civil conflict overtook constitutional politics. Score 4. The formal architecture survived, with parliament legally controlling taxes and laws, but operative constraint fractured. The Crown’s military requirements and factional conflict eliminated parliament’s bargaining power. |
| 1461–1484 | 3 | Yorkist fiscal independence. Edward IV established financial autonomy using domain revenues, trade ventures and a French pension secured by the 1475 Treaty of Picquigny. He called six parliaments in 22 years. Hause and Maltby (1999, 344): “The proceeds from these efforts, together with a pension extorted from Louis XI … left him largely independent of Parliament.” This broke the link between supply and parliamentary leverage. Richard III’s brief reign (1483–1485) followed the same pattern. Score 3. Formal constraints remained on paper, as the king legally needed parliament to tax, but the executive rarely had to test them. Henriques et al. code 1450=5 for the Lancastrian period. The drop from 5 to 3 in 1461 reflects a shift in operative constraint. |
| 1485–1528 | 4 | Early Tudor period. Henry VII called six or seven parliaments in 24 years. The Crown took control of the Speaker and directed procedural management. The core constitutional principle survived. According to Russell (1971, 38), “the king could not impose full-scale taxes except by the consent of Parliament.” Furthermore, “[i]f the king wanted something to have the indisputable force of law, he had to get it passed by both houses of Parliament and embodied in a statute” (Russell 1971, 38–39). Benevolences and forced loans occurred concurrently, but their legality was contested and their effectiveness limited. Henriques et al. code 1500=4, and the van Zanden et al. data records 59 meetings for England in the sixteenth century. Score 4: the formal fiscal and legislative constraints remained binding, although Henry VII’s fiscal discipline made parliament a low-frequency event and royal procedural control peaked. The score is 4 instead of 5 because the Crown retained the initiative and parliament met only at the king’s convenience. |
| 1529–1602 | 3 | Reformation to Elizabeth. The Reformation Parliament (1529–1536) demonstrated that major legislative programs still required parliamentary enactment. Henry VIII told parliament in 1543 that “we at no time stand so highly in our estate royal as in time of Parliament, wherein we as head and you as members are conjoined and knit together into one body politic” (Russell 1971, 42). The Tudor monarchy, however, “‘debased’ the legislative role of the Parliament and exerted more royal control over the representatives” (Henriques et al. 2026, citing Keir 1973, 99, 139). Russell (1971, 44) describes a “one-party state.” Parliament could veto expensive policies but had no role in shaping them. By 1601, the Elizabethan financial system “had reached the point of breakdown” (Russell 2011, 2). Crown revenue fell to 1.5% of GNP, and “there was no likelihood of remedying it by parliamentary actions”. Score 3. Formal fiscal and legislative constraints remained, but Tudor management left the Crown facing little organized opposition outside major crises. |
| 1603–1641 | 4 | Early Stuart period. James I inherited a structural fiscal crisis. Russell (2011, 5–6) notes that “parliaments … could not consent to the sums of taxation the Crown needed.” Charles I’s parliaments grew hostile, imposing the 1628 Petition of Right on the Crown to counter arbitrary imprisonment and forced loans. The 1640 Long Parliament passed the Triennial Act, then abolished the Star Chamber and Ship Money. By May and June of 1641, parliamentary leadership openly demanded “some share in executive power” and requested that their leaders receive key offices (Russell 1971, 330). Score 4. Parliament obtained institutional concessions from the king and demanded direct influence over executive appointments. The Crown’s fiscal dependence provided the Commons with leverage that was absent under the Tudors. |
| 1642–1648 | 2 | Civil War. Both sides claimed constitutional legitimacy. Charles I initiated the war by “ceremonially raising his standard at Nottingham on 22 August 1642 and summoning his subjects to aid him in suppressing the rebellion headed by the Earl of Essex” (Woolrych 2002, 234). Parliament seized London and the fiscal-military apparatus. Armed force directly challenged the executive’s authority. Parliamentary armies imposed constraints on the Crown through battlefield victories, operating outside the constitutional process. Score 2 instead of 1 because the constitutional dispute persisted, rather than settling into absolutism. The constraint mechanism, however, was open war instead of institutionalized accountability. |
| 1649–1652 | 4 | Commonwealth (Rump Parliament). The state abolished the monarchy and House of Lords in 1649. Worden (1974, 2) writes of “the Commons thereafter assuming the title of ‘the parliament’ and a monopoly of both legislative and executive power.” The Commons declared that the people “have the supreme power in this nation.” Parliament functioned as both legislature and executive. This structure makes the XCONST metric difficult to map, as there was no distinct executive to constrain. Score 4 reflects the paper sovereignty of a parliament claiming absolute authority. However, the army supported the regime, its social base was narrow, and it excluded royalist factions entirely. |
| 1653–1659 | 1 | Protectorate. Cromwell governed as Lord Protector under the 1653 Instrument of Government. He commanded the army, and parliamentary control over the executive lapsed. Cromwell summoned parliaments, encountered non-cooperation, and dissolved them. From 1655 to 1657, the Major-Generals administered England directly under military rule. Henriques et al. (2026) note: “The parliamentary rebellion that ensued led to the abolition of the monarchy, but not to Parliamentary sovereignty.” Score 1. The executive faced no regular limits on its actions, and parliament existed at the Protector’s discretion. |
| 1660–1688 | 4 | Restoration. Charles II returned “to take over the constitution of 1641” (Russell 1971, 397). Russell (1971, 397) notes: “King and gentry resumed their partnership.” The Cavalier Parliament (1661–1679) began loyal but soon demonstrated independent legislative authority by passing the 1673 Test Act and 1679 Habeas Corpus. Between 1681 and 1685, Charles II bypassed parliament entirely, operating the state on French subsidies without attempting to abolish the institution. James II (1685–1688) challenged the Restoration settlement. He suspended statutes by prerogative fiat, filled parliament with loyalists, and prosecuted the Seven Bishops. His 1688 overthrow demonstrated that parliament remained the ultimate arbiter. Score 4. The formal constraint architecture requiring tax consent and legislative assent remained intact. The Crown retained the initiative, however, and could govern without parliament for years at a time. |
| 1689–1760 | 6 | The post-Glorious Revolution settlement. The 1689 Bill of Rights and the ensuing financial settlement eliminated royal fiscal independence. Brewer (1989, 21) writes that the mid-century upheavals “showed just how difficult it was for the monarch — or any head of the executive — to dispense with parliament.” After 1688, “it quickly became a cardinal principle that the polity had to be ruled by king and parliament, or, to be more precise, by king in parliament” (Brewer 1989, 22). The Commons established Commissions of Public Accounts and rejected government excise proposals. The 1701 Act of Settlement removed placemen from the Commons. Under Anne, a 1706 standing order granted the Crown a monopoly on proposing money bills. This constrained private members while reinforcing parliament’s gatekeeping role. The 1716 Septennial Act extended parliaments to seven-year terms, reducing electoral accountability, but the Crown’s formal dependence on parliament remained absolute. Brewer (xix) notes: “Public scrutiny reduced peculation, parliamentary consent lent greater legitimacy to government action.” Berman (2019, 45) adds: “What Britain became after the Glorious Revolution was an aristocratic oligarchy, but one with a constitution institutionalizing some liberal rights and a strong, national parliament that provided representation to the elite and could check the Crown.” Score 6 instead of 7 because the Crown retained foreign-policy initiative and used Treasury patronage for political management. Parliament constrained the executive but did not subordinate it. |
| 1761–1783 | 5 | George III and the “King’s Friends.” George III attempted to reassert royal prerogative and break the Whig ascendancy. The Crown used Treasury patronage to build a loyal parliamentary bloc called “the King’s Friends.” Contemporaries viewed this influence as excessive. Dunning’s Resolution (1780, HC Deb, 6 April 1780) declared that “the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.” The American War (1775–1783) exposed the limits of parliamentary control. The executive pursued an unpopular war that Parliament initially authorized but could not redirect. Burke’s 1782 Economical Reform Acts targeted the material roots of Crown influence directly. They abolished sinecures, removed voting rights from revenue officers, and disqualified government contractors. The collapse of Lord North’s ministry in March 1782, after losing the Commons’ confidence, demonstrated that parliamentary constraint survived. The necessity of these reforms, however, indicated structural weakness. Henriques et al. code 1750=6. Score 5. Systematic Crown management of the Commons weakened operative constraint. |
| 1784–1831 | 6 | Pitt the Younger to the Reform Act. Pitt the Younger’s ministry (1784–1801) advanced administrative reform, eliminating 104 customs offices between 1784 and 1797. The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815) required large parliamentary grants, and the Commons applied direct scrutiny. Fiscal oversight became institutionalized. The unreformed parliament, however, remained “essentially an aristocratic oligopoly dominated by an Anglican landowning elite” (Berman 2019, 186). This elite held a monopoly on the cabinet, civil service, army, Lords, and Commons. Score 6. Formal constraints functioned, but parliament’s restricted social base meant the system served an oligarchy. Dincecco (2009) dates limited government in England to 1688. |
| 1832–1866 | 6 | Post-Reform Act. The 1832 Reform Act increased the electorate by roughly 50% and eliminated rotten boroughs. Berman (2019, 195) notes that “its supporters viewed it … as a way of preventing democratization.” Landowners maintained control of the cabinet, civil service, and Commons. The 1846 repeal of the Corn Laws demonstrated that parliament could override landed interests. This confirmed the Commons’ independence from the Crown and aristocratic economic power. Score 6. The Reform Act improved parliamentary accountability, but property restrictions limited the franchise, and the Lords retained full veto power. |
| 1867–1910 | 6 | Second and Third Reform Acts. The 1867 Reform Act roughly doubled the electorate by enfranchising urban male householders. The 1872 Ballot Act introduced the secret ballot. Berman (201) calls this “a major blow against electoral corruption.” The 1884 Act expanded the franchise further, allowing two out of three men in England and Wales to vote. The House of Lords, however, retained its veto. It rejected Irish Home Rule in 1893 and operated without major limitations until 1911. A Prime Minister answering to the Commons directed the executive, but the Lords could still block legislation. Score 6. Executive constraint expanded, but the bicameral system with an unreformed upper house kept the score below 7. |
| 1911–1920 | 7 | Parliament Act. The 1911 Parliament Act removed the Lords’ veto over money bills and reduced their delaying power to two years. Berman (202–203) calls this “marking a definitive break with the aristocratic oligarchic order that had ruled Britain since 1688.” The 1918 Representation of the People Act introduced universal manhood suffrage (all men 21+, women 30+). The Crown’s executive power operated through a Prime Minister who answered to a democratically elected House of Commons. The Lords retained a suspensory veto. Score 7. Accountability groups, including the Commons and the voters, hold effective authority matching or exceeding the executive in most areas. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1361 | 1 | Pre-Swedish Finnish tribes. There were no representative institutions. Before Swedish integration, the Finnish tribes “differed from each other in many respects and were often hostile to each other” (Klinge 1990, 10–16). After the Swedish crusades (c. 1150–1293), Finland became part of the Kingdom of Sweden. It did not have separate representative institutions, and the Swedish Riksdag did not yet exist. Jutikkala and Pirinen (1988, 19–20) note: “No unified state evolved among the Finnish tribes. Within the framework of smaller areas, however, measures of social organization were taken for the supervision of religious rites, the administration of justice, and defense against aggressors.” Score 1: no accountability group checked the executive. |
| 1362–1434 | 2 | The 1362 royal-election charter. A 1362 charter allowed the Finnish lagman (the highest magistrate) and Finnish diocese representatives to participate in electing Swedish kings. This gave them equal status with other parts of the kingdom. Klinge (1990, 22): “The right of representatives of the Finnish body of lagman (law-man = the country’s highest magistrate) to participate in the election of the King was confirmed in 1362. This legal system, together with the four-estate representation (the nobility, the clergy, the burghers and the farmers) which had developed since the beginning of the 15th century, gave Finland indisputable and full political rights within the Kingdom of Sweden.” The four-estate Riksdag had not fully developed at this time. Finns exercised their 1362 rights through the lagman rather than through regular parliamentary sessions. Jutikkala and Pirinen (1988, 37–38) identify the 15 February 1362 charter as the basis of Finnish political rights. Score 2: the arrangement placed some constraints on royal discretion. This is above a 1, but below a 3 because there was no regular accountability group with substantive powers. |
| 1435–1522 | 2 | Riksdag of the Four Estates. The first Riksdag of the Four Estates dates to 1435 in Arboga. Klinge (1990, 19–22): “This legal system, together with the four-estate representation (the nobility, the clergy, the burghers and the farmers) which had developed since the beginning of the 15th century, gave Finland indisputable and full political rights within the Kingdom of Sweden.” Jutikkala and Pirinen (1988, 54): “It was during the conflicts of the period of the Scandinavian Union that the Swedish parliamentary system was born, and the Finns also were represented in the Diet of Four Estates.” The king required consent from the estates for extraordinary taxes and major legislation. However, meetings were irregular and the king retained the initiative. Score 2: the representative assembly had fiscal-consent powers, but the king controlled the initiative and meetings were infrequent. |
| 1523–1544 | 3 | Reign of Gustavus Vasa. The end of the Kalmar Union under Gustavus Vasa established a national Swedish monarchy. At the 1527 Diet of Västerås, the king required the estates to support the Reformation and appropriate church property (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 55–60). The Riksdag met only when summoned by the king, but he still required its consent for taxes and constitutional changes. “So successfully did Gustavus Vasa augment his position that in 1544 the system of elected kings was replaced with an hereditary monarchy” (Klinge 1990, 34). This eliminated elective kingship as a constraint, but the Riksdag continued to function. Score 3: the Riksdag had fiscal and legislative powers, while the king controlled the summons and the agenda. |
| 1545–1717 | 3 | Swedish Age of Greatness. The Riksdag met regularly to approve extraordinary taxes and participate in legislation. Finnish representation continued during this time. Finnish nobles had seats in the House of Nobility (constructed in 1626), and Finnish clergy, burghers, and peasants participated through their own estates. “With Stockholm the final home of central administration and with the Diet firmly rooted there through the erection of the first parliament building, the House of Nobility, the town exerted an influence on all parts of the Kingdom” (Klinge 1990, 36). The 1634 Form of Government established an aristocratic Council of the Realm (Riksråd) to share executive power, introducing an aristocratic constraint. This gave the Council a constitutional role. “Moreover, the Diet was not always convened in full to make decisions in the sphere of foreign policy” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 93–94). Van Zanden et al. (2012, Appendix S1) record 19 parliament meetings for Sweden in the sixteenth century and 35 in the 17th. Score 3: constraints remained consistent during this period. |
| 1718–1771 | 5 | Swedish Age of Liberty. Charles XII died without an heir in 1718, leading to a constitutional shift. The 1719 Form of Government, revised in 1720, transferred executive power from the king to the Council of the Realm, which was accountable to the Riksdag. The 1719 Form of Government “fundamentally limited the authority of the ruler” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 119). The Riksdag met every three years or annually. It directed foreign policy through the Secret Committee and managed taxes and legislation. “The primary purpose of the Form of Government was to fix rigid limits to the authority of the monarch... According to the Form of Government, the Council of the Realm was the highest department of the government” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 123–124). The king had a limited formal role. The system operated as an aristocratic oligarchy. Nobles controlled the Secret Committee, leaving the lower estates with less authority. Score 5: executive limits approached parity but had an aristocratic bias. Lower estates (burghers, farmers) lacked influence. |
| 1772–1808 | 2 | Gustavian absolutism. King Gustavus III took control in August 1772, replacing the previous constitution with a new Form of Government that returned executive power to the crown. “The Form of Government of 1772 was destined to have a much greater and more far-reaching significance to Finland than to Sweden, for the autonomous status of the Finnish nation was to depend on the interpretation of the confused provisions of that law, for more than a century. The executive power was placed exclusively in the hands of the king” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 138). The Diet continued to meet, but the king managed the agenda and the schedule. Gustavus III convened it four times (1778, 1786, 1789, 1792). The 1789 Act of Union and Security allowed the king to “decide upon the offices of the realm” and issue decrees for matters outside existing law (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 161). Gustav IV Adolf convened the Diet only once during his reign (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 150). Score 2: the requirement for Diet consent for new taxes remained, but the Diet lost legislative initiative and the king determined meeting times. |
| 1809–1862 | 1 | Autonomous Grand Duchy under Russia. The September 1809 Treaty of Hamina made Finland an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire. The Diet met at Porvoo (March–July 1809) to swear loyalty to Tsar Alexander I, who adopted Swedish constitutional laws as Finland’s fundamental laws. “The executive power was totally vested in the sovereign” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 161). The land-rent system eliminated the need for new taxes in the early decades. As a result, “the Diet could then be left unconvened for over half a century without violating its rights in the endorsement of taxes” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 162). Nicholas I “did not once convene the Diet of the Grand Duchy” but “did not violate Finnish rights by making laws that required the approval of the Estates” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 168). The Senate and the Committee for Finnish Affairs managed the administration, and the Tsar appointed and controlled both groups. Finland maintained “its own legislation and its own form of society” without active Diet sessions (Klinge 1990, 53). Score 1: there were no operative institutional constraints, and no representative body monitored the executive administration. |
| 1863–1905 | 3 | Revived Diet of Four Estates. Alexander II convened the Finnish Diet in September 1863. “The rules of procedure for the Diet, which contained Four Estates until 1906, were enacted in 1869” (Klinge 1990, 67–72). The Diet could approve new laws, amend existing ones, authorize new taxes, and use a limited right of legislative initiative. “The Czar was obliged to convene the Diet every five years. It soon became customary to summon it every third year” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 184). The franchise was restricted. Voting occurred by estate, limited by property and status requirements. “The question of extending the suffrage did not much interest the framers of the new constitution”. The Tsar maintained executive control through the Senate and Governor-General, held veto power over legislation, and could issue decrees. Between 1899 and 1905, Governor-General Bobrikov implemented a Russification campaign, reducing autonomy with the 1899 February Manifesto. Score 3: the Diet provided legislative constraints, though a restricted franchise, Tsarist vetoes, and Russification policies limited its authority. |
| 1906–1917 | 5 | Eduskunta under Tsarist veto. The 1905 general strike and the Russian Revolution led Nicholas II to accept parliamentary reform. A unicameral Eduskunta of 200 members, elected by universal suffrage including women, replaced the four-estate Diet. “Europe’s most radical parliamentary reform was carried out in a single sweep: the antiquated Diet of four Estates was replaced by a totally democratized system and the number of voters was multiplied tenfold (from 126,000 to 1,273,000)” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 207). Klinge (1990, 91) notes: “At a stroke Finland changed over from the oldest parliamentary system in Europe to the most modern” and “Finland became the first country in Europe to extend the franchise to women.” The Tsar retained executive power through an appointed Governor-General and Senate. He held an absolute veto over all laws, the right to issue decrees, and the authority to dissolve Parliament. He used this dissolution power four times between 1908 and 1910. “The Czar had not agreed, in connection with the parliamentary reform, to making the government dependent on Parliament” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 208). When the Eduskunta passed laws, they “were not ratified by the Czar” and did not take effect. Klinge (1990, 94): “The new Parliament had no constitutional basis which meant that the Senate and the Governor-General were dependent on the confidence of the Czar.” Score 5: the parliament operated with a wide franchise, but the executive was not accountable to it and used vetoes and dissolutions. |
| 1918 | 1 | Finnish Civil War and regency. Finland declared independence on 6 December 1917. The Red Guards occupied Helsinki and southern Finland on 27 January 1918, causing the Svinhufvud Senate to relocate to Vaasa. Between January and May 1918, a civil war occurred between the German-backed Whites led by Mannerheim and the Soviet-backed Reds. Mannerheim won the battle of Tampere in early April. German forces landed on the south coast and captured Helsinki (Klinge 1990, 98–100). “The leadership of the young state had thus been placed in the hands of two strong men, Svinhufvud and Mannerheim” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 217). After the White victory, Svinhufvud was elected regent in May 1918. The state drafted a monarchist constitution and elected a German prince as king in October 1918, but he did not take the throne; after Germany’s defeat, Svinhufvud resigned and Mannerheim was elected regent in his place in December 1918. Score 1: state authority collapsed. No operational institutional constraints existed during the civil war and the subsequent regency period. |
| 1919–1920 | 6 | Republican Form of Government. Germany’s defeat in November 1918 ended the monarchist plans. The March 1919 parliamentary elections resulted in a republican majority of 80 Social Democrats, 26 Progressives, and 42 Agrarians. The Form of Government became law on 17 July 1919. The constitution “gives the Finnish head of State greater power than Western sovereigns enjoy, though less power than the president of the United States can exercise” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 226–227). The president retained significant powers, including foreign policy control, commander-in-chief status, and the ability to dissolve parliament. Parliament obtained full legislative authority and budget control. Klinge (1990, 101) explains: “The Finnish Constitution was created as a compromise between republican and monarchist opinion. It left the President with most of the power enjoyed by the head of state under the previous constitution: responsibility for foreign policy, the position of Commander in Chief of the army and the right to dissolve Parliament.” The first president, K. J. Ståhlberg (elected July 1919), “laid a solid foundation for applying that constitutional law” (Jutikkala and Pirinen 1988, 227). Score 6: constitutional constraints operated with multi-party competition. Parity was not reached because the president maintained independent authority over foreign policy and parliament dissolution. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1301 | 1 | Pre-representative Capetian monarchy. Early Capetian kings governed through the Curia Regis, a council of nobles and clergy, without a representative body. Hugh Capet (987) and his successors gained office through election and consecration but operated without institutional checks on executive power. Bisson (2015, 158) notes early Capetian kingship required the elite to ratify the coronation: “Only then were the prelates, counts, viscounts, knights, and ‘people greater and lesser’ invited to ratify the election.” This represented ceremonial aggregation rather than an ongoing institutional constraint. Ertman (1997, 23–25) describes the Capetians as a case of patrimonial state-building that bypassed representative institutions. The crown first summoned the Estates-General in 1302 (Major 1980, 11). Van Zanden et al. record no Estates-General meetings in the twelfth century. Score 1. |
| 1302–1438 | 2 | Estates-General. Intermittent constraint. Philip IV called the first Estates-General in 1302 (Major 1980, 11). The Estates-General rejected the king’s requests for aids in 1321 and 1328 (Henriques et al. 2026). Between 1355 and 1358, under Etienne Marcel, it pushed “great demands for control of the government.” The assembly required elected officials to collect and disburse taxes under strict supervision (Myers 1975, 68). The body failed to collect the taxes it authorized, and “a rare opportunity for a central assembly to become part of the institutional system had been lost” (Major 1980, 17). The Estates-General did not become permanent. Monarchs convened it during crises and ruled without it otherwise. Provincial estates developed into a more durable mechanism for consent. Score 2 reflects the Estates-General’s existence and occasional assertiveness without achieving full institutionalization. |
| 1439–1559 | 3 | Renaissance monarchy. Provincial-estate constraint. Charles VII levied the taille in 1439 without consulting the Estates-General. After 1440, he “held no central assemblies of the three estates during his reign” (Major 1980, 37). The 1484 Estates-General of Tours secured a promise on tax limits (Henriques et al. 2026, citing Chevalier 2002). The crown broke the agreement, and “proceeded to set the amount of the taille and to apportion it without consulting the Estates General” (Major 1980, 45). At that point, “Consent to taxes at the national level ceased” (Major 1980, 48). Francis I (1515 to 1547) convened no meetings of the Estates-General (Major 1980, 55). Provincial estates operated in approximately 60 percent of France. In these pays d’états, “committees and officials appointed by the estates apportioned and collected the taxes that they voted” (Major 1980, 58). Major (1980, 2) writes: “France lay clearly in the constitutional sphere during the sixteenth century.” The monarchy had “neither a large enough nor a loyal enough army or bureaucracy to impose their will” (Major 1980, 2–3). Kings “were strong only to the extent that they could persuade the leaders in society to support them.” Score 3 reflects the fiscal constraint imposed by provincial estates. The king retained the initiative, determined tax levels, and governed without national consent. |
| 1560–1598 | 2 | Wars of Religion. Institutional collapse. Myers (1975, 102) notes the Estates-General divided during this period. It “scattered in confusion” following the assassination of the Guise leaders by Henry III. The institution functioned as a tool of factional conflict. The Estates-General convened three times (1560 to 1561, 1576 to 1577, 1588 to 1589) and failed to stabilize the kingdom (Myers 1975, 95–102). Executive constraints arose from armed factions and civil war rather than representative bodies. Score 2 reflects the weakness of the executive rather than institutionalized constraint. Military force prevented unilateral action by the crown. Score 2 instead of 1: the executive lost freedom of action. Score 2 instead of 3: the constraint lacked institutionalization and did not originate from a body holding recognized constitutional authority over the king. |
| 1599–1660 | 2 | Order restored. Estates-General abandoned. Henry IV (1594 to 1610) rebuilt royal authority following the 1598 Edict of Nantes. The final Estates-General before 1789 met in 1614 and 1615. Major (1980, 409) notes that “the deputies of 1614 were tired of civil wars” and the crown ignored their cahiers. Under Louis XIII, Richelieu (1624 to 1642) “permitted [provincial estates] to continue to decay” wherever they demonstrated weakness (Major 1980, 618). Nine provincial estates dissolved by 1620 (Henriques et al. 2026, citing Mousnier 1981). The Fronde (1648 to 1653) represented the final major challenge. The Parlement of Paris and elements of the nobility rebelled against Mazarin. The crown summoned the Estates-General twice (1649, 1651) but prevented it from meeting (Major 1980, 623–624). Major (1980, 629) explains: “The suffering and futility of the Fronde made most of the people willing to accept a more absolutist form of government.” Colbert suppressed the Normandy estates between 1655 and 1663. By that time, “the final relics of a once-proud institution were swept away” (Major 1980, 657–658). Operative constraint declined throughout this period. Score 2. |
| 1661–1715 | 1 | Louis XIV personal rule. Absolutism. Louis XIV announced in March 1661 that he would rule without a chief minister. In 1673, he abolished the parlements’ right of preregistration remonstrance. J. B. Collins (1995, 146) writes: “the Parlements now had to register all royal edicts before they could send their objections to the king.” The crown had “broken” the provincial estates by 1674. Burgundy “voted all that he requested in a single deliberation” (Major 1980, 640). Louis XIV’s memoirs stated that the pays d’états “began to use their liberty only for making their submission more pleasing to me” (qtd. in Major 1980, 632). The Estates-General did not meet. Major (1980, 668) notes: “So submissive did the Parlement of Paris become that in 1672... its magistrates registered six financial edicts without opposition.” Major (1980, 2) concludes that by “the end of the first decade or so of Louis XIV’s personal reign, [France] had become a predominantly absolute monarchy.” J. B. Collins (1995) confirms the king implemented the capitation (1695) and dixième (1710) (both universal taxes) without representative consent. Operative executive constraint collapsed. Score 1. |
| 1715–1770 | 2 | Regency and parlement revival. Following Louis XIV’s death in 1715, the Regent restored to the parlements their right of preregistration remonstrance, reversing the 1673 abolition. J. B. Collins (1995, 139) notes this “gave back political power to a very different group than had lost it in the 1660s.” The parlements could delay and edit legislation, although the king retained the power to override them via a lit de justice. Judges owned their offices through venality. The crown could not dismiss them without large financial compensation, giving them independence (J. B. Collins 1995, 13). Provincial estates in Brittany and Languedoc negotiated over taxes (J. B. Collins 1995). The Estates-General remained dormant, and a determined king could overcome resistance. Louis XV made this clear at the 1766 Séance de la Flagellation: “to me alone belongs the legislative power... the rights and interests of the nation... are necessarily united with my rights and interests, and repose only in my hands” (qtd. in J. B. Collins 1995, 252). Score 2 reflects limited constraint. Parlements could delay legislation and increase the political cost of royal action, but they could not stop a determined king. |
| 1771–1774 | 1 | Maupeou revolution. Parlements abolished. Chancellor Maupeou abolished the parlements in 1771. He established new courts with appointed judges and ended venality in judicial offices (J. B. Collins 1995, xiv, 253). “The new courts did work reasonably well but the edifice rested on shaky ground” (J. B. Collins 1995, 254). This measure represented an exercise of royal power that removed the final institutional check on the executive. The arrangement lasted until Louis XV died in May 1774. Score 1. |
| 1775–1786 | 2 | Parlements restored. Ancien régime constitutionalism. Louis XVI reinstated the parlements upon his accession in 1774. “When they fell, in the summer of 1774, celebrations broke out all over France” (J. B. Collins 1995, 255–256). The revived parlements opposed royal policies, but the king retained his lit de justice override. The constitutional dynamic mirrored 1715 to 1770: limited constraint. J. B. Collins (1995) shows the parlements registered the vingtième levies after remonstrances and royal pressure, without blocking them entirely. Score 2 indicates the king maintained his override power while the parlements increased the political cost of executive action. |
| 1787–1789 (May) | 3 | Pre-revolutionary crisis. Parlements block the crown. The Assembly of Notables (February to May 1787) refused to support Calonne’s reform plan, requesting to review the financial records. Upon discovering the deficit, demands arose that “only the Estates-General” could approve new taxes (Doyle 2018, 72). The Parlement of Paris announced it was “incapable of sanctioning a perpetual tax. That right belonged solely... to the Estates-General” (Doyle 2018, 76). The 1788 May Edicts attempted to bypass parlement resistance by transferring registration to new plenary courts. This generated wide resistance. Doyle (2018, 83) notes that “Other parlements renewed the call for the Estates-General.” The crown yielded. Brienne scheduled the Estates-General for 1 May 1789. The parlements halted royal taxation, compelling the king to convene the first national representative body since 1614. Score 3 reflects this increase in operative constraint. |
| 1789 (Jun)–1791 | 6 | National Assembly. Executive constrained. The Third Estate declared itself the National Assembly on 17 June 1789, took the Tennis Court Oath on 20 June, and compelled Louis XVI to order the clergy and nobility to join them by 27 June. “The Estates-General had gone. They had been replaced by a single National Assembly... claiming sovereignty in the name of the nation” (Doyle 2018, 111). The 1791 Constitution was built “to keep the executive weak” (Doyle 2018, 123). The king lost the power to propose laws. He retained a suspensive veto. The legislature determined his civil list and possessed the authority to impeach ministers (Doyle 2018, 120, 123). Score 6 reflects this constitutional constraint. The legislature directed major decisions, while the king maintained his suspensive veto and command of the military, pending legislative war declarations. |
| 1792–1794 (Jul) | 1 | Terror. No constraint on the executive. The state suspended the monarchy on 10 August 1792. The Convention became the sovereign body and delegated executive power to the Committee of Public Safety (CPS), formed in April 1793. The December 1793 Law of 14 Frimaire formally placed executive power in the CPS “subject always to the overriding authority of the Convention” (Doyle 2018, 263). In practice, after the CPS purged the Girondins (June 1793) and executed the Dantonists and Hebertists (March and April 1794), it controlled the Convention through the threat of denunciation. Doyle (2018, 264) notes the Law of 14 Frimaire “was the very opposite of that aspired to by the constitution-makers of 1791.” Robespierre stated: “The goal of constitutional government is to preserve the Republic; that of revolutionary government is to found it” (qtd. in Doyle 2018, 264). The Convention retained the authority to dismiss the CPS, a power it exercised at Thermidor on 27 July 1794. During the Terror, however, no institutions constrained the CPS. Score 1. |
| 1794 (Aug)–1795 | 3 | Thermidorian Convention. Constraint restored but unstable. After Robespierre fell on 9 Thermidor (27 July 1794), the Convention regained authority. Doyle (2018, 283) observes: “within a month of Robespierre’s fall, the central institutions of Terror and Revolutionary Government had been dismantled by a Convention increasingly certain that they were no longer necessary.” The assembly reformed the CPS, requiring members to rotate monthly to prevent factional control (Doyle 2018, 283). Constraint returned. The institutional framework remained the unreformed Convention, which operated through emergency edicts while drafting a new constitution. Score 3 reflects a transitional period of moderate constraint. It indicates more limitation than the Terror without representing a stable constitutional settlement. |
| 1795–1799 | 4 | Directory. Formal constraints undermined by coups. The 1795 Constitution of Year III established complex checks and balances. It featured a bicameral legislature, pairing a Council of Five Hundred that initiated laws with a Council of Elders that accepted or rejected them without amendments. A five-member Directory held executive power, replacing one member annually by lot, and held no legislative initiative. “Experience since 1789 had borne out all the warnings... about the dangers of a single chamber. A constitution of elaborate checks and balances was now the aim” (Doyle 2018, 320). In practice, the constitution “was never in fact given the chance to work properly” (Doyle 2018, 378). The Directory annulled election results during Fructidor (September 1797) and Floreal (May 1798), governing through purges and military intervention. The Councils responded by purging the Directory during Prairial (June 1799). Doyle (2018, 373) calls this “the first and only occasion on which the Councils purged the Directory and not the other way round.” Score 4 indicates formal constitutional constraint existed in text, but frequent coups reduced operative constraint. |
| 1800–1813 | 1 | Napoleon. Absolutism. The Brumaire coup (9 and 10 November 1799) installed a provisional government directed by three Consuls. The December 1799 Constitution of Year VIII handed “a plenitude of power to the executive” (Doyle 2018, 379). The Tribunate could debate without voting. The Legislative Body could vote without debating. The government alone drafted laws, preparing them in the Council of State. As First Consul, Bonaparte wielded “overriding authority” (Doyle 2018, 380). The January 1802 purge eliminated “the last vestiges of free parliamentary life” (Doyle 2018, 391). Bonaparte became Consul for life in August 1802 and Emperor by May 1804. No institution could block or amend his decisions. Dincecco (2009) dates French fiscal centralization to 1790 but delays limited government until 1870. Score 1. |
| 1814 | -88 | Transition year. Napoleonic collapse to Bourbon Restoration. Napoleon abdicated on 6 April 1814. The Senate declared a provisional government that day and invited Louis XVIII to take the Charte constitutionnelle. No stable institutional framework survived the year. Score -88 marks this transition between regimes. |
| 1815–1829 | 3 | Bourbon Restoration. Charter of 1814. Louis XVIII issued the 1814 Charter. Rosanvallon (1994, Ch. I to III) describes it as “libéralisme octroyé”, functioning as a unilateral royal grant rather than a negotiated constitution. The king monopolized legislative initiative, held the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, and appointed the Chamber of Peers. Article 14 permitted him to “make the regulations and ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws and the security of the state.” Charles X later used this clause to justify his actions (Rosanvallon 1994, Pt. 1, Ch. 2). The Charter established constraints. The Chamber authorized taxes, ministers faced accountability, and a parliamentary dynamic developed. Talleyrand resigned after the 1815 “Chambre introuvable”, marking the first time a ministry collapsed because it lost parliamentary confidence (Rosanvallon 1994, Pt. 1, Ch. 5). Charles X took the throne in 1824 and tested the boundaries of the settlement, resulting in the Four Ordinances of July 1830. Score 3. |
| 1830–1847 | 4 | July Monarchy. Charter of 1830. The July Revolution (27 to 29 July 1830) removed Charles X after he issued his Four Ordinances to dissolve the Chamber, reduce the electorate, restrict the press, and govern by decree. The updated 1830 Charter operated as a binding pact rather than a royal favor. The authors removed all “octroi” language (Rosanvallon 1994, Pt. 2, Ch. 2). The king and Chambers shared legislative initiative. Ministerial responsibility expanded, press censorship ended, and the Chamber gained the right to elect its president. Suffrage remained restricted. The 1831 electoral law established an electorate of approximately 166,000 men out of a population exceeding 30 million (Rosanvallon 1994). Score 4 indicates the Chamber provided a check on the executive, but the narrow franchise and Louis-Philippe’s political interference preclude a higher score. |
| 1848 | -88 | Transition year. July Monarchy to Second Republic. The February Revolution (24 and 25 February 1848) removed Louis-Philippe. He “called off all resistance and abdicated in favour of his grandson, the comte de Paris” (Agulhon 1983, 25). The Provisional Government declared the Republic that afternoon. The July Monarchy functioned as the operative regime through early 1848, and the state lacked a settled constitutional order until the November 1848 constitution was enacted. Score -88 marks the transition. |
| 1849–1851 | 5 | Second Republic. Universal male suffrage. The Second Republic’s constitution (4 November 1848) established universal male suffrage and a unicameral legislative assembly with authority over laws and the budget. The chamber was “to be purely legislative, the executive power resting with the President of the Republic who was to be both Head of State and leader of the government and directly elected by universal suffrage” (Agulhon 1983, 67). Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte ended the regime with his 2 December 1851 coup. Score 5 instead of 6 or 7: the elected president retained independent powers, including command of the armed forces and the right to appoint ministers. This prevented the legislature from fully subordinating the executive. |
| 1852–1859 | 1 | Second Empire. Authoritarian phase. Louis-Napoleon’s 2 December 1851 coup created an authoritarian regime modeled on the Napoleonic Consulate. Under the January 1852 constitution the Corps législatif’s consent was required for all laws and taxes, but its role “was viewed as primarily consultative”: it discussed “legislative proposals prepared by the Conseil d’Etat,” and “Deputies would not be permitted to initiate legislation” (Price 2001, 65). Every piece of legislation thus originated with the government. Dincecco (2009) delays French limited government until 1870, placing the Second Empire in the pre-limited-government era. Score 1: no institution possessed the power to block or amend the emperor’s decisions. |
| 1860–1869 | 3 | Second Empire. Liberalizing phase. The balance of power between the emperor and legislature shifted, but the transition remained incomplete. The legislature gained debate rights, interpellation, and legislative initiative by 1869. Dincecco (2009) dates limited government in France to 1870, confirming the liberalizing Second Empire did not meet that threshold. Score 3 rather than 1 indicates operative constraints increased compared to the authoritarian phase. Score 3 rather than 5 reflects the emperor’s continued ability to dissolve parliament, appoint ministers, and govern by decree. |
| 1870–1876 | -88 | Transition. Second Empire to Third Republic. The Second Empire ended following the capture of Napoleon III at Sedan (September 1870). Rosanvallon (1994) documents the subsequent period: the monarchist-dominated 1871 Assembly failed to agree on a candidate for the throne, leaving the republic provisional. The 1875 constitutional laws formalized the Third Republic’s framework. The 16 May 1877 crisis affirmed parliamentary supremacy after President MacMahon dissolved the Chamber and lost the subsequent elections. Score -88 records the transition. |
| 1877–1920 | 6 | Third Republic. Parliamentary supremacy. After the 16 May 1877 crisis, the president did not dissolve the Chamber again. The prime minister and cabinet were accountable to the Chamber of Deputies, which controlled the budget and dismissed governments. The Senate functioned as a legislative co-equal. Universal male suffrage was established, and multiple parties competed in elections. The regime survived the Boulanger crisis (1889), the Dreyfus Affair, the 1905 separation of church and state, and the First World War. Dincecco (2009) dates limited government in France to 1870. Score 6 rather than 7 because the French president retained formal and informal authority. Score 6 rather than 5 because the legislature consistently maintained confidence authority over the government. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 1300–1494 | 1 | Pre-Reichsreform Holy Roman Empire. The pre-Reichsreform Holy Roman Empire had no representative check on government. The Golden Bull of 1356 only regulated the imperial election and placed no limits on imperial authority. The late medieval Reichstag met occasionally and lacked fixed competence. |
| 1495–1805 | 3 | Reichsreform constitutional order. The 1495 Reichsreform created an independent Reichskammergericht. Its remit was “to maintain the public peace and to adjudicate in disputes between the emperor’s vassals.” The reform defined “the limits of imperial power … the emperor’s position was to be more that of a referee in the legal system than that of a sovereign ruler” (Whaley 2012, vol. 1, 33). Starting in 1519, an electoral capitulation bound every emperor. Whaley (2012, vol. 1, 160) notes that “all subsequent emperors were obliged to subscribe.” The Peace of Augsburg (1555) provided “the first comprehensive statement of the imperial constitution” (Whaley 2012, vol. 1, 61). In its public-peace measures “the emphasis was on control by the Estates rather than by the emperor” (Whaley 2012, vol. 1, 335). The Reichstag also controlled taxation: between 1556 and 1603 it granted 409 Roman Months (Whaley 2012, vol. 1, 355–356). The Peace of Westphalia (1648) created “a more satisfactory balance … that endured until … 1806” (Whaley 2012, vol. 2, xxiii). The imperial courts could “protect the rights of territorial Estates against ‘absolutist’ rulers” (Whaley 2012, vol. 2, 190). This constitutional order remained under “constant renegotiation between 1648 and 1806” (Whaley 2012, vol. 2, xxiii). The score stays at 3 rather than 4 because the post-1663 Perpetual Reichstag “worked … to the advantage of the crown” (Whaley 2012, vol. 2, 57), and Leopold I reached “a position of power … perhaps greater than that occupied by any predecessor or successor” (Whaley 2012, vol. 2, 27). This shows meeting frequency did not equal constraint. The framework lasted until “destroyed by Napoleon in 1806”. |
| 1806–1815 | 1 | Napoleonic dissolution. Francis II abdicated the imperial title in 1806 and the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved. The Confederation of the Rhine (1806 to 1813) was a French satellite system with no German-wide representative institution, and no all-German framework existed between its collapse and the organization of the German Confederation at the Congress of Vienna. Score 1: there was no German-wide executive to constrain and no accountability group at the national level. |
| 1816–1866 | 2 | German Confederation. The German Confederation (1815 to 1866) was “an extremely loose form of association, looser in some ways than the former Empire (there was no superior court … and no head of state) … the Confederation diet had little importance” (Blackbourn 1998, 93). The Bundesversammlung president “functioned as the chairman of its proceedings, not as a chief executive” (Sheehan 1989, 403–404). The system had no central executive. The diet operated under Metternichian reaction and reached a reactionary nadir in 1850. Score 2 rather than 3 because the Confederation lacked equivalents to the Holy Roman Empire’s institutional machinery like independent courts, binding capitulations, and Reichstag tax consent. |
| 1867–1918 | 3 | North German Confederation and German Empire. From 1867 the North German Confederation, and from 1871 the German Empire, had a Reichstag elected by universal manhood suffrage that held legislative and budget power. The Kaiser appointed and directed the Chancellor instead of parliament. Blackbourn (1998, 400) notes that “the chancellor had been dismissed by Kaiser William II.” Score 3 because parliament constrained laws and budgets without holding the executive accountable. |
| 1919–1920 | 7 | Weimar Republic. Under the 1919 Weimar Constitution, the Chancellor answered to the Reichstag. The system used universal suffrage and proportional representation. This established executive accountability to the legislature. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1203 | 1 | Byzantine Empire. Autocratic, no representative institutions. The Byzantine Empire governed Greek-speaking territories as provinces (themes) during this period. The emperor held absolute power, lacking any independent legislature or system to hold the executive accountable. The Senate of Constantinople was a ceremonial group of office-holders, not a legislative body. Score 1 for unlimited authority. |
| 1204–1452 | 1 | Frankish and Latin successor states. Fragmented successor states and Frankish/Latin rule. The 1204 Fourth Crusade dismantled the Byzantine Empire. The Latin Empire of Constantinople, the Principality of Achaea, the Duchy of Athens, and other Frankish states formed next to Byzantine successor states (Empire of Nicaea, Despotate of Epirus, Empire of Trebizond). No Greek state had representative institutions during this time. Score 1 throughout: none of the successor states placed institutional limits on their rulers. |
| 1453–1820 | 1 | Ottoman rule. Greeks lived as subjects of the Ottoman Empire without a Greek state. The Ottoman sultan was an absolute autocrat. Henriques et al. (2026) code the Ottoman Empire at 1 for all benchmarks from 1400 to 1850: “There was no legislative or representative body to limit the Sultan’s power” (citing Imber 2002, İnalcık 1973). Clogg (2014, 10) notes the Ottomans gradually secured control over the Greek-speaking world after 1453. The ecumenical patriarch held administrative authority over Orthodox subjects by Ottoman permission. However, this was delegated governance from the sultan, not an institutional check on a Greek executive. Greek communal self-governance (Phanariot elites, local notables, klephts) operated locally and did not constrain a non-existent Greek ruler. |
| 1821–1826 | 3 | War of Independence. Liberal constitutions and wartime constraints. The First National Assembly at Epidaurus (December 1821) adopted a constitution modeled on the 1795 French Constitution, establishing a democratic republic founded on civil liberties and equality for all (Gallant 2001, 22). The Second National Assembly at Astros (April 1823) revised it. However, wartime conditions, limited territorial control, factional rivalries, and open civil war (such as Kolokotronis seizing executive council members, Gallant 2001, 22–23) meant these documents were only partially enforced. Score 3 instead of higher because wartime disruption and factional violence weakened the formal rules. Score 3 instead of 2 because these constitutions made a real attempt at limited government and legislative supremacy, and they introduced universal male citizenship rights unusually early. |
| 1827–1832 | 2 | Kapodistrias presidency and transition to monarchy. The Third National Assembly at Troezen (April 1827) adopted a constitution that established strict limits: it gave the Legislative Assembly broad impeachment powers, denied the president veto power, barred the president from legislative sessions, and required a cabinet minister to countersign all presidential orders (Gallant 2001, 27). Elected President at Troezen in April 1827, Ioannis Kapodistrias found these limits too restrictive after taking up the post in January 1828. “Kapodistrias was able to introduce modifications to the Constitution that shifted the balance slightly toward the executive, but nonetheless, the difficulties of governing an already fractious group were only compounded by the power sharing scheme” (Gallant 2001, 27). He “opted instead to rule through enlightened despotism even though this entailed his eventually abrogating the constitution on the basis of which he had been elected” (Gallant 2001, 28). Assassins killed him in October 1831, leaving the state in anarchy (1831–1832). The Great Powers then imposed a monarchy via the May 1832 London Convention, installing Otto of Bavaria as absolute monarch. Score 2 because Kapodistrias resisted and eventually abolished the Troezen constitution. |
| 1833–1843 | 1 | Bavarian Regency and absolute monarchy under Otto I. The installation treaty made Otto “absolute monarch” (Gallant 2001, 31). He ruled without a constitution or parliament. A three-man Bavarian Regency controlled the state during Otto’s minority until June 1835. “Whether it was under Armansperg or Otto, the government of Greece was autocratic” (Gallant 2001, 33). The Greeks called this period the Bavarokratia. Score 1 for unlimited authority lacking a representative body or institutional limits. |
| 1844–1862 | 3 | Constitutional monarchy (1844 constitution). The bloodless 3 September 1843 coup forced Otto to concede a constitution. Released in March 1844, it “granted virtually universal manhood suffrage” (Clogg 2014, 51). It created a bicameral legislature with a king-appointed Gerousia and a Vouli elected by universal male suffrage. “Greece became in theory one of the most democratic states in Europe” (Gallant 2001, 41). However, Otto “quickly manifested a disinclination to abide by the rules of the constitutional game” (Clogg 2014, 51). Through Kolettis, he set up “a kind of parliamentary dictatorship” (Clogg 2014, 51) sustained by patronage and “lavish use of gifts and bribes, cajoling and intimidation” (Gallant 2001, 41). By the 1850s, Otto “had by and large reduced constitutional government to a sham, effectively ruling as an autocrat at the head of a royalist faction” (Gallant 2001, 43). Score 3. Greece had democratic institutions on paper, but royal manipulation bypassed those checks in practice. |
| 1863 | -88 | Transition. Otto deposed, new constitution drafted. This row marks Otto’s deposition in 1862, the convening of a constituent assembly in December 1862, and the arrival of King George I in 1863 while drafters wrote the 1864 constitution (Gallant 2001, 44–45). |
| 1864–1874 | 4 | Crowned democracy (1864 constitution). The 1864 constitution was “far more democratic than its predecessor” (Gallant 2001, 45). It vested sovereignty in the Greek people, featuring a direct secret ballot, a unicameral Vouli with full legislative powers, and universal male suffrage for men over 21 with property or a trade. The text limited the king’s powers. However, the first decade saw severe instability. Greece went through 18 administrations between 1865 and 1875. The longest survived 20 months and the shortest just 14 days (Gallant 2001, 47). “The difficulty was that King George had the power to appoint or dismiss ministers, and so he could create or collapse administrations at will”. “Laws ... were there essentially to be got round rather than obeyed” (Clogg 2014, 61). Score 4. An elected parliament with real powers enforced substantial constraints, but the king’s grip on ministerial appointments and rampant clientelism kept the actual limits weaker than the written rules. |
| 1875 | -88 | Transition. Dedilomeni principle established. King George I accepted a binding convention to only appoint the parliamentary majority leader as prime minister. Clogg (2014, 63): “The turning-point came in 1875 when the king accepted the principle that he would invariably call upon the party leader enjoying the support of a majority of deputies in parliament to form a government.” The score increases from 4 to 5 because parliament bypassed royal ministerial appointments, allowing the parliamentary majority to choose the government. |
| 1876–1914 | 5 | Dedilomeni principle. Two-party system; Venizelos reforms. The dedilomeni produced a genuine two-party system. Trikoupis alternated with Deliyiannis, resulting in only seven general elections in the last 25 years of the nineteenth century, compared to 18 administrations in the decade before. Parliament passed major reforms through legislation and budget debates. Clogg (2014, 63) notes Trikoupis supported the westernizing tradition while Deliyiannis backed the traditionalists. They engaged in genuine, policy-driven alternation. The 1911 Venizelos constitutional revision passed roughly 50 amendments, introducing civil-service merit exams, land reform, minimum wages for women and children, legal trade unions, and a progressive income tax (Clogg 2014, 75). Score 5 instead of 4 because parliament exercised real fiscal and legislative power, and the dedilomeni prevented the king from overriding the majority. The score stays at 5 instead of 6 or 7 because the king still controlled foreign policy, and clientelism undermined electoral accountability. Greece’s universal male suffrage (active since 1844) and competitive multi-party system made its actual constraints stronger than those in comparable managed-alternation systems like Spain’s turno pacífico (coded 4 for 1876–1920). |
| 1915 | -88 | Transition. National Schism begins. King Constantine I, who took the throne in 1913, clashed with Venizelos over entering World War I. Venizelos resigned in March 1915, won the June 1915 elections, returned in August, and was dismissed again in October, which directly violated the dedilomeni. The king’s “constitutional powers over the conduct of foreign policy were substantial but ill-defined” (Clogg 2014, 85); “Venizelos and his supporters claimed that the king had grossly exceeded his constitutional powers” (Clogg 2014, 86–87). |
| 1916 | 2 | National Schism. Two rival governments. Venizelist officers in Salonica launched an August 1916 coup, supported by the National Defense organization. Venizelos set up a “provisional government complete with its own army” in Salonica in the autumn of 1916, while the royalist government held Athens (Clogg 2014, 89). British and French forces landed in Piraeus in December 1916. Fighting broke out, forcing the allies into “ignominious retreat”. The Entente recognized Venizelos’s government and imposed a blockade on the country, causing “severe hardship in royalist-controlled areas”. Score 2 because the state broke down. Two rival governments claimed sovereignty and the constitutional order was suspended. |
| 1917 | -88 | Transition. Constantine deposed, Venizelos restored. The Entente deposed King Constantine in June 1917 “on the ground that he had violated his oath as a constitutional monarch” (Clogg 2014, 89), elevating his son Alexander. Venizelos recalled the June 1915 parliament, which “rewarded Venizelos with a massive vote of confidence” (Clogg 2014, 90), ending the period of rival governments. |
| 1918–1920 | 5 | Venizelos unified government. Greece restored the constitutional government and parliament. The state also reintroduced ministerial accountability and passed substantial legislation. Greece entered WWI on the Allied side, and Venizelos led the 1919 Paris Peace Conference delegation. However, large purges of royalist sympathizers occurred during this time. “Judges, civil servants and teachers were dismissed wholesale. The most sensitive purges took place in the armed forces” (Clogg 2014, 90–91). Score 5 instead of 6 because actual parliamentary checks coexisted with partisan purges and heavy reliance on Entente backing. Score 5 instead of 4 because parliament maintained genuine legislative and fiscal limits, drawing legitimacy from the body elected in 1915. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1221 | 1 | Early Árpád monarchy. The Magyar tribal confederation became a Christian kingdom under Stephen I (crowned 1000). The early Árpád monarchy followed the Western Christian model without estates-based constraints. Kontler notes a royal council of the king’s appointees: “Major decisions were still made by the king upon consultation with the royal council consisting of prelates, court office holders and the ispáns of the counties, a body of considerable and indefinite size” (Kontler 2002, 70–71). The state lacked a parliamentary institution. Van Zanden et al. observe zero meetings in the twelfth century. Score 1. |
| 1222–1300 | 2 | Golden Bull era. The 1222 Golden Bull granted the nobility exemption from arbitrary detention and taxation without consent. It gave lords a right of resistance against unlawful royal acts. Kontler (2002, 77) notes that resistance to royal exactions “compelled Andrew II to issue the famous Golden Bull,” an additional clause of which “invested the secular and ecclesiastical lords with a right of resistance in case the aforementioned were violated by the king.” The Esztergom assembly (1267) confirmed the Golden Bull and demanded annual county deputy meetings. This was “an important step in the development towards the rise of noble self-government” (Kontler 2002, 82). The first parliamentary assembly at Rákos field near Pest (1277) gathered prelates, barons, noblemen, and Cumans. Kontler (2002, 83) calls it “the first beginning of parliamentariansm” [sic]. However, “the short term impact of the movement... was meagre”. Van Zanden et al. observe 3 meetings in the thirteenth century. The Golden Bull provided a formal constraint document. Enforcement relied on magnate resistance rather than a regular institutional assembly. Score 2. |
| 1301–1386 | 2 | Angevin period (Charles Robert 1308 to 1342, Louis I 1342 to 1382). Strong kings neglected diets. Kontler (2002, 89): “Charles could neglect convening diets, which the budding ideology of the estates required.” Charles Robert and Louis I “frequently claimed to rule... with ‘the plenitude of power’.” They called the diet only when absolutely necessary. Estates-based parliamentarism lay dormant. Institutions survived at the county level. Van Zanden et al. count 5 meetings in the fourteenth century. Score 2. |
| 1387–1457 | 2 | Sigismund and the interregnum. Sigismund of Luxembourg (1387 to 1437) and Habsburg/interregnum successors. Baronial factions dominated. The 1397 diet at Temesvár removed the Golden Bull’s resistance clause. Kontler (2002, 104) writes: “the king first tested the strength of this new team at a diet convened in the autumn of 1397 in Temesvár. He confirmed the Golden Bull, but without the famous resistance clause.” Short reigns and the “de facto interregnum of 1444–1452” led to baronial rule. Estates elected kings and imposed conditions. Institutional instability limited operative constraints. Van Zanden et al. observe 10 meetings in the fifteenth century. Score 2. |
| 1458–1490 | 2 | Reign of Matthias Corvinus. Matthias Corvinus (1458 to 1490) maintained a strong centralized monarchy. Kontler (2002, 120) points to “the pretension that as king he had ‘absolute power’ and was ‘unbound by the law’.” Diets met often but faced strict limits. Kontler explains: “diets were quite frequent, but some of their basic functions, like the voting of taxation, were often exercised by the royal council” (2002, 120). Matthias built “a mercenary... multi-ethnic ‘Black Army’” that bypassed the need for noble military service. This involved personal centralization rather than institutional change. Score 2. |
| 1490–1526 | 3 | Jagiellonian period (Vladislaus II 1490 to 1516, Louis II 1516 to 1526). Weak kings allowed estates to dominate. Kontler (2002, 128): “the estates dismantled the achievements of centralised monarchy.” Kontler: “the diets poured out edicts.” The royal council took control: “Control shifted into the hands of the royal council whose decisions Wladystaw never contested.” This earned him the nickname “the Very Well” (Dobze). The 1498 diet was “the starting point of the development of the diet into the bicameral assembly it subsequently became”. Following the 1498 diet’s order, Werbőczy’s Tripartitum went to deputies in 1514. It codified Hungarian customary law for three centuries. Score 3 because diet activity exceeded the bare meeting count. |
| 1527–1687 | 3 | Tripartite Hungary. Tripartite Hungary divided into Royal Hungary (Habsburg), Ottoman Hungary, and the Principality of Transylvania after the 1526 Battle of Mohács. The diet continued operating in Royal Hungary and retained fiscal consent power. Kontler (2002, 143) identifies “two important limits on the power of the Habsburg kings”: the weight of the magnates, and estates that “responded to the steps of the Habsburg administration which affected their rights as vigorously as if they had been its equal partners.” The fiscal veto had teeth: “The king could not neglect convening the diet because in principle he was not entitled to impose taxes unless voted by the estates, which usually refused to do so until they extorted a promise that their grievances would be redressed” (Kontler 2002, 143). The sixteenth century was, as Kontler puts it, “one of a constitutional division of power between Vienna and the Hungarian estates” (Kontler 2002, 143). However, “the role of the estates was confined to a free scope of action in internal affairs”. Pálffy dates the estates’ apex to the 1640s, when they “rose to the height of their powers” (Pálffy 2021, 147), and even the settlement that ended the Rákóczi war in 1711 retained “the dualist governance of the country as developed in the decades after 1526” (Pálffy 2021, 239). After 1670, Leopold I’s absolutist policies suppressed Hungarian constitutional institutions. The division of power returned when “a Palatine was elected at the diet convened in 1681” (Kontler 2002, 180). Pálffy (2021, xxiii–xxxi) documents diets meeting throughout this period to negotiate taxation, military contributions, and religious settlements. Van Zanden et al. observe 10 meetings in the sixteenth century and 19 in the 17th. The score is 3 instead of 2 because the estates’ fiscal veto was binding and enforced, not merely formal. The score is 3 instead of 4 because the estates’ scope was confined to internal affairs and Leopold I could suspend the constitutional machinery after 1670. |
| 1687–1711 | 2 | Diet of Pressburg. The 1687 Diet of Pressburg recognized the Habsburgs as hereditary kings and abolished the ius resistendi (the Golden Bull of 1222’s right of resistance). Kontler (2002, 184): “At the diet of 1687, still in the shadow of Caraffa’s gallows at Eperjes, the Hungarian estates were quite willing to yield to the Emperor’s demand... giving up the right of resistance.” Leopold’s policies “aimed at breaking the backbone of the estates”. The diet survived but remained submissive. Rákóczi’s War of Independence (1703 to 1711) disrupted Habsburg control. Score 2. |
| 1711–1790 | 2 | Peace of Szatmár settlement. The 1711 Peace of Szatmár restored constitutional compromise. Governance “could still be described as absolutism, but it was of a milder, far more sober kind” (Kontler 2002, 195). “The balance between the crown and the corporate structures... was preserved”, and “the voting of recruitment and war subsidies were referred to the competence of the diet”. The Hungarian diet acknowledged the Pragmatic Sanction (1722 to 1723) after “many informal discussions to ascertain the support of loyal aristocrats... the handing out of estates and other preferments”. The crown bought consent through patronage. Joseph II ruled without calling the diet. Score 2 rather than 3 because the diet remained compliant and Joseph II effectively suspended it. |
| 1790–1795 | 3 | Leopoldine compromise. The 1790 to 1791 diet restored constitutional compromise after Joseph II’s absolutist reforms. Leopold II (1790 to 1792) negotiated with the estates. The 1790 laws described Hungary as a “free and independent” kingdom governed only by its own laws (Kontler 2002, 220). An active committee system generated reform proposals. The resulting ninety-six volumes “constituted a major source of inspiration for the next generation of reformists”. The era ended when the state executed seven Jacobin conspiracy leaders in May and June 1795. Score 3. |
| 1796–1812 | 2 | Francis I’s unenlightened absolutism. Francis I brought “unenlightened absolutism” following the 1795 Jacobin trials. He did not govern as an absolute monarch in the technical sense. He called diets frequently because the restored 1791 constitution required estate consent for taxation and recruitment (Kontler 2002, 222). The diet cooperated instead of constraining the king. Kontler notes how “the diet displayed a co-operative attitude to the Viennese government” (Kontler 2002, 223) and “voted about a million recruits and thirty million florins”. Secret police, censorship, and camarilla governance from Vienna restricted the diet’s independence. Score 2. |
| 1812–1825 | 1 | Rule by decree. Francis I dissolved the diet in 1812 and ruled by decree for thirteen years. Kontler (2002, 224) writes: “Francis dissolved it and introduced the patent of devaluation ‘provisionally’... by decree.” Kontler adds: “the diet did not convene for thirteen years.” “Royal commissioners and, when necessary, the military ensured that the will of Vienna was enforced”. The executive operated without parliamentary constraints. Score 1. |
| 1825–1848 | 3 | Reform Era. Francis I reluctantly called the diet in 1825 after a thirteen-year gap (Kontler 2002, 224, 230). Reform-minded gentry presented the 1832 to 1836 diet with “a programme of comprehensive reform” (Kontler 2002, 236) developed through county assemblies. The opposition focused first on what Kölcsey called “liberty and property”. The 1839 to 1840 diet “not only achieved amnesty for the political prisoners” but passed substantive reforms. County assemblies functioned as bases for the reform movement. Score 3. |
| 1848–1849 | 6 | April Laws (1848). Hungary became a hereditary constitutional monarchy with an accountable ministry. Kontler (2002, 249): “The thirty-one April Laws... were sanctioned by Ferdinand V on April 11, 1848. Hungary became a hereditary constitutional monarchy.” Executive decisions required ministerial countersignature: “The decisions of neither of them were considered valid unless signed by one of the ministers in a government responsible to an annually convened legislature”. The April Laws “abolished tax privileges... liberated all serfs from personal bondage and manorial obligations”. The monarch retained war and peace powers alongside major appointments. War with Austria erupted in summer 1848. This ended the system early. Deák (2001, xiii): “In the spring of [1848] he and his fellow liberals among the nobility seized the opportunity presented by the European revolutions to legally restore the sovereignty of their country under the Habsburg Crown.” Score 6 because an elected legislature and accountable ministry imposed substantial executive constraints. It fell short of full parliamentary sovereignty because the monarch held reserved powers. |
| 1850–1860 | 1 | Bach absolutism. Bach absolutism followed the August 1849 surrender at Világos. A military regime governed Hungary: “a military dictatorship whose sole objective was... revenge and intimidation” (Kontler 2002, 264). The state carried out “altogether at least a hundred executions... and over 1,500 long term imprisonments”. The regime divided Hungary into five districts under German administration and applied the Austrian Civil Code. “The period of neo-absolutism in Hungary is remembered as the Bach period”. The state operated without a diet or constitutional government. Score 1. |
| 1860 | 1 | October Diploma. The Bach system remained operative through most of 1860. The October Diploma was issued on 20 October 1860. It was “in fact a mere cosmetic surgery that removed the ugliest excesses of the Bach regime” (Kontler 2002, 273). The administrative apparatus installed under Bach continued operating the entire year. Score 1 to match the Bach absolutism period, since the Diploma’s constitutional effect began only in 1861. |
| 1861 | 2 | February Patent diet. The February 1861 Patent created the Reichsrat framework. Hungary’s second representative parliament met in April 1861 but found itself “in an awkward position” and refused to support the centralizing imperial model (Kontler 2002, 274). The diet performed genuine deliberative functions. Francis Joseph dissolved the Hungarian legislature on 22 August. Consequently, “autocratic centralism was restored under Schmerling”. Score 2 because a functioning diet sat for part of the year, but the executive dissolved it instead of governing through it. |
| 1862–1865 | 1 | Schmerling provisorium. After the August 1861 diet dissolution, Hungary returned to direct administrative rule from Vienna. As Kontler (2002, 275) notes, “autocratic centralism was restored under Schmerling.” With the diet dissolved until the legislature reconvened in autumn 1865, parliamentary constraints did not exist. Score 1. |
| 1866 | 2 | Ausgleich negotiations. The diet joined the Ausgleich negotiations, but the Ausgleich had not yet taken effect. Deák’s 16 April 1865 “Easter article” started talks. This prompted the Hungarian legislature to convene in autumn 1865 to negotiate (Kontler 2002, 276–277). “Deák paved the way to the compromise and had a party in parliament to push it through” (Kontler 2002, 277). Andrássy became Prime Minister in February 1867 and passed the Ausgleich in March 1867. Score 2 because the diet worked as an independent negotiating body during the transition before the full Ausgleich constitution took effect. |
| 1867–1918 | 4 | Austro-Hungarian dualism. Dualist constitutional monarchy under the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (Ausgleich). Hungary governed itself internally with an accountable ministry and a bicameral parliament. Joint ministries for defense, foreign affairs, and common finance were “reponsible [sic] to the emperor-king and to delegations consisting of sixty members from both parliaments” (Kontler 2002, 278). The Hungarian parliament was “a largely independent agent in its dealings with the crown”. However, the franchise extended only “to c. 6 per cent of the population throughout the period”. Because “most districts being the patrimony of local potentates and political groups, elections were, as a rule, managed”, the system kept “roughly 80 per cent of MPs permanently drawn from the landowning classes”. The ruler retained “the right of approving government legislative drafts”. This meant “government bills could only be presented in parliament by his prior approval” (Kontler 2002, 278). Péter (2012, 163): “the source of the government’s authority was not the electorate (or the elected parliament) but the crown and parliament jointly.” Jászi (1929, 227): “the most important was the open voting because, by this means, the poorer electorate could be easily terrorized by the local administration which was entirely under the control of the feudal circles.” Score 4: genuine parliamentary constraints over domestic affairs were between slight and substantial limitations. This dynamic showed the tension between institutional independence and heavy voting restrictions. |
| 1919 | 1 | Hungarian Soviet Republic (March to August 1919). On 21 March 1919, the Social Democrats accepted sole governmental responsibility and concluded a merger with the imprisoned Communist leaders. “A new government, the Revolutionary Governing Council, presided by a Social Democrat but in effect led by Béla Kun, was formed on the same day, with the declared aim of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Kontler 2002, 334). Gyáni (2020, 94) labels it “the 1919 Republic of Councils, the first Hungarian Bolshevik state.” A National Congress of Soviets eliminated the representative order. The executive operated without parliamentary constraints. Score 1. |
| 1920 | 3 | Horthy regency. Horthy regency established. The 1920 elections produced a “one-chamber, 218 member parliament whose first major task was to determine the form of the state and choose a head of state.” Ultimately, “the only viable candidate for the regency, a medieval institution now resuscitated, was Horthy,” who on 1 March 1920 was “elected Regent, with moderately strong presidential powers” (Kontler 2002, 341). Formal parliamentary institutions functioned under an authoritarian-conservative regency. The political elite was “proudly proclaiming itself a counterrevolutionary regime” (Gyáni 2020, 148). Score 3. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1297 | 1 | Gaelic kingships and the Anglo-Norman lordship. Ireland lacked a representative body. Multiple competing kingdoms existed without a unified parliament. Local lords or rí held executive authority and relied on advice from kin and learned classes (brehons). Connolly (2007, 15): “The brehons were only one of several hereditary learned classes who, in the absence of centralized political structures, had a particularly important role in defining and maintaining the social order.” Neither Connolly (2007) nor Cosgrove (1987) identifies representative institutions constraining Gaelic kings. Ireland became a lordship of the English crown following the Anglo-Norman invasion (1169 to 1172). A justiciar or lord deputy appointed from England governed the territory. Cosgrove titles a chapter “The parliament of 1297” (1987, 271), indicating the first recognized parliament met in 1297. Van Zanden et al. record zero meetings in the 12th and thirteenth centuries, stating the “Irish Parliament with the third estate started in 1341.” The executive faced no regular limitations before 1297. |
| 1297–1495 | 2 | The medieval Irish parliament. A parliament existed but remained subordinate to the executive. The first recognized Irish parliament met in 1297 and became a regular institution by the fourteenth century. Neither Cosgrove (1987) nor Connolly (2007) views it as an independent constraint on the executive. The lord deputy managed the parliamentary agenda and could prorogue or dissolve parliament. The 1460 Drogheda parliament declared Ireland “corporate of itself” to claim legislative autonomy. Connolly (2007, 39): “the land of Ireland is and at all times has been corporate of itself, by the ancient laws and customs used in the same.” Connolly describes this as an exception driven by Yorkist politics. Poynings’ Law (1494 to 1495) was enacted “to prevent future lords deputy using Ireland’s legislative apparatus as an independent source of apparently legitimate authority” (Connolly 2007, 65). Parliament had political weight, but executive management remained standard practice. A score of 2 applies since parliament had a fiscal role while the lord deputy controlled the agenda. |
| 1495–1641 | 2 | The Tudor and early Stuart parliament. Under Poynings’ Law, parliament was formally subordinated. Poynings’ Law (1494 to 1495) required prior approval from the English privy council for all Irish legislation. Connolly (2008, 33): “Poynings’s Law, enacted in the parliament of 1494–5, laid down that no bill could be presented to the Irish parliament until it had been formally approved, under seal, by the English privy council.” Connolly (2007, 65) explains the statute “was clearly intended to prevent future lords deputy using Ireland’s legislative apparatus as an independent source of apparently legitimate authority.” In 1628 Charles I conceded the “Graces.” Connolly notes these were concessions rather than constitutional rights: “the king had agreed a series of concessions, ‘the Graces’... in exchange for three annual subsidies or grants of taxation.” The 1640 to 1641 parliament was assertive, as the Commons approved “a ‘Humble and Just Remonstrance’ outlining the arbitrary and illegal proceedings of Strafford’s administration”. They claimed a right of impeachment, which “would imply that Irish office holders, appointed from England... would become accountable to it for their actions”. The October 1641 Ulster rising ended this period. Parliament existed and had fiscal leverage, but Poynings’ Law removed its independent legislative initiative. |
| 1641–1692 | 1 | Confederate wars and Cromwellian rule. Ireland had no effective parliament during the civil war, Commonwealth, and Restoration. The October 1641 Ulster rising started the Confederate Wars and disrupted the Irish parliament. The Cromwellian Commonwealth (1649 to 1660) merged Ireland with England and closed the Dublin parliament. The 1660 Restoration revived the parliament, but it met only once (1661 to 1666) before being prorogued. Connolly (1992, 37): “The lack of regular meetings of parliament, prorogued since 1666, took away the main potential forum for opposition.” The Jacobite parliament met in Dublin during the Jacobite war (1689 to 1691). James II “blocked the repeal of Poynings’s Law, the most important mechanism by which the proceedings of the Irish parliament were controlled from London” (Connolly 1992, 34). The lack of functioning parliaments and executive control over the few that convened removed institutional constraints. |
| 1692–1782 | 2 | The Protestant Ascendancy parliament. A regular parliament had supply leverage but remained subordinated. Following the Williamite victory, the Irish parliament became a regular institution. Connolly (1992, 44): “After 1692, meetings of the Irish parliament became much more frequent, eventually settling down to a regular session of five to eight months’ duration every second year.” Beckett (1986, xxxix): “It was then, for the first time, that the Irish parliament... became a regular and essential part of the machinery of government. ... From this time onwards governments become increasingly dependent upon parliamentary supply.” In 1692, the Commons claimed the “sole right” to initiate financial legislation. Connolly records that Sydney “seized on the most provocative of the Commons’ acts, their claim that they had the ‘sole right’ to initiate legislation relating to finance, as an excuse to suspend the proceedings by a prorogation” (Connolly 1992, 75). Poynings’ Law remained “the most important mechanism by which the proceedings of the Irish parliament were controlled from London” (Connolly 1992, 34). The Declaratory Act (1720) established Westminster supremacy. Chief governors controlled parliament through the “undertaker system” and patronage (Connolly 1992, 96). Parliament gained leverage through its control of supply. A regularly meeting parliament enforcing supply checks provided a moderate limitation. A London-appointed executive and mechanisms like Poynings’ Law limited its independence. |
| 1782–1801 | 3 | Legislative independence (1782). Grattan’s Parliament achieved legislative independence, but the executive remained unaccountable. The Constitution of 1782 removed Poynings’ Law and the Declaratory Act, giving the Irish parliament authority to legislate for Ireland. Connolly (2008, 409): “Ireland is now a nation! In that new character I hail her! and bowing to her august presence, I say, Esto Perpetua.” The Irish parliament gained legislative sovereignty. London still appointed the executive, the lord lieutenant, who did not rely on a parliamentary majority. The parliament remained exclusively Protestant, using a narrow franchise that excluded Catholics. The parliament legislated independently and controlled supply, but the executive operated without accountability and the institution did not represent the governed population. |
| 1801–1920 | 1 | Union with Britain. The Act of Union abolished the Irish parliament, shifting governance to London. The Act of Union, effective 1 January 1801, dissolved the Irish parliament. Hoppen (1989, 16): “With the Dublin parliament abolished, a hundred Irish MPs, twenty-eight Irish peers, and four Church of Ireland bishops would sit at Westminster.” The Dublin administration governed Ireland from Dublin Castle but answered to London. Hoppen (1989, 27): “The chief secretary was effectively the Irish minister in the Commons and as such spent most of the parliamentary session in London... The under-secretary minded the shop in Dublin Castle.” Beckett (1986, xli) writes that the Act of Union meant “the extinction of the Irish parliament and the merging of Ireland with Great Britain in a new United Kingdom”; “the union of the Irish and British parliaments marked a break.” Irish MPs at Westminster could influence British policy, resulting in British parliamentary pressure on a British executive rather than an Irish institution constraining an Irish executive. O’Connell’s Repeal movement and the Home Rule movement sought to restore Irish self-government but did not succeed during this period. Irish institutions provided no constraint on the executive. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1439 | 1 | Communal and fragmented Italy. Pre-communal and early commune Italy. During the first century of this period, the Kingdom of Italy under the Holy Roman Empire split into duchies, marches, and bishoprics. Bishops and counts governed these fragments at royal pleasure. Tabacco (1989, ch. 4) points out that ducal and episcopal autonomy established de facto limits against royal power. However, the executive lacked formal institutional constraints. The northern communes emerged in the late eleventh century: “Late eleventh-century evidence for this in Milan, as in many other cities of the kingdom, is supplied by the mention of the consulate ... and appeared in the cities before the term commune came to be used” (Tabacco 1989). The consuls functioned as the executive, creating a collective magistracy instead of an external body checking a separate executive. This does not qualify as constraint under the Polity rubric. Venice’s Maggior Consiglio (1172) introduced structured deliberation. After the 1183 Peace of Constance, Frederick Barbarossa gave the Lombard League cities “all the powers that legal doctrine considered to be founded on royal and imperial authority ... rights of jurisdiction ‘in causes both criminal and pecuniary’; rights to an army and fortification” (Tabacco 1989, 216). Venice’s constitutional setup, including the Great Council, Senate, and Council of Ten (from 1310), was the most advanced on the peninsula. The doge was “everywhere beset by limitations” (Knapton 2012, 139). However, Venice was an exception. The Papal States operated without a representative assembly checking the pope (Carocci 2012, 74). The papacy was “a sort of monarchy, but elective, collegiate and elderly” (Carocci 2012, 80). Naples and Sicily were unconstrained monarchies under Norman, Hohenstaufen, Angevin, and early Aragonese rule. Florence shifted from a guild republic to Medici dominance. The Visconti took Milan by 1277. Factionalism divided Genoa. Since the Papal States, Naples, Milan, Florence, and Genoa operated without constraints, Italy as a whole scores 1 for every decade from 980 through 1439. |
| 1440–1509 | 2 | Aragonese Naples and Venice. Aragonese Naples temporarily increased the country score. The Kingdom of Naples transferred control to Alfonso the Magnanimous of Aragon in 1443, beginning a phase of active parliamentary activity. Henriques et al. (2026) code Naples at a high level for 1450–1500. The portfolio codes it at moderate constraint because the Neapolitan parlamento performed fiscal-consent functions, but could not convene independently, and the king could ignore its petitions. Because Naples had a parliamentary system alongside the constrained republic of Venice, Italy as a whole rose above 1. Starting in 1500, the Spanish conquest of Naples (finished in 1504) eliminated southern parliamentary activity. The Florentine republic (1494–1512) briefly provided constraint in the north, but by 1510 Spanish rule controlled Naples and ended its parlamento. Milan fell under Sforza and then French rule, while factional disorder affected Genoa. The Aragonese parliamentary period in Naples created enough constraint across the peninsula to increase the country score to 2, before the Spanish conquest ended it. |
| 1510–1529 | 1 | Spanish conquest of Naples. Transition period. Spanish forces completed the conquest of Naples by 1504, and the parlamento declined under viceregal rule. The Florentine republic (1494–1512) provided some constraint in Florence early in this period. Najemy (2006, 387) notes the Florentine Great Council held “final approval of all legislation,” with over 3,000 citizens participating. The Medici returned backed by Spanish troops in 1512, ending the republic. Genoa remained disordered by factions. Milan shifted from Sforza to French rule. Once the Spanish crown absorbed Naples and defeated the Florentine republic, Venice was the only constrained polity on the peninsula. Italy as a whole drops back to 1, marking the low point between the Aragonese parliamentary period and Andrea Doria’s reform of Genoa. |
| 1530–1799 | 2 | Genoese and Venetian republics. Genoa’s aristocratic republic maintained the country score at 2 alongside Venice. Andrea Doria took control of Genoa in 1528, reviving the republic with an aristocratic constitution. The aristocratic council elected the doge, and a formal constitution limited his authority. Venice maintained its full constitutional apparatus (Great Council, Senate, Council of Ten, and collegio). This ensured the doge could not act alone on foreign affairs, war, or finances (Knapton 2012, 137–139). This arrangement lasted until Napoleon defeated it in 1797. However, the mainland polities operated as absolutist or near-absolutist states. Milan was a Spanish viceroyalty from 1535, before becoming Austrian in 1713. Naples was a Spanish viceroyalty from 1504, transitioning to Austrian and then Bourbon rule from 1734. Henriques et al. (2026) code Naples at 1 for 1650, 1700, and 1750. The final parlamento met in 1642, leaving the rulers to negotiate taxation solely with the city of Naples. Tuscany operated as the Medici grand duchy starting in 1537, later transitioning to the House of Habsburg-Lorraine. The Papal States had no assembly to check the papacy. Dincecco, Federico, and Vindigni (2011) note that Italian states lacked limited government during this time. Fragmentation, rather than representative institutions, limited fiscal extraction. Italy as a whole scores 2 during this period. Venice and Genoa continued as constrained republics, while Milan, Tuscany, Naples, and the Papal States were governed by absolutist regimes. The two republics prevented the score from falling to 1, but did not raise it further. The abolition of the Venetian Republic in May 1797 (sealed by the Treaty of Campo Formio that October) and Genoa’s transition into a French satellite reduced the score to 1. |
| 1800–1859 | 1 | Napoleonic satellite states and restoration absolutism; from 1848, the Statuto Albertino in Piedmont only. French revolutionary armies reorganized the peninsula into satellite republics and the 1805 Kingdom of Italy under Viceroy Eugène de Beauharnais. Rulers imposed constitutions from above, allowing the viceroy to govern by decree. After 1815, the Congress of Vienna restored the pre-Napoleonic rulers. This established Austrian dominance across Lombardy-Venetia, Bourbons in Naples-Sicily, the Papal States, and the smaller duchies. Sardinia-Piedmont was the only state to grant a lasting constitution. Carlo Alberto’s 4 March 1848 Statuto Albertino established a bicameral system featuring “a chamber of deputies, with members elected on the basis of a limited suffrage ... a ministry responsible to parliament,” and parliament “met for the first time” on 8 May 1848 (Langer 1972, 704). This began Cavour’s parliamentary career (Romeo 2011). Venice and Milan remained under Austrian rule, and a restored Habsburg-Lorraine governed Florence. Naples disregarded its February 1848 constitution and formally revoked it in 1851. France defeated the Roman Republic in July 1849. Because almost the entire peninsula was subject to absolutist or foreign rule, and only Sardinia-Piedmont maintained a functioning parliament, Italy as a whole scores 1 through 1859. |
| 1860–1869 | 2 | Unification under Sardinia-Piedmont. Unification transition. Most regions joined Sardinia-Piedmont under the Statuto. Garibaldi’s 1860 Expedition of the Thousand incorporated the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies into the new state. Lombardy was annexed after the Second War of Independence. Tuscany joined through a March 1860 plebiscite. Leaders proclaimed the Kingdom of Italy on 17 March 1861. By 1860, the Statuto Albertino governed most of the North, establishing parliamentary constraints. Romeo (2014) notes that Cavour’s push for unification required continuous support from the Chamber. Governments fell and formed based on parliamentary votes, even though the king retained his appointment powers. Venice remained under Austrian rule until 1866. The Papal States continued under temporal papal rule (backed by a French garrison until 1870), and Naples and Sicily spent 1860 in transition. Italy as a whole scores 2 for the 1860s. Most Italians lived under the Statuto, but Venice remained separate, and the Papal States remained outside the constitutional order. |
| 1870–1920 | 5 | Liberal Kingdom of Italy. Unified Kingdom of Italy. The Statuto framework facilitated Giolittian parliamentary consolidation. Forces captured Rome in September 1870, annexed the Papal States, and completed unification. From 1870 onward, Italy scores directly as a single polity. The Statuto established a bicameral parliament with an elected Chamber of Deputies, a royally appointed Senate, and a ministry responsible to parliament. The Destra Storica (1861–1876) governed with voting restricted to about 1.9 percent of the population. The king retained significant influence over foreign policy and the military. Romanelli (2023) notes the king “nominava e licenziava i suoi ministri” (appointed and dismissed his ministers) and “mantenne a lungo ampi poteri sull’indirizzo politico del governo, soprattutto nella nomina dei ministri degli Esteri, della Guerra e della Marina” (long maintained extensive powers, especially over the ministers of Foreign Affairs, War, and the Navy). The March 1876 “parliamentary revolution” resulted in the first government change caused by a parliamentary vote instead of royal initiative. An August 1876 royal decree regulated the Council of Ministers, “di fatto sottraendone molte al sovrano, tanto che alcuni datarono solo ad allora la nascita del governo parlamentare in Italia” (in fact removing many functions from the sovereign) (Romanelli 2023). The 1882 reform increased the electorate from roughly 2 to 7 percent. When the Pelloux government attempted to restrict civil liberties by decree (1899–1900), parliamentary obstruction defeated the move. The 1912 reform introduced near-universal male suffrage, increasing the electorate from roughly 3 million up to 8.5 million. Romanelli (2023) notes the rise of mass parties ended the old trasformismo, demonstrating that Italian parliamentarism functioned substantively. Italy entered the First World War in May 1915 following the Treaty of London. The king and foreign minister signed it, bypassing parliament before securing a later ratification (“la guerra aveva considerevolmente aumentato i poteri del governo.” Romanelli 2023). The Chamber continued to meet and vote on war measures. Score 5. A parliament holding legislative power, backed by broad (and post-1912 near-universal) male suffrage, placed substantial limits on the executive and regularly brought down governments. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1300 | 1 | Pre-representative comital rule. No representative institutions. Myers (1975, 78) tracks the provincial estates of the Low Countries back to the Burgundian period; no standing assembly existed before that consolidation. Israel (1995, 277) notes: “before 1572, the States of Holland, like the other provincial assemblies, were an occasional, advisory body meeting (usually) only when summoned by the ruler.” No institutionalized legislative constraint existed before the fourteenth century. Van Zanden et al. (2012) count zero States-General meetings in the fourteenth century and log no activity before 1464. Score 1. |
| 1300–1464 | 2 | Provincial estates. Provincial estates formed, introducing consultation without legislation. During the 14th and early fifteenth centuries, provincial estates started meeting in the wealthier provinces. In Holland, “the nobles had only one vote, whereas eighteen towns had a vote each” (Myers 1975, 80). Rulers only called these assemblies to negotiate taxes. “Before 1572, the States of Holland... were an occasional, advisory body meeting (usually) only when summoned by the ruler, chiefly (though not exclusively) to discuss the ruler’s tax needs. Religion, military affairs, and foreign policy... were out of bounds” (Israel 1995, 277). Score 2 rather than 1 because individual provincial estates held a fiscal veto. The score remains 2 rather than 3 because the ruler controlled the summons and agenda, bypassing the estates on non-tax matters. |
| 1464–1572 | 3 | Burgundian-Habsburg States-General. The States-General formed and established regular fiscal consultation. Philip the Good called the first States-General in 1464. In 1477, Mary of Burgundy conceded the Great Privilege. Under this agreement, “the States-General must be consulted on many important issues, including the levy of taxation and the declaration of any war; they were to be allowed to meet where and when they wished” (Myers 1975, 79). Myers notes, “Between 1464 and 1576 there were about 160 meetings of the States-General” (1975, 79). Rulers, however, “rapidly negated in practice” the Great Privilege (Israel 1995, 32). The Habsburgs maintained tight control over agendas, convocations, and dismissals. The States-General bargained over taxes but could not legislate or block the executive regarding religion, war, or appointments. Score 3 rather than 4 because the body lacked initiative and non-fiscal constraints. |
| 1572–1587 | 5 | Dutch Revolt. Revolt transition: the States of Holland assumed sovereignty. The Dutch Revolt transformed the States from an advisory body into a sovereign governing institution. “After 1572 ... It was also essential, if the Revolt was to survive, that the States of Holland should assume both executive and legislative power, as well as responsibility for implementing decisions” (Israel 1995, 278). “[B]efore 1572, it was unusual for the States of Holland to meet for as many as sixty days in a year. After 1572, they invariably gathered for over 200 days per year”. The 1579 Union of Utrecht established the confederal framework. The 1581 Act of Abjuration deposed Philip II. “Only with Leicester’s departure, in 1587, did a fully republican system evolve in which the States of Holland, led by Oldenbarnevelt, emerged in practice, if not in theory, as the principal decision-making body” (Israel 1995, 700). A score of 5 applies to these contested constraints during the transition. |
| 1587–1618 | 7 | Oldenbarnevelt’s republic. Republican ascendancy: the States of Holland acted as the sovereign decision-maker. “a fully republican system evolve[d] in which the States of Holland, led by Oldenbarnevelt, emerged in practice, if not in theory, as the principal decision-making body” (Israel 1995, 700). The constitution subordinated the Stadholder (Maurits) as “an official of the Provincial Estates” (Hart 1993, 20). At the federal level, “on all important issues, such as war and peace, or taxation, unanimity was required”. Central revenues formed only a small fraction of the total, tying most revenue to provincial consent. The Council of State’s “executie” remained “always highly contested and therefore seldom applied” (Hart 1993, 82). Score 7: the representative body held authority equal to or greater than the executive, and veto points prevented autonomous executive action. |
| 1618–1650 | 5 | Maurits and Frederik Hendrik stadholderate. Orangist ascendancy: the Stadholder dominated, but the provinces retained their fiscal veto. Maurits’s 1618 coup “fundamentally changed the structure of power at all levels in the United Provinces, replacing a fully republican with a quasi-republican ‘Caesarean’ system” (Israel 1995, 700). Under Frederik Hendrik, “Holland remained in an essentially subordinate position, with major appointments and decisions being made by the Stadholder and his favourites” (Israel 1995, 701). Yet “the States of Holland could be manipulated but not coerced, and their financial strength meant that their consent was essential to the successful government of the Republic” (Price 1998, 63). Furthermore, “Amsterdam was an impregnable bulwark of provincial independence throughout the seventeenth century” (Price 1998, 85). Score 5: the Stadholder exercised substantial independent authority, while the fiscal veto and the independence of Holland’s towns imposed actual constraints. |
| 1650–1672 | 7 | First Stadholderless Period. First Stadholderless Period: “True Freedom.” William II’s death in November 1650 “precipitated a much more fundamental change than his sensational coup... The new era of republican rule was to last twenty-two years” (Israel 1995, 702). The Perpetual Edict (1667) formalized “the transfer of the political functions of the Stadholder of Holland to the provincial States” (Israel 1995, 792). Under the restored republic, “it was the committees of the States of Holland which controlled diplomacy and the use of the army” (Israel 1995, 701). Score 7: the executive answered to the representative body. |
| 1672–1702 | 5 | William III’s stadholderate. William III’s Stadholderate: strong executive and functional fiscal constraint. The 1672 French invasion triggered William III’s restoration. “It was the people who made the Prince Stadholder in July 1672, transforming the structure of power” (Israel 1995, 802). He “concentrat[ed] power and influence in the hands of the Stadholder and his favourites, weakening the formal procedures of the Republic” (Israel 1995, 960). The institutional constraints remained intact. “The princes could wield a great deal of influence in Holland but they were never able to subvert its political system... In particular, Amsterdam was an impregnable bulwark” (Price 1998, 85). Score 5. |
| 1702–1747 | 6 | Second Stadholderless Period. Second Stadholderless Period: “Republic of the Regents.” William III’s death triggered a second abolition of the stadholderate. “The States of Holland had decided to ... suspend the political functions of the stadholderate, precisely as in 1650” (Israel 1995, 959). Power shifted to the regent oligarchies. Score 6 rather than 7 because these oligarchies functioned as a hereditary patriciate. The States governed directly and checked power at the elite level without democratic participation. |
| 1747–1787 | 5 | Hereditary stadholderate. Hereditary Stadholderate restored with regent counterbalance. French military pressure in 1747 triggered an Orangist uprising. This movement restored William IV as Stadholder of all seven provinces and made the office hereditary (Israel 1995, 1067–1071). From 1780, the Patriot movement sought to “wrest control of civic and provincial life from the hands of the Stadholder’s favourites, and the regent oligarchies, and transfer power to those who regarded themselves as the spokesmen and representatives of the people” (Israel 1995, 1100). Score 5: the Stadholder possessed substantial independent authority, while provinces and towns retained administrative and fiscal power. |
| 1787–1795 | 4 | Orangist restoration. Orangist restoration under Prussian protection. Prussian intervention ended the Patriot Revolution in September 1787. William V returned, and the regime functioned as a Prussian and British protectorate. The Stadholder depended on foreign support rather than domestic legitimacy (Israel 1995, 1113–1114). Score 4: the Stadholder still required provincial consent for revenue. The presence of foreign troops and the suppression of opposition diminished this constraint compared to the period from 1747 to 1787. |
| 1795–1806 | 3 | Batavian Republic. Batavian Republic under French hegemony. French forces invaded in January 1795 and proclaimed the Batavian Republic. The March 1796 National Assembly became the first nationally elected representative body in Dutch history: “if the National Assembly was not the nonpareil of popular sovereignty its more radical protagonists had wished to see, neither was it quite like any other representative institution the Dutch Republic had ever known” (Schama 1977, 246). The 1798 unitary constitution swept away “the entire structure of the past” (Israel 1995, 1123). A neofederal reaction in 1801 preceded French-imposed centralization. Score 3: representative institutions operated but could not constrain the executive without French approval. |
| 1806–1813 | 1 | Kingdom of Holland and annexation. Kingdom of Holland and French annexation. The Batavian Republic became the Kingdom of Holland under Louis Napoleon in 1806, functioning as a French client state (Israel 1995, 1129). The 1810 annexation eliminated Dutch sovereignty, and Napoleon thereafter ruled the country directly. Score 1: no working constraint on the executive. |
| 1813–1815 | 2 | Sovereign Principality of Willem I. Provisional government and constitution drafting. Following Napoleon’s defeat, Willem I returned as Sovereign Prince. A commission drafted the 1815 constitution. The members of the States General called to approve it “had even been directly appointed by the king himself” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 88). Willem I ruled by decree until the constitution passed. Score 2: a representative body convened, but the members were appointed rather than elected. |
| 1815–1840 | 2 | Reign of Willem I. Willem I and autocratic rule. The 1815 constitution established “the bestowment of hereditary autocratic powers upon a new king” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 86). Parliament approved the budget every ten years, and “the consequences of a sustained rejection of the budget were unclear” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 87). Article 73 explicitly stated “Le Roi décide seul” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 86). A narrow group voted indirectly for parliament, chosen “by a taxpayers’ elite of some 3.5 percent of the relevant age-group” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 88). Ministers answered exclusively to the king. Score 2: the budget veto forced Willem I’s abdication in 1840, but he otherwise governed without formal checks. |
| 1840–1848 | 3 | 1840 constitutional amendment. The 1840 amendment and budget reform. This amendment introduced “a modest degree of ministerial responsibility” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 104) and shifted from ten-year to two-year budgets. The revision required public government finances. As a result, “the most important change introduced in 1840... was that all information about government finance was to be made public, ending the period of hidden and semilegal operations” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 171). Willem II’s views “were hardly more liberal than those held by his father” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 172). Score 3: two-year budgets and transparency increased parliamentary leverage, though the king retained the power to appoint ministers and dissolve parliament. |
| 1848–1868 | 6 | Thorbecke constitution. Thorbecke constitution and parliamentary government. Through the 1848 constitution, the Dutch bourgeoisie “managed to eliminate the monarchy from the competition for formal executive and legislative power” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 174). Annual budgets requiring parliamentary approval became “the cornerstone of parliamentary power” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 175). “There is no doubt that this new constitution... was well ahead of its time” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 175). The confidence convention remained unsettled. Willem III dismissed Thorbecke in 1853 despite his parliamentary support. Score 6: the formal rules operated immediately, though the confidence convention took time to consolidate. |
| 1868–1920 | 7 | Parliamentary supremacy. Parliamentary supremacy confirmed. The crisis of 1866 to 1868 established that cabinets required parliamentary support. The 1848 constitution had allowed the bourgeoisie to “eliminate the monarchy from the competition for formal executive and legislative power” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 174), and annual budget control remained “the cornerstone of parliamentary power” (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004, 175). The 1917 Pacification introduced universal male suffrage and proportional representation without altering the executive constraints. Score 7. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1379 | 1 | Kingship, things, and royal council. Bagge (2010, 334) concludes that “the current ideology in thirteenth-century Norway was closer to dominium regale than regimen politicum” and that “[t]here were few exact limits to what the king could do on his own.” The lagthings functioned primarily as judicial bodies: “The only way for the king to influence legislation and communicate with the people was through negotiations at the lagtings” (Bagge 2010, 335). A national diet existed from the mid-twelfth century, but it was “not a clearly defined institution with fixed membership and competence and regular meetings”. Hákon Hákonsson and Magnus Law-mender used these assemblies to legitimize legislation like the Landslov (1274), and the king retained final authority. From Håkon V (1299 to 1319) onward the royal council replaced the assemblies, but it formed no check: “The governing circle around the king was so vaguely defined and so elusive that it is very difficult to imagine that it can have formed an effective barrier against the king’s ability to make the day-to-day decisions he wanted” (Bagge 2010, 343). “From a constitutional point of view, the king’s position may seem to resemble that of a modern military commander who is obliged to listen to advice but not to follow it”. Score 1: the things and the council provided negotiation and advice, but no accountability group held recognized powers over the executive. |
| 1380–1535 | 1 | Kalmar Union and the decline of the council. Norway entered a personal union with Denmark in 1380. The Norwegian council (rigsråd) formally retained its constitutional position: the 1449 to 1450 accession charters stated that “the council of the realm should consent to all important royal decisions concerning Norway” (Schück 2003, 695). The formal rights were never operative. The accessions of 1448 and 1481 were occasions for asserting the council’s authority, but Christian I’s håndfestning, the Bergen Union Treaty of 1450, and the Halmstad Recess “marked progress in this direction, but only on parchment; conditions for exploiting the formal rights of the council in practice were obviously lacking” (Schück 2003, 698). By the early sixteenth century, the Norwegian high nobility was “almost extinct” due to dying lineages and marriages into Danish families (Ulsig 2003, 648), and the king placed foreign favorites in a council that lacked the power to carry out its policies (Schück 2003, 699–700). Danish control then intensified as the crown pushed toward full incorporation, and Danish appointees dominated the council (Larsen 1948, 223–224). Score 1: the council’s consent rights existed on parchment, but no accountability group constrained the executive in practice. |
| 1536–1813 | 1 | Danish rule and absolutism. After Christian III won the Count’s War in 1536, the formal Norwegian council “simply disappeared without having been formally abolished” (Larsen 1948, 246). Norway was governed through a statholder. “From 1536 until 1660 Norway was a kingdom under Danish rule without any permanent representative organ for any part of the Norwegian population” (Rian 2016, 392). The 1660 coup then gave the king absolute power, and he extended the Kongelov (Lex Regia, 1665) to Norway. The Norwegian estates met in Christiania in 1661, swore an oath to absolutism, and never met again (Larsen 1948, 289). “In theory the Danish-Norwegian absolutism was the most logically developed and complete divine-right absolutism in all Europe”. The Lex Regia remained “the constitution of the two countries” until 1814 (Larsen 1948, 289). Score 1: no accountability group or representative institution existed at any point between the disappearance of the council and the 1814 constitutional break. |
| 1814–1858 | 5 | Eidsvoll Constitution. The Eidsvoll Constitution established a constitutional monarchy with a separation of powers. The 17 May 1814 Constitution created a limited hereditary monarchy based on popular sovereignty and Montesquieu’s division of powers (Larsen 1948, 386). The Storting acted as an elected legislature with exclusive control over taxation and legislation. The king retained significant executive power. He appointed and dismissed a government that operated independently of the Storting (Gammelgaard and Holmøyvik 2014, 14). He held a suspensive veto over laws (Larsen 1948, 405), and the Storting possessed the authority to impeach ministers. “The establishment of a liberal constitutional monarchy in place of absolutism, giving Norway a more democratic government than that of any other country in Europe, was a great achievement” (Larsen 1948, 386). Score 5: real fiscal and legislative checks existed, but the executive retained significant independent power. |
| 1859 | 6 | Storting ascendancy. The Storting increased its capacity to constrain the executive. Efforts to make ministers answerable to the Storting gathered force in the decades before their resolution in 1884 (Gammelgaard and Holmøyvik 2014, 13–14). The year marks Karl XV’s accession: as regent during Oscar’s illness he had left the statholder post in Norway vacant and “intimated his willingness to sanction abolition of the office as his ‘morning gift’ to the Norwegian people” (Larsen 1948, 425), opening the statholder controversy that broke in 1860. Score 6: the Storting exerted concrete pressure on the crown regarding executive appointments during this transition. |
| 1860–1883 | 5 | Veto conflicts over ministerial attendance. The Storting constrained the crown, but parliamentary government remained unestablished. Conflicts over seating ministers in the Storting escalated during the 1870s and 1880s. The Storting passed amendments to require ministerial attendance three times. The king vetoed them all and claimed an absolute veto over constitutional changes (Larsen 1948, 456–457). Score 5: the executive faced practical limits but did not answer constitutionally to parliament. |
| 1884–1920 | 7 | Advent of parliamentary government. The 1884 impeachment of the Selmer ministry established parliamentary government: “All power was gathered ‘in this hall,’ i.e., the Storthing” (Larsen 1948, 458). In practice, “the king could not appoint a government that lacked majority support in Storthinget” (Gammelgaard and Holmøyvik 2014, 14). The 1911 amendment to Article 31 formalized this system. The Council of State had to approve all executive decisions, which codified the structure established after 1884. Score 7: the constitution formalized full executive subordination to parliament. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1374 | 1 | Piast monarchy. No institutionalized representative body. Mieszko I and his successors used an advisory council of nobles (Rada), but it did not institutionally constrain the prince. Under Casimir III (1333 to 1370), the monarchy faced no disputes and no representative assembly existed (Henriques et al. 2026, citing Frost 2015). The fragmentation period (1138 to 1320) split authority among Piast dukes without creating a parliament. Van Zanden et al. (2012) list zero meetings in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The roughly 20 noble assemblies in the fourteenth century were ad hoc meetings rather than a formal parliament with set powers. Score 1: no institutional constraint on the executive. |
| 1375–1425 | 2 | Privilege of Koszyce. The Privileges of Kassa set a fiscal limit on the crown. Louis of Anjou needed the nobles to approve his daughters’ succession, so he issued the Privileges of Kassa in 1374. He capped the poradlne (land tax), and it “could not be revised without the consent of the assembly of the nobles” (Henriques et al. 2026). The 1386 Krewo Act united Poland and Lithuania under one ruler. “By 1400 the executive was not all powerful and the Polity IV Constraints on executive score is 2” (Henriques et al. 2026). Formal parliamentary institutions had not yet formed, resulting in an ad hoc fiscal check. Score 2: a limited fiscal check on the executive, with no standing institution. |
| 1425–1505 | 3 | Nobles expanded their privileges. The bicameral Sejm emerged. Under the Jedlnia Privileges (1430 to 1433), “the king could no longer expropriate the nobility without a court order” (Henriques et al. 2026, citing Frost 2015, 352). Neminem captivabimus (1425) stopped imprisonment without a court order. In 1493, Poland created the bicameral Sejm by splitting it into the Senate and Chamber of Envoys. The fifteenth-century constraint was heavy, but the 1505 Nihil Novi statute had not yet secured full legislative supremacy. The king could still write laws and call the Sejm whenever he wanted (Henriques et al. codes 1450 and 1500 at 3). Score 3: an accountability group plays a legislative role, but its veto does not bind the king. |
| 1505–1572 | 5 | Golden Liberty. Nihil Novi established Sejm legislative supremacy. The 1505 Statute of Nihil Novi declared that “no new law could pass without the approval of the Chamber of Envoys” (Henriques et al. 2026). The Mielnik Articles (1501) laid out “the conditions under which the monarch might lawfully be resisted and even deprived of his throne should he behave tyrannically” (Henriques et al. 2026, citing Frost 2015, 347). Starting in 1538, “the king cannot remove anyone from the office” (Henriques et al. 2026). In the bicameral Sejm, the Chamber “retained legislative power and appointed some statewide offices, including the treasurer” (Henriques et al. 2026). The Union of Lublin (1569) formed the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, giving it a shared Sejm and an elected monarch. Score 5: the diet acts as the primary legislative body, and the king cannot pass laws without its consent. However, the formally elected monarchy and Pacta Conventa needed for score 7 did not exist yet. |
| 1573–1652 | 7 | The Henrician Articles. The Sejm achieved parity with the crown. The Henrician Articles (1573) meant that “kings were elected, and any nobleman could be king; the crown was not hereditary; the king must summon the diet every two years at least; money for the military was collected and spent locally; the king could not borrow without the Diet’s permission; personal inviolability of the nobility; religious freedom; kings could be abolished” (Henriques et al. 2026). Resident senators watched the king: “since 1600 constraints on executive score is 7, since there is parity between the executive and the accountability body” (Henriques et al. 2026). Davies (2005, vol. 1, 254) calls the Chamber of Envoys “the more powerful element in the Sejm, therefore, and, as such, the highest authority in the state. These arrangements, completed in time for the accession of the first elected king in 1573, prevailed until 1791.” Score 7: parity balances the king and the diet, as the liberum veto did not appear until 1652. |
| 1652–1697 | 5 | First liberum veto. The Sejm weakened, but constraint persisted. In the first liberum veto (1652), a single deputy “first brought parliamentary proceedings to a complete stop by his sole protestation.” The veto “broke” the entire Sejm, wiping out all legislation (Lukowski 1991, 91–92). “The liberum veto finished off the Sejm as a serious legislative organ” (Lukowski 1991, 91). Under John III Sobieski, the Sejm worked through confederations. These groups voted by majority and ignored the veto, forming “the union of the nobility into a common cause in time of extreme peril” (Lukowski 1991, 92). Score 5 rather than 7: the liberum veto hurt the Sejm’s ability to act. It could block the executive but could not reliably pass laws. The Henrician Articles and confederations kept the constraint above score 3. |
| 1697–1764 | 2 | Saxon period. The Sejm ceased functioning, and active constraint disappeared. Bribery and foreign intervention installed the Saxon Wettin kings. “Of thirty-seven Sejmy between 1697 and 1762, only thirteen reached a positive conclusion in the form of legislation or the election of a new king” (Lukowski 1991, 92). “Under Augustus III (1733–63), only one Sejm was able to pass any legislation at all” (Davies 2005, vol. 1, 265). Worse, “The Sejm, the dietines, and the Royal elections were all governed by the principle of unanimity” (Davies 2005, vol. 1, 259). Score 2 rather than 7: the working constraint dissolved. The impossibility of governing limited the king, rather than active oversight. The score is 2 instead of 1 because the elected monarchy and Pacta Conventa technically survived, and confederations occasionally acted. It stays at 2 rather than 3 because the Sejm could not reliably pass laws. |
| 1764–1788 | 3 | Stanisław August. Limited reforms under Russian domination. Elected in 1764 as Catherine the Great’s favored choice, Stanisław August Poniatowski started reforms. The 1764 Convocation Sejm limited the liberum veto on economic issues, set up treasury and military commissions (Lukowski 1991, 179–180), and began composing a state budget (Henriques et al. 2026). The 1775 Permanent Council (Rada Nieustająca) was “divided into five departments, of foreign affairs, the army, the judiciary, the treasury and police” (Lukowski 1991, 208), though it existed mainly to tie the king’s hands. Russia forced through the 1768 Cardinal Laws, “formally codified as ‘Cardinal Laws’. These were to remain immutable” (Lukowski 1991, 196). This kept the liberum veto alive for core issues, and the Commonwealth suffered the First Partition in 1772. Score 3: the Sejm regained some legislative activity, but Russian control prevented it from acting as an independent check. |
| 1788–1791 | 5 | The Four Years’ Sejm. Reform momentum. The Four Years’ Sejm (1788 to 1792) held legislative authority during open sessions: “The Four Years Sejm saw an unprecedented flood of polemical literature” (Lukowski 1991, 245). It pushed back against Russian control, ultimately producing the Constitution of 3 May 1791. Score 5: a deliberative body with working legislative power. The score is 5 rather than 6 because the old Pacta Conventa framework still formally governed while they finalized the new constitutional settlement. |
| 1791–1793 | 6 | The Constitution of 3 May. Brief constitutional monarchy. The 3 May 1791 Constitution built “a new constitution... based on the US constitution, but with a hereditary crown and a government tightly controlled in taxation, war declarations, and budgets by the Chamber of Envoys” (Henriques et al. 2026). It abolished the liberum veto and set up a constitutional monarchy where ministers answered to parliament. It lasted less than 18 months. The Targowica Confederation invited Russian intervention in April 1792, and the king yielded by July. Score 6 rather than 7: the design met score 7, but it did not last long enough for parliamentary sovereignty to take hold before external threats ended it. |
| 1793–1795 | 1 | Second Partition and institutional collapse. Convened under Russian military occupation, the 1793 Grodno Sejm had to ratify the Second Partition under duress. The Russians restored the liberum veto and repealed the May 3 Constitution. They defeated the Kościuszko Uprising in 1794, and the 1795 Third Partition ended the Commonwealth. Score 1: the Polish state existed on paper but functioned entirely under foreign military control, leaving the Grodno Sejm with no independent authority. |
| 1795–1807 | -66 | Partition interregnum. The October 1795 Third Partition divided all remaining Polish territory among Russia, Prussia, and Austria, dissolving the Commonwealth. No sovereign Polish executive existed to constrain, and no Polish legislative institutions survived. This code applies until the Treaty of Tilsit created the Duchy of Warsaw in July 1807. |
| 1807–1815 | 3 | Duchy of Warsaw. A French client state with a constitution. Napoleon created the Duchy through the 1807 Treaty of Tilsit, putting Frederick August of Saxony in charge as hereditary ruler (Wandycz 1974, 43–47). The constitution “provided for a near absolute monarchy and vested the king with full executive powers and exclusive initiative in legislation.” However, “legislative powers, although greatly circumscribed, were vested in a bicameral Sejm” (Wandycz 1974, 44–45); “The Sejm voted on tax legislation, although it had no say in drawing up the budget” (Wandycz 1974, 45). Napoleon held ultimate authority. Score 3: the constitution imposed a moderate constraint, but the ruler kept the executive initiative and outsiders imposed the rules. |
| 1815–1831 | 3 | Congress Kingdom. An autonomous constitutional monarchy under the Russian tsar. The 27 November 1815 Constitutional Charter set up “a bicameral Sejm.” It also required that “before being crowned kings of Poland Alexander’s successors had to swear to observe the charter” (Wandycz 1974, 75–76), and it included “an impressive sounding section on civil liberties” (Wandycz 1974, 76). Even so, “theory and practice soon drew apart”: the state imposed censorship in 1819 and silenced the opposition by the 1825 Sejm (Wandycz 1974, 76, 83, 87). Score 3: a standing bicameral legislature held specific powers, but the tsar held power, making the guarantees impossible to enforce. |
| 1831–1867 | -66 | Organic Statute repression. Following the 1830 to 1831 November Uprising, Tsar Nicholas I issued the 1832 Organic Statute. This abolished the Polish constitution, the Sejm, and the separate army. Russia absorbed the Congress Kingdom under military administration and later defeated the 1863 to 1864 January Uprising. No sovereign Polish executive existed (pre-interruption score 3). |
| 1867–1918 | -66 | Partitioned provincial diets. After the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, Galicia gained autonomy and its own provincial diet. Poles sat in “native sejms... the Galician diet, the Viennese Reichsrat, the Poznanian diet, the Prussian Landtag, the German Reichstag, and finally even the Russian Duma” (Wandycz 1974, xi–xii). These groups represented provinces or minorities within foreign states. They did not constrain a sovereign Polish executive, because one did not exist until November 1918. |
| 1918–1920 | 6 | Second Polish Republic. A functioning parliamentary democracy under wartime conditions. Poland regained sovereignty in November 1918. The January 1919 Legislative Sejm, elected through universal suffrage, controlled the budget, wrote laws, and oversaw the government. The 1919 Small Constitution established Sejm supremacy. Score 6 rather than 7: they did not adopt the full constitution until March 1921, and the state fought the Polish-Soviet War (1919 to 1920) with executive power concentrated in Chief of State Piłsudski. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1253 | 1 | Pre-parliamentary monarchy. No regular representative institution existed. Ramos, Sousa, and Monteiro (2009, 77) trace the first Cortes with regular municipal representation to 1254. No similar body existed before the Cortes of Leiria: town procuradores appear “[s]eguramente a partir de 1254.” Van Zanden et al. (2012) log zero meetings in the twelfth century. Score 1: pre-parliamentary default. Records show no accountability group constrained the executive before 1254. |
| 1254–1384 | 3 | Early Cortes meetings. The 1254 Cortes of Leiria first included regular town representatives alongside the nobility and clergy: “Seguramente a partir de 1254, data que assinala a reunião de Cortes pelo rei em Leiria, os concelhos tiveram procuradores nessas assembleias” (Ramos et al. 2009, 77). The Cortes acted as “um órgão de representação dos principais grupos sociais e de consulta por parte do monarca”. It established the rule that extraordinary taxation needed consent from the three estates: “desde muito de trás se entendeu, e cumpriu, que a matéria fiscal tinha de ser votada pelos três estados, muito em especial as imposições extraordinárias” (Romero Magalhães 1993, 74). Still, the Cortes lacked the power to convene itself: “as cortes não reúnem sem ser a chamado do rei” (Romero Magalhães 1993, 74). Score 3: a representative body holds recognized fiscal and advisory roles. However, it lacks self-convocation and binding authority over the executive. |
| 1385–1480 | 4 | Avis peak. The Cortes reached its highest medieval influence. The 1385 Cortes of Coimbra elected João I as king: “a aclamação do novo monarca, no dia 6 de Abril” (Ramos et al. 2009, 139). This set a precedent “nunca esquecido” (Romero Magalhães 1993, 74). João I called the Cortes 24 to 26 times between 1385 and 1418, “um número muito considerável de vezes, até então nunca visto” (Ramos et al. 2009, 138). The 1438 to 1439 Cortes managed the regency during Afonso V’s minority, overriding Duarte’s will. Under Afonso V, town procuradores “não poupavam nas palavras e chegavam a interpelar a pessoa do rei” (Ramos et al. 2009, 161). Score 4 rather than 5 because the Cortes lacked the power to call itself to meet. The king could ignore petitions (and often did: “nada obrigava a que assim fosse” [Romero Magalhães 1993, 75]). No legislative veto existed. The Cortes checked the executive by approving taxes and legitimizing successions, not through actual parity. |
| 1481–1580 | 2 | Royal consolidation and Cortes decline. João II deliberately buried the Cortes starting in 1481. At the 1481 to 1482 Cortes of Évora, he staged a feudal homage ceremony before the opening, “Confusão premeditada de actos diversos, com que inicia a actividade domesticadora de grandes, títulos e senhores” (Romero Magalhães 1993, 75). After the 1502 Cortes of Lisbon, “Não mais D. Manuel se lembrou de recorrer às cortes” (Romero Magalhães 1993, 76). Cape Route money made fiscal consent unnecessary, launching a 23-year gap. João III brought the Cortes back “apenas para confirmar a tradição dinástica do juramento do herdeiro e para conceder esses serviços extraordinários”. He answered the 1525 and 1535 petitions late in 1539, “negando dar seguimento a não poucos dos pedidos apresentados”. Score 2. |
| 1581–1640 | 2 | Habsburg rule. The Cortes became marginalized. The April 1581 Cortes of Tomar featured real negotiation: “The assembly of the three estates — nobility, clergy, and the people — met for this purpose in April 1581 and by virtue of the pact agreed upon there, the kingdom of Portugal retained its legal system and its administrative and institutional autonomy” (Costa, Lains and Miranda 2016, 100–101). Philip II “teve o bom senso de não pedir serviços e empréstimos aos povos” (Romero Magalhães 1993, 78). The Cortes met only twice more over the next 60 years (1583, 1619), just to swear in heirs. Under Philip IV, taxation without parliament returned. The crown imposed the 1632 meias anatas “sem consentimento dos Três Estados do Reino e que, por isso, foi continuadamente considerado como ilegítimo” (Hespanha 1987, 190). Score 2: the constitutional rule still held normative force but functionally failed for most of the period. |
| 1641–1646 | 3 | Restoration revival of the Cortes. The Cortes met three times in five years (1641, 1642, 1646). In January 1641, it recognized João IV’s succession, abolished illegal Habsburg taxes, and passed the décima, “an entirely new income tax that would remain part of the fiscal system in Portugal until the nineteenth century” (Costa et al. 2016, 116). The Cortes “consented to the principle of the universality of the fiscal contribution, and reaffirmed it again in 1645” (Costa et al. 2016, 116–117). They built the Junta dos Três Estados, “vested with jurisdiction to oversee the collection of the décima and to control the spending of this tax stream,” and operated with “complete autonomy from the treasury council” (Costa et al. 2016, 117). Score 3: a real but temporary check on fiscal policy. |
| 1647–1699 | 1 | The Cortes abandoned. The Cortes stopped checking the executive after 1646. The Restoration war ended in 1668, ending the fiscal emergency. Henriques et al. note: “the Cortes did not meet after 1699, as the monarchs did not want to negotiate further taxes with this body” (2026). Score 1: no formal institution checked executive action. |
| 1700–1807 | 1 | Absolutism. The Cortes vanished for over a century. Pombal (1750 to 1777) relied on “dictatorial legislation as the only means of building up the economy of a nation” (Ogg 1965, 227). He acted as “in effect, the ruler of the state.” Maria I’s viradeira (1777 to 1807) brought back the Church and nobility socially, but not institutionally. She never summoned a Cortes. Van Zanden et al. (2012) log zero meetings in the eighteenth century. Score 1 throughout. |
| 1808–1819 | -66 | Court in Rio de Janeiro. The November 1807 French invasion pushed the court to Rio de Janeiro. The French occupation (1807 to 1808) led to British military rule under Beresford (1808 to 1811), and finally Portuguese governance from Brazil (1811 to 1820). No Cortes or assembly existed. The crown governed by decree from Rio. This left no sovereign Portuguese executive on Portuguese soil. |
| 1820–1822 | -88 | Liberal Revolution of Porto. The August 1820 Liberal Revolution in Porto called the Cortes Gerais Extraordinárias e Constituintes. They drafted the 1822 Constitution. This established a unicameral parliament, restricted the king to a suspensive veto, stripped his power to dissolve parliament, and made ministers answer to the Cortes. “É patente a situação de inferioridade do monarca” (Canotilho 1993, 152). The constitution lasted barely eight months (23 September 1822 to 4 June 1823, when João VI formally revoked it days after the Vila-Francada): “Foi mais símbolo do que lei” (Canotilho 1993, 153). The score interpolates from 1 (absolutism) to 6 (the 1822 Constitution). |
| 1823–1832 | 1 | Absolutist restoration. In the May 1823 Vila-Francada, Prince Miguel led an absolutist coup, scrapped the 1822 Constitution, and dissolved the Cortes. Pedro IV granted the Carta Constitucional in 1826. However, Miguel I usurped the throne in 1828, suspended the Carta, and brought back full absolutism. This sparked the Liberal Wars (1828 to 1834). Neither side operated under constitutional constraints during the civil war. |
| 1833 | -88 | Liberal Wars endgame. Liberal troops under Pedro IV advanced and besieged Lisbon in July 1833. The May 1834 Évora-Monte convention ended the civil war with a liberal victory. The score interpolates from 1 (Miguelite absolutism) to 3 (restored Carta). |
| 1834–1835 | 3 | The Carta Constitucional restored. The 1826 Carta rebuilt a bicameral Cortes. It established the Chamber of Deputies and Chamber of Peers. The Poder Moderador gave the king substantial power. Canotilho (1993, 155–156) points out the Poder Moderador’s “armas” included dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, creating peers, appointing ministers, and sanctioning laws. Score 3 rather than 4 because the Poder Moderador proved decisive. The king could ignore parliamentary majorities: “nada obrigava a que assim fosse” (Romero Magalhães 1993, 75). Score 3 rather than 2 because the Cortes functioned and ministerial responsibility carried constitutional weight. |
| 1836–1841 | 5 | The Setembrista revolution and the 1838 Constitution. The 1836 September Revolution triggered the 1838 Constitution. This restored national sovereignty, abolished the Poder Moderador, made the Senate elective, and introduced direct elections. It broadened the vote, though still tied it to the census. The text felt “mais próxima do espírito do cartismo, pelo menos do cartismo reformista, do que do setembrismo revolucionário” (Canotilho 1993, 160). Score 5 rather than 7 because the king kept his veto and dissolution powers. The 1838 Constitution tightened constraints compared to the Carta, but did not achieve executive parity. |
| 1842–1850 | 2 | Cabralismo. Costa Cabral staged a coup in January 1842, restored the Carta, and ruled without parliamentary input. The government controlled the legislature using the crown’s power and rigged elections. “controle governamental cabralista” shut down parliamentary debate (Vargues and Tavares Ribeiro 1993, 190). Score 2: constitutional rules existed on paper, but the executive dominated the system. |
| 1851–1905 | 4 | Regeneração and rotativismo. The Regeneração started in 1851 and launched the rotativismo system. The crown used the Poder Moderador to swap power between the Partido Regenerador and Partido Progressista. Tortella (2000, 446–447) links Portugal’s rotativismo with Spain’s turno pacífico and Italy’s trasformismo. These systems all relied on managed alternation. Vargues and Tavares Ribeiro (1993, 197) highlight systematic election rigging: “Corrupções, viciação de cadernos eleitorais, aliciação ao voto foram denúncias constantes desde 1822.” They also note executive dominance (“despotismo do poder executivo sobre as maiorias parlamentares que controlava”). Between 1852 and 1910, the country held 33 legislative elections, even though “respeitando-se a periodicidade constitucional, deveriam ter ocorrido apenas 17 ou 18” (Vargues and Tavares Ribeiro 1993, 196). Score 4 throughout. The liberalizations occurred, but the executive manipulated elections and forced alternation from the top. This matches Spain’s turno pacífico. |
| 1906–1907 | 1 | The João Franco dictatorship. Prime Minister João Franco dissolved parliament in May 1907 and ruled by decree. Score 1. |
| 1908–1909 | 5 | Constitutional restoration after the regicide. Parliamentary limits returned, though they operated within the manipulated alternation system. Score 5 rather than 7 because the Carta’s Poder Moderador gave the executive unilateral power (Canotilho 1993, 156). Score 5 rather than 4 because the monarchy used those powers less aggressively than it had during the rotativismo era. |
| 1910 | -88 | Republican revolution. The Republic launched on 5 October 1910, and a Constituent Assembly drafted the 1911 Constitution. The score interpolates from 5 (constitutional monarchy under the restored Carta) to 6 (First Republic). |
| 1911–1916 | 6 | First Republic. A parliamentary regime. The 1911 Constitution built a parliamentary republic. It featured a bicameral Congress, a ceremonial president elected by Congress, and a government that answered to parliament. Score 6 rather than 7: the legal structure tied the executive’s hands, but instability and coup attempts blocked executive parity. |
| 1917–1918 | 2 | The Sidónio Pais dictatorship. The state paused parliamentary checks and shelved the 1911 Constitution. Score 2: parliamentary government functioned immediately before and after this period. |
| 1919–1920 | 6 | Republic restored. Parliamentary government returned following Pais’s assassination in December 1918. This restored the 1911 Constitution. Score 6, matching 1911 to 1916: it featured the same constitutional rules and suffered the same instability. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1330 | 1 | Foreign overlordship of the Romanian lands. No unified Romanian polity existed and domestic institutional constraints were absent. Foreign rulers governed the lands that became Moldavia and Wallachia, including the First Bulgarian Empire, the Cumans, the Golden Horde, and the Hungarian crown. Local voivodes “were established in the future Wallachia in 1247, in accordance with the Diploma granted the Knights Hospitalers by Bela IV” (Georgescu 1991, 16–17). Basarab succeeded Tihomir in Wallachia and “was a vassal of King Charles I of Hungary, who called him ‘our voivode’” (Georgescu 1991, 17). There were no domestic representative institutions. Score 1: No accountability group or sovereign Romanian executive existed. |
| 1330–1500 | 1 | Princely absolutism of the principalities. The independent principalities had autocratic princes and only an advisory divan. Wallachia became independent in 1330, and Moldavia followed in 1359. The prince (domn) wielded “legislative, administrative, judicial, and military powers as well” (Georgescu 1991, 35–36). “From the fourteenth century through the sixteenth the princes ruled absolutely, and neither the decentralizing efforts of the boyars nor interference from neighboring powers could prevent them from consolidating power at the top” (Georgescu 1991, 36). The prince hand-picked the divan, a group of court officials, which meant that “all power was concentrated in the hands of the prince” (Georgescu 1991, 37). Boyar factions fought to control the autocracy rather than to build institutional constraints. Score 1. |
| 1500–1833 | 1 | Ottoman suzerainty and the Phanariot regime. Both principalities were under Ottoman suzerainty. The prince ruled at the sultan’s pleasure while domestic autocracy remained intact. The sultan’s power to hire and fire princes was “perhaps the most formidable single check on princely authority” (Hitchins 1996, 20), but this was an external limit. At home, “His political and judicial powers were nearly absolute, and his voice in fiscal and economic policy usually decisive. He controlled all the levers of central and provincial administration” (Hitchins 1996, 19). The old assembly of estates was “reduced in size to those persons specifically invited by the prince to attend. As in the seventeenth century, no legal statute regulated its structure or defined its powers” (Hitchins 1996, 24). The Phanariot period began, and “The last election of a hospodar by the assembly took place in 1730, and its last session, held to discuss the abolition of serfdom, was in 1749. After this date, no organized institution was capable of opposing the hospodar’s despotism” (Georgescu 1991, 79). Score 1: No domestic accountability group constrained the prince. |
| 1834–1859 | 2 | Organic Statute boyar oligarchy. During the Organic Statute period, the first institutional constraints emerged, restricted to the elite. The Organic Statutes (Regulamentele Organice) were introduced in Wallachia in 1831 and Moldavia in 1832. They created the first domestic institutional constraints and handed legislative authority to the Ordinary General Assembly, “whose approval was required before a bill could become law. Even though the assembly lacked the power to initiate legislation, it could make representations to the prince and, as a last resort, bring the grievances of the country to the attention of the suzerain and protecting powers” (Hitchins 1996, 163). The assembly was “the instrument of a narrow élite intent upon maintaining its privileges”. The Statutes replaced “the old princely despotism with an oligarchy that concentrated all power in the hands of a few great boyar families” (Georgescu 1991, 135), and ministers remained “responsible to him rather than to the assembly” (Hitchins 1996, 163). Score 2: The assembly held a real legislative veto over bills, which raises the score above 1, but it lacked the power to initiate laws. A very narrow franchise restricted power, and the prince still dominated the executive, keeping the score below 3. |
| 1859–1863 | 2 | Cuza and the United Principalities. The union occurred under Cuza using the Convention of Paris framework. Voters elected Alexandru Ioan Cuza prince of both Moldavia and Wallachia in January 1859. This created the United Principalities. They operated under the 1858 Convention of Paris and the Organic Statute rules. The assembly functioned normally. Cuza later dissolved “an obstreperous assembly in May 1864” (Hitchins 1994, 7), but that event falls in the next period. Score 2: The basic framework held steady through 1863. |
| 1864–1865 | 1 | Personal rule under the Statut. Cuza established personal rule under the Statut. He dissolved the assembly in May 1864 and put the Statut to a referendum. “Approved overwhelmingly, the new fundamental law confirmed the prepronderance [sic] of the executive over the legislature, limited the role of the mass of citizens in the political process, and consolidated the power of the central bureaucracy at the expense of local government. Cuza thus retained parliamentary forms, but under the Statut the essence of Rumanian constitutionalism lay in the personal rule of the prince” (Hitchins 1994, 7). The period ended in February 1866 when a coalition forced Cuza out. Score 1: Cuza suspended all real institutional constraints. |
| 1866–1918 | 4 | 1866 constitutional monarchy. A liberal constitutional monarchy emerged under the 1866 constitution. It featured a managed parliament and a restricted franchise. The 1866 rules were modeled on the 1831 Belgian constitution. They established a bicameral parliament and separated powers: “the enhanced position of the legislature... now became an almost equal partner with the prince in making laws. To become law under the new constitution a bill required the approval of both... Both might also initiate legislation, except for bills relating to the income and expenditures of the state, which had to originate in the Chamber of Deputies” (Hitchins 1994, 18). However, the prince kept an absolute veto and could dissolve parliament whenever he liked: “the cabinet, or government, was not the creature of parliament” (Hitchins 1994, 21, also 16). Lawmakers locked down the franchise in “an avowed attempt to keep the ‘ignorant and inexperienced’ masses from ‘diluting or annihilating the votes of the intelligent and cultivated classes’”. The state rigged elections: “The new government used all available means to assure itself of a majority... and until after the First World War it was never disappointed... its practical responsibility to parliament lost any significance”. Score 4: The legislative veto over all bills, the open sessions, and true two-party alternation were more than slight limitations. The rigged elections and narrow franchise decided who controlled parliament. However, parliament still constrained the executive when it functioned. |
| 1918–1920 | 5 | Universal male suffrage. Universal male suffrage led to the first genuinely free elections. The Liberal government forced through universal male suffrage in November 1918. The November 1919 elections were devastating for the incumbents: “The Liberals miscalculated... Their party received only 22 per cent of the vote and 103 deputies out of 568... This was the first time that the government’s administrative apparatus had failed to deliver an absolute majority to the party running the elections” (Hitchins 1994, 406). Following this shock, a “Parliamentary Bloc” coalition formed a new government under Alexandru Vaida (Hitchins 1994, 407). The 1866 constitution survived, and the king’s veto and dissolution powers remained untouched. The massive new voting base permanently shifted the balance of power. Score 5: Universal suffrage and competitive elections established heavy limits. The monarch’s reserve powers were the only remaining balance. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1240 | 1 | Kievan Rus. Kievan Rus’ lacked representative constraints. The Rurikid dynasty ruled a federation of principalities with an armed retinue (druzhina). The popular assembly (veche) only appeared in larger cities during the eleventh century. It provided advice but lacked legislative authority, except in Novgorod and Pskov. Pipes (1974, 31): “One cannot speak of the populace of Kievan Russia exerting any institutional pressure on the ruling elite, least of all in the ninth and tenth centuries.” No regular council or parliament constrained the Grand Prince. Score 1. |
| 1240–1480 | 1 | Mongol Yoke. Moscow rose during the Mongol Yoke. Russian princes ruled as tributary vassals of the Golden Horde and received investiture from the Khan. The Boyar Duma gave advice but “lacked some of the most important characteristics of institutions known to wield effective political power” (Pipes 1974, 106). Ivan III consolidated Moscow using patrimonial rule. Score 1. |
| 1480–1547 | 1 | Muscovite autocracy under Ivan III. Muscovite autocracy became established. Ivan III claimed the title “autocrat” (samoderzhets) and stopped paying tribute to the Horde. The Boyar Duma functioned as an advisory council of servitors. It is “best regarded not as a counterweight to royal authority but as its instrumentality; a proto-cabinet rather than a proto-parliament” (Pipes 1974, 106). The phrase “the tsar ordered and the boyars affirmed” describes their relationship well. They held no regular sessions, kept no records of debates, and had no defined legislative role. Score 1. |
| 1548–1564 | 2 | Early reign of Ivan IV. Ivan IV introduced limited consultation early in his reign. The “Council of Reconciliation” met in 1549. The government consulted advisors to produce the 1550 Sudebnik (law code), and the 1551 Stoglav council addressed religious reform. Hosking (1997, 50): the Zemsky Sobors were “not representative assemblies in the sense in which that term was understood in the medieval West: they were more like consultations of the Tsar with such local agents as could be conveniently assembled.” Score 2: the tsar alone convened the consultative assembly, creating a slight limitation. |
| 1565–1613 | 1 | Oprichnina and Time of Troubles. Executive constraints disappeared during this period. The Oprichnina (1565) eliminated the boyar elite’s remaining independence. The 1566 Zemsky Sobor operated as “a consultation of the government with its own agents” (Kliuchevskii, via Pipes 1974, 107). Ivan died in 1584. When the 1598 Sobor elected Boris Godunov, he rejected a charter that would limit his power (Hosking 1997, 58). The Time of Troubles (1605–1613) involved a dynastic crisis, civil war, and Polish occupation. Score 1. |
| 1613–1653 | 2 | Early Romanov Zemsky Sobor. The Zemsky Sobor met frequently under the early Romanovs. The Sobor of February 1613 elected Mikhail Romanov with broad representation. It met almost continuously from 1613 to 1622. The 1648–1649 Sobor drafted the Ulozhenie (law code). The final Sobor met in 1653 to approve incorporating Ukraine. Pipes (1974, 107) follows Kliuchevskii in emphasizing that the Sobors functioned as tools of absolutism. Participants performed a duty as state servants rather than exercising rights as representatives. No records indicate the Sobor ever refused the Tsar. Score 2 reflects genuine consultation on major questions without the power to compel. This follows the specialist reading instead of the mechanical van Zanden et al./Henriques et al. score of 3. |
| 1654–1682 | 1 | Reign of Tsar Alexei. The Zemsky Sobor stopped meeting after 1653. The central bureaucracy (prikazy) expanded under Tsar Alexei (1645–1676), and the Boyar Duma declined in relevance. The Duma and Assemblies “may best be viewed as expedients necessary to the state until such time as it could afford an adequate bureaucratic apparatus. ... As the bureaucratic apparatus improved, both institutions were quietly dropped” (Pipes 1974, 108). Score 1. |
| 1682–1725 | 1 | Petrine absolutism. Peter the Great established bureaucratic absolutism. He abolished the Boyar Duma in 1711 and replaced it with the Senate, a bureaucratic executive body. The Holy Synod replaced the Patriarchate in 1721. In 1722, the Table of Ranks created a service nobility dependent on the sovereign. The state convoked no representative institutions. Score 1. |
| 1725–1762 | 1 | Era of palace coups. Guards regiments and court factions controlled succession during several palace coups (1725, 1730, 1741, 1762). The Supreme Privy Council briefly tried to limit Anna’s power in 1730, but she reversed this within weeks. Score 1: palace coups occurred, but no institutional accountability group existed. |
| 1762–1801 | 1 | Catherinian autocracy. Catherine the Great and Paul I maintained autocratic rule. The Legislative Commission (1767–1768) served as an advisory body. “This was no longer a ‘consultation of the government with its own agents’, as the Muscovite Assemblies had been, but a national forum of a kind that would not convene again until the First Duma 138 years later” (Pipes 1974, 255). The Commission produced no legislation. Catherine dissolved it before it could create any constraint. Her Nakaz had no binding force. Paul I (1796–1801) ruled arbitrarily. Score 1. |
| 1801–1855 | 1 | Reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I. Alexander I and Nicholas I maintained autocracy. Speransky’s 1809 plan proposed an elected State Duma. The state instead created an appointed consultative State Council in 1810. Russia proper never enacted further drafts. The Decembrist revolt of 1825 demanded constitutional government but failed. Nicholas I governed through military-bureaucratic absolutism. Score 1. |
| 1855–1881 | 1 | Great Reforms of Alexander II. Alexander II enacted major reforms without a national parliament. Emancipation (1861), zemstvo local government (1864), judicial reform (1864), municipal government (1870), and military reform (1874) altered Russian society. The zemstvos lacked a national coordinating body. The government denied them the right to petition the center. All reforms were “subject to the whim of the autocrat” (Raeff 1984, 182). Assassins killed Alexander in 1881 while he was considering a limited consultative assembly. Score 1: no national accountability group constrained the executive. |
| 1881–1905 | 1 | Counter-reform autocracy. Alexander III and Nicholas II maintained autocratic rule. The government restricted zemstvo autonomy, limited judicial independence, and expanded police powers. The country had no national representative institution. Score 1. |
| 1905–1906 | -88 | October Manifesto. Polity “Transition.” The 1905 Revolution led to the October Manifesto (17 October 1905): “The decisive change came with the Manifesto of 17 October 1905, in which the Tsar guaranteed his subjects a broad repertoire of civil rights and announced the establishment of a legislative assembly, the State Duma, to be elected on a wide suffrage” (Hosking 1997, 398). The April 1906 Fundamental Laws kept the word “autocracy” but dropped “unlimited.” Interpolated from XCONST 1 (1905) to 3 (1906). |
| 1906–1917 | 3 | Duma monarchy. The Duma monarchy introduced limited constitutionalism. Four Dumas sat between 1906 and 1917. The state dissolved the First Duma in 1906 after 72 days. The government dissolved the Second Duma in June 1907 and altered the electoral law. The Third Duma (1907–1912) served a full term. The Fourth Duma (1912–1917) participated in the February Revolution. The Duma’s powers were “roughly equivalent to those held by the Reichstag in Germany” (Hosking 1997, 425). Both chambers could initiate, amend, and veto bills. The Tsar retained the power to issue emergency decrees under Article 87, appoint ministers independently of the Duma, and dissolve the chamber. “Autocracy was not formally abolished, and the emperor retained ultimate authority” (Raeff 1984, 189–191). Score 3: the Duma had legislative and budgetary authority. The score is discounted because of the Tsar’s power to dissolve the chamber, appoint ministers independently, and manipulate the franchise. |
| 1917 | -88 | Revolutions of 1917. Polity “Transition.” The February Revolution of March 1917 forced Nicholas II to abdicate. The Provisional Government shared power with the Petrograd Soviet and scheduled Constituent Assembly elections. The October Revolution followed. The Bolsheviks dissolved the Constituent Assembly after a single session in January 1918. “But the Assembly was not to reconvene, for in the morning Sverdlov had the CEC ratify the Bolshevik resolution dissolving it” (Pipes 1990, 554). Interpolated from XCONST 3 to 1. |
| 1918–1920 | 1 | Bolshevik one-party rule. The Bolsheviks established one-party rule during the civil war. The state abolished opposition parties. The executive (first the Sovnarkom, then the Politburo) ruled by decree without any functioning legislative check. Its “distinguishing quality was the concentration of executive and legislative authority, as well as the power to make all legislative, executive, and judiciary appointments in the hands of a private association, the ‘ruling party’” (Pipes 1990, 507). Score 1: no institutional constraints checked the executive. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1165 | 1 | Byzantine vassalage. Serbian grand župans ruled as Byzantine vassals under the theme system. The territory lacked an independent executive. Ćirković (2004, 21–23) writes: “The governor at Sirmium had the name Serbia in his official title (‘strategos Serbias,’ or ‘douks of Thessalonika, Bulgaria, and Serbia’), which is an unquestionable indication that at least part of the territory held by the Serb princes was under direct Byzantine rule.” The Byzantine emperor “deposed some rulers, such as Primislav... and appointed others” (Ćirković, 23–31). No domestic institutions constrained the leadership. Score 1. |
| 1166–1458 | 1 | Nemanjić state and Despotate. The Sabor functioned as an advisory body under the Nemanjić state and its successors. Stefan Nemanja united the Serbian lands in 1166 and claimed the title of autokrator. The 1196 Ras Assembly convened merely to announce the succession. Nemanja “appointed Stefan as his heir and requested everyone... to submit to the new ruler” (Ćirković, 31–34). Myers (1975, 37) notes that “the Sabor never gave any indication of acquiring the stability or the powers of the Estates in the realms of Latin Christendom.” Article 69 of Dušan’s Code (1349) prohibited unauthorized assemblies as “conspiracy, and not part of the state assembly” (Ćirković, 69–76). While the Deževa assembly (1282) imposed conditions on Milutin’s succession, this represented an ad hoc noble intervention rather than an institutional constraint. “A successful takeover required supporters and military power, which meant the active role of the nobility and court circles” (Ćirković, 49). During the Despotate period from 1402 to 1459, leaders acted as vassals to Hungary and the Ottomans. The despots owed vassal obligations to the Hungarian crown, “in exchange for which they occupied leading positions in the Hungarian Diet and aristocratic hierarchy” (Ćirković, 101–103), participating as individual magnates rather than constitutional actors. Score 1. |
| 1459–1803 | 1 | Ottoman provincial rule. There was no distinct Serbian polity during the Ottoman provincial period. The fall of Smederevo (1459) completed the Ottoman conquest. “The great majority of the farming population had the status of reaya and were obliged to serve their lord” (Ćirković 2004, 111–129). “Voivode, knezovi, and primićuri were on the the [sic] lowest, albeit influential, rungs of the Ottoman administrative hierarchy.” The restored Patriarchate of Peć (1557) provided ecclesiastical autonomy through the millet system but lacked political authority. Within the Habsburg monarchy, Serbian church bodies functioned as ecclesiastical assemblies discussing “Serbian privileges” (Ćirković, 165–169). They did not operate as political assemblies with influence over the executive. Score 1. |
| 1804–1813 | 1 | First Serbian Uprising. The First Serbian Uprising resulted in Karageorge’s military rule. “Karageorge was acknowledged as the overall leader, the man who provided the military, organizational and revolutionary drive... He was watched jealously by most of the other leaders, all of whom clung to their power over their portion of territory and over their armed followers” (Pavlowitch 2002, 30). He governed through personal military authority without any formal institutional checks. Ottoman forces defeated the uprising in October 1813. Score 1. |
| 1814 | 1 | Restored Ottoman administration. The Ottomans defeated the First Uprising in October 1813 and restored their rule. The Second Uprising began in April 1815 (Pavlowitch 2002, 32). During this intervening year, the region fell under direct Ottoman provincial administration without any local Serbian institutional structure. Score 1. |
| 1815–1838 | 1 | Miloš Obrenović’s personal rule. The Second Uprising (1815) established Miloš Obrenović as “paramount elder” (Pavlowitch 2002, 32). He “ruled with the unlimited authority of the supreme leader who had obtained the rights that Serbia now enjoyed” (Pavlowitch 2002, 34). The 1830 Hatti-Sherif made him a hereditary prince with “supreme authority over the native population” (Pavlowitch 2002, 33). He declined to convene the mandated Council. “Instead of forming the Council, which would curb his power, Miloš introduced administrative bodies” (Ćirković, 194–196). The 1835 Sretenje Constitution was “in force for only two weeks” (Ćirković, 195–196). The Porte, Russia, Austria, and Miloš all vetoed the document. Score 1. |
| 1839–1858 | 4 | The Defenders of the Constitution. The 1838 “Turkish Constitution” constrained the prince through an independent Council. The Porte imposed this statute with Russian backing, creating a seventeen-member body that established a separation of powers. “Prince Miloš was affected by the stipulation on the separation of powers. He had to share power with members of the Sovjet (Council), whom he could not dismiss” (Ćirković, 195–215). The constitution “reduced his prerogative to that of a modern constitutional monarch... It was limited not by an assembly, but by a seventeen-member council, appointed for life by the prince from the most important elders... introduced government by prince-in-council” (Pavlowitch 2002, 37). In addition, “the Constitution of 1838 divided the power between the ruler and a state council of oligarchs, with the latter being dominant” (Petrovich 1976, 369). Unwilling to accept these limits, Miloš abdicated in 1839. Under the Constitutionalists from 1842 to 1858, the Council members acted as “the real rulers of the principality of Serbia until 1858” (Pavlowitch 2002, 41). The score is 4 because the prince could not dismiss the Council, yet Serbia still lacked an elected legislature. The constraint was oligarchic rather than representative. |
| 1859–1860 | 1 | Restoration of Miloš. The St. Andrew’s Day Assembly (December 1858) deposed Alexander Karadjordjević and restored Miloš, who dismantled the existing constitutional system. He “found it convenient to have the whole constitutional system destroyed by popular acclaim” (Pavlowitch 2002, 44). He abolished the 1838 Council framework and governed without formal institutional checks until his death in September 1860. Score 1. |
| 1861–1868 | 1 | Michael Obrenović’s autocracy. Michael Obrenović transformed the Council into a subordinate body, effectively securing unlimited executive power. “He thus transformed the Council into the apex of the civil service, a body of legal and financial control under the prince... Law-making was thus effectively transferred to the prince; rule by the Prince-in-Council became rule by Council-under-the-Prince” (Pavlowitch 2002, 50–51). “For eight years he ruled without restrictions... Their loyal opposition was not allowed any means of expression” (Pavlowitch 2002, 52). The Assembly became “docile” and kept only “consultative functions” (Pavlowitch 2002, 51). There were no operative institutional constraints on the leadership. Score 1. |
| 1869–1888 | 3 | The 1869 Regency Constitution. The Regency enacted the 1869 “Regency” Constitution following Michael’s assassination. The resulting framework was “a veritable constitutional government, if not yet a parliamentary one. It gave the Assembly limited legislative authority over the growing executive, thus turning the elected legislature into a true constitutional factor, alongside the prince and the Council” (Pavlowitch 2002, 58). At the same time, “The first section of the constitution preserved all the powers of the prince, including the right to initiate, to proclaim, and to veto laws” (Petrovich 1976, 366). This meant “Serbia had a parliament, but not a parliamentary government” (Petrovich 1976, 369). The score is 3 because the Assembly held legislative consent powers, but the prince retained the power to initiate, proclaim, and veto laws, as well as bypass mechanisms. |
| 1889–1893 | 5 | The 1888 Constitution. An all-party commission drafted the 1888 Constitution, which King Milan approved prior to his abdication. “Passed by parliament, the constitution of 1888 introduced parliamentary government tempered by the influence of the crown” (Pavlowitch 2002, 71). It eliminated the king’s power to legislate alone, abolished appointed deputies, and established secret elections. It also granted the Assembly equal legislative initiative and stronger budget oversight. “The king was forced to share power with the Assembly as never before, but the bureaucratic system and the army remained largely intact” (Petrovich 1976, 443). The score is 5 because the king retained a residual veto, the power of dissolution, and command over the army, preventing complete subordination to the legislature. |
| 1894–1902 | 2 | Alexander Obrenović’s coup. King Alexander staged a coup in 1893 and centralized executive control. In May 1894, he “abolished the Constitution of 1888 and restored in its place the Constitution of 1869” (Petrovich 1976, 465). He “proceeded to turn constitutional government into a farce... manipulating elections through administrative pressure, and... obtaining parliamentary sanction of sorts” (Pavlowitch 2002, 73). His administration featured “a completely subservient Assembly” (Petrovich 1976, 476). Additionally, the April Constitution of 1901 “made no provision for ministerial responsibility to the parliament” (Petrovich 1976, 483). The score is 2 because the state maintained a formal constitutional text and an assembly that met nominally, even though actual practice reduced the legislature to a rubber stamp. |
| 1903–1914 | 5 | Golden age of parliamentarism. The May 1903 coup installed Petar Karadjordjević, and the 1903 Constitution restored the 1888 framework. “The Constitution of 1903 was in several ways an admirably liberal document. It declared Serbia to be a hereditary constitutional and parliamentary monarchy... gave the National Assembly broad powers... Crucial among these powers was that of the purse; the Assembly had to approve an annual budget” (Petrovich 1976, 535). As Pavlowitch observes, “The following decade has often been described as the golden age of parliamentary democracy in Serbia... in terms of the percentage of the population entitled to vote, Serbia was third in Europe after France and Switzerland” (Pavlowitch 2002, 79). This era operated under “a tacit division of power between parliamentary government, dominated by one party, and the military” (Pavlowitch 2002, 80). The score is 5 to reflect the combination of Radical Party dominance and the military’s informal influence. |
| 1915–1918 | -66 | Occupation and Corfu exile. Austro-German-Bulgarian forces overran Serbia in late 1915. The government, king, army, and assembly retreated across Albania to Corfu. “Serbia was no more. The exiled remnants of the state maintained a symbolic continuity in the most precarious situation on Corfu” (Pavlowitch 2002, 97). The occupied territory lost its domestic executive and constitutional order. The government-in-exile lacked sovereign administrative authority during this period. |
| 1919–1920 | 5 | Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Leaders proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 1 December 1918 and restored the Skupština. In November 1920, voters elected a Constituent Assembly to draft the Vidovdan Constitution, adopting it in 1921. “Only when the new state and its borders had been internationally accepted was the Constituent Assembly elected. Universal male franchise and a proportional system had been adopted; 419 representatives were returned in November 1920” (Pavlowitch 2002, 116). The administration re-established parliamentary government based on the pre-war model. The score of 5 carries forward from 1903 to 1914. The Serbian parliamentary monarchy framework carried over into the new kingdom, maintaining the prior institutional limits without achieving full executive parity. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1000 | 1 | Magyar tribal rule. Before the Hungarian kingdom formed, the collapse of Great Moravia left the territory of modern Slovakia under Magyar tribal rule. Steinhübel (2011, 18): “After the break-up of Great Moravia (c. 907), the Old Magyars conquered the territory of Slovakia.” The region lacked representative institutions. Score 1: this pre-state era had no formal executive or accountability group. |
| 1000–1222 | 1 | Árpádian Kingdom of Hungary. The Kingdom of Hungary operated without institutional constraints. Stephen I became the first king in 1000/1001. He organized the realm through the royal county (comitatus) system of appointed officials. Kontler (2002, 77) describes the Golden Bull of 1222 as “the beginnings of a process in which the idea of communitas regni became influential in Hungary and an estates based parliamentarism developed,” indicating that such limits did not exist earlier. The curia regis acted strictly as an advisory body. The van Zanden et al. data records zero Hungarian Diet meetings in the twelfth century. Score 1: no formal accountability group with recognized powers operated before the Golden Bull. |
| 1222–1490 | 2 | Golden Bull and the estates. The 1222 Golden Bull introduced early limits on the crown by establishing noble privileges and the right of resistance (Kontler 2002, 76–77). The 1267 Esztergom assembly demanded annual meetings of county noble deputies. Kontler (2002, 83) calls the 1277 Rákos assembly “the first beginning of parliamentariansm” [sic]. Myers (1975, 85) argues the Diet became a permanent institution between 1437 and 1457. The van Zanden et al. data records 3 meetings in the thirteenth century, 5 in the 14th, and 10 in the 15th. Powerful Angevin kings temporarily reduced the diet’s role, though the coronation diploma became a standard requirement starting in the fifteenth century (Kontler, 83–84). Score 2: the estates applied limited pressure through fiscal consent and the right of resistance, but fell short of regularized institutional accountability. |
| 1490–1526 | 3 | Jagiellonian estate dominance. Under Vladislaus II (1490 to 1516) and Louis II (1516 to 1526), weak kings let the estates of the Kingdom of Hungary, which included the territory of modern Slovakia, dominate the government from the diet. Kontler (2002, 128): “the estates dismantled the achievements of centralised monarchy” and “the diets poured out edicts.” Control shifted into the hands of the royal council, whose decisions the king never contested. The 1498 diet was “the starting point of the development of the diet into the bicameral assembly it subsequently became”. Following the 1498 diet’s order, Werbőczy’s Tripartitum codified Hungarian customary law. Score 3: diet activity exceeded the bare meeting count, matching the Hungary panel for the same diet. |
| 1526–1608 | 3 | Habsburg accession at Pozsony. After the 1526 battle of Mohács, the Hungarian Diet continued to meet at Pozsony (Pressburg, now Bratislava). Pálffy (2021, xxiii) notes that the Pozsony diet elected Ferdinand of Habsburg king in December 1526, and the city became the diet’s permanent seat in 1536 (Pálffy 2009, 68). A coronation oath bound Habsburg kings to respect Hungarian laws and liberties (Deák 2001, 1). The counties functioned as “the bastions of self-government and representation of the interests of the nobility” (Pálffy 2009, 190). The same fiscal veto operated here as in the Hungary panel: the king could not impose taxes unless voted by the estates, and the system amounted to “the dualist governance of the country as developed in the decades after 1526” (Pálffy 2021, 239). The van Zanden et al. data records 10 meetings in the sixteenth century. The score is 3 instead of 2 because the diet’s fiscal consent was binding in practice, matching the Hungary panel for the same Pozsony diet. The score is 3 instead of 4 because Habsburg military and financial resources restricted the estates’ leverage to internal affairs. |
| 1608–1687 | 3 | Estates’ bargaining era. Following the Bocskai uprising, the 1608 Diet of Pozsony secured constitutional guarantees for Protestant religious exercise. Pálffy (2021, xxvii) calls this “[t]he first compromise between Vienna and the estates in the seventeenth century,” with later agreements reached at Sopron (1622) and Pozsony (1646 to 1647) (Pálffy 2021, xxviii). Hungarian diets “seldom granted a favor without wresting some favors in return” (Deák 2001, 1). The van Zanden et al. data records 19 meetings in the seventeenth century. Score 3: the diet met regularly. The estates wielded genuine bargaining power, backed by negotiated compromises and the demonstrated threat of rebellion. |
| 1687–1711 | 2 | Diet of Pressburg. The 1687 Diet of Pressburg (Pozsony) recognized the Habsburgs as hereditary kings and abolished the ius resistendi (the Golden Bull of 1222’s right of resistance). Kontler (2002, 184): “At the diet of 1687, still in the shadow of Caraffa’s gallows at Eperjes, the Hungarian estates were quite willing to yield to the Emperor’s demand... giving up the right of resistance.” Eperjes is modern Prešov, in eastern Slovakia. Leopold’s policies “aimed at breaking the backbone of the estates”. The diet survived but remained submissive. The Rákóczi uprising (1703 to 1711) demonstrated the estates’ capacity for armed resistance and ended with the Treaty of Szatmár (1711). Score 2: the renunciation of elective monarchy and of the right of resistance left the diet formally intact but submissive, matching the Hungary panel, until the Szatmár settlement restored the compromise. |
| 1711–1765 | 2 | Pragmatic Sanction settlement. The 1711 Treaty of Szatmár restored cooperation between the Habsburgs and the Hungarians. The 1722 to 1723 diet accepted the Pragmatic Sanction (Deák 2001, 1). While the diet voted on taxes and military contributions to secure confirmation of noble privileges, Maria Theresa increasingly bypassed the assembly through administrative centralization. Score 2: the diet retained its formal role, but the Habsburg executive sharply curtailed its independent leverage compared to the previous century. |
| 1765–1790 | 1 | Josephinist enlightened absolutism. Maria Theresa never convened another diet after the 1765 to 1766 session. Joseph II (sole ruler 1780 to 1790) refused to let the Hungarian estates crown him, thereby avoiding the constitutional oath. Kontler (2002, 207ff) describes his program as enlightened absolutism designed to bypass the estates. He governed by decree, abolished the autonomous administration of the county system, and mandated German as the official language. Score 1: the country operated without a functioning diet for 25 years, leaving the executive entirely unconstrained by parliament. |
| 1790–1825 | 2 | Compromise of 1791. Leopold II convened the diet after Joseph II died in 1790. Deák (2001, 3) highlights “the compromise of 1791, when Leopold II and the Diet codified in detail the rights and duties of both sovereign parties.” Under Francis I, the restored 1791 constitution required the diet to consent to new taxes and recruitment. Francis I nevertheless governed through the Hungarian Chancellery. Following the 1811 to 1812 diet, he waited thirteen years before calling the next session (1812 to 1825). Score 2: the constitution required the diet’s fiscal consent, but the crown controlled the agenda and dictated the timing of meetings. |
| 1825–1848 | 3 | Hungarian Reform Era. The 1825 to 1827 diet initiated a new era of reform. Subsequent sessions in 1832 to 1836, 1839 to 1840, 1843 to 1844, and 1847 to 1848 debated and passed major legislation. Kontler (2002, 231ff) notes these diets provided a forum where liberal nobles developed “constitutional monarchy with civil liberties,” and the elected county representatives in the lower house effectively opposed crown preferences. Score 3: the diet wielded actual fiscal consent and mounted open opposition that forced policy changes against the crown’s wishes. The score remains below 4 because the franchise covered only about 5 percent of the population and the upper house was appointed. |
| 1848 | 5 | April Laws. Between March and April 1848, the diet passed the April Laws. These laws turned Hungary into a constitutional monarchy with a responsible ministry, annual diets, and expanded representation. The legislation abolished serfdom and noble tax exemptions while granting freedom of the press and religion. The liberals, Deák (2001, xiii) writes, “seized the opportunity presented by the European revolutions to legally restore the sovereignty of their country under the Habsburg Crown.” Score 5: the responsible ministry answered directly to parliament. The score falls short of a 6 because the monarchy retained significant reserve powers and the regime operated under wartime conditions starting in September 1848. |
| 1849 | -88 | Suppression of the revolution. Habsburg forces, backed by Russian troops, militarily suppressed the Hungarian revolution by August 1849. The imperial government subsequently imposed the Bach system. Because the year covers both the April Laws regime and the onset of absolutism, no single score applies. Coded -88. |
| 1850–1860 | 1 | Bach neo-absolutism. Starting in 1849, the imperial government under Alexander Bach imposed direct Austrian administration on the territory. The state abrogated the Hungarian constitution, dissolved the diet, replaced the county system with Austrian-style districts, and mandated German as the official language. Kontler (2002, 272) describes this period as “neo-absolutism” characterized by military administration, centralized bureaucracy, censorship, and police surveillance. Score 1. |
| 1860–1867 | 2 | October Diploma interim. The October Diploma (1860) restored the Hungarian diet and several county institutions. The diet reconvened in 1861 but was dissolved during a deadlock over Hungary’s constitutional status (Péter 2012, 344). A period of passive resistance lasted from 1861 to 1865. Habsburg military defeats in 1859 and 1866 eventually forced Compromise negotiations. Score 2: the state partially restored institutional constraints but operated without a settled constitutional framework. |
| 1867–1918 | 3 | Austro-Hungarian Compromise. The Compromise (Law XII of 1867) revived Hungarian constitutional self-government by establishing a responsible ministry and a bicameral parliament. This made Hungary a co-equal partner in the Dual Monarchy. Dincecco (2009) identifies 1867 as the limited-government transition year for Austria. Score 3: the parliament held genuine legislative authority over Hungarian domestic affairs. The score remains a 3 because the franchise covered only about 6 percent of the population, the emperor-king controlled foreign policy and the military, and the state intensified Magyarization policies after 1890. |
| 1918–1920 | 7 | Czechoslovak Republic founding. Leaders proclaimed the Czechoslovak Republic on 28 October 1918, and a provisional constitution established a parliamentary republic on 13 November 1918. The final constitution on 29 February 1920 created a bicameral parliament elected by proportional representation, introduced universal adult suffrage, and established a president with limited powers alongside an independent judiciary. Krajčovičová (2011, 140–147): Slovakia was recognized as an administrative unit within the centralized state. Score 7: the system featured full legislative authority, an executive accountable to parliament, and constitutionally protected civil liberties. (Hungary diverges at this point, becoming an independent kingdom with a regency and a restricted franchise.) |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1187 | 1 | León-Castile under the curia regis. Leonese and Castilian kings governed through the curia regis, a council of nobles and clergy. Noble factions competed and launched coups, such as the noble coup that overthrew Sancho I within two years of his accession in 956 and the Galician revolt in 982. These actions imposed no institutionalized constraint on the executive (R. Collins 1995, 676–689). Wickham (2005, 38) confirms the Visigothic councils of Toledo functioned as ceremonial aggregation rather than representative constraint. The van Zanden et al. data starts counting in 1188. Marongiu identifies this date as the first fully developed parliament. Score 1: the executive faced no regular limitations on its actions. |
| 1188–1282 | 2 | Birth of the Cortes. The state established the Cortes, which introduced early constraint. Alfonso IX of León summoned town representatives to the 1188 Cortes. He promised to consult bishops, nobles, and “good men” on issues of peace and war (Myers 1975, 59). Marongiu (1968, 61–62) calls the 1188 assembly “the first clear signs of the evolution of the old concilios into true parliamentary institutions” whose decisions were “equivalent... to a constitutional charter.” O’Callaghan (1989, 5) notes the Cortes was the king’s court but “[o]nce in session... often displayed a mind of its own.” Score 2: an accountability group existed, but constraint remained nascent and the king kept full initiative. |
| 1283–1479 | 4 | Privilegio General to the Cortes’ heyday. The Cortes gained substantial medieval strength. It managed fiscal consent and influenced legislation and foreign policy. Zaragoza established the petition-before-grant procedure by 1264 (Bisson 1991, 80). The 1283 Barcelona Cortes established annual meetings and legislative consent in Catalonia (Bisson 1991, 88). The Aragonese Privilegio General (1283) and Privileges of the Union (1287) created quasi-constitutional charters (Kagay 2006, VI, 31; X, 65). Myers (1975, 60) notes that “by the fourteenth century... the king could not levy extraordinary taxes without an explicit grant from the Cortes.” Alfonso XI reduced the frequency of meetings after coming of age around 1325, holding only three plenary sessions in 25 years of personal rule (O’Callaghan 1989, 37–38), and the Trastámara dynasty that took power in 1369 relied on Cortes support for legitimacy. The Henriques et al. dataset codes 1400 and 1450 as 5, observing that “[t]he Castilian representative assemblies had their heyday precisely during this period, as they managed to mitigate the fiscal demands of the king and acquired de facto roles in consenting to administrative reform, laws, and changes in coinage”; parliament “influenced decisions on foreign politics, had a legislative role and approved extraordinary taxation.” Score 4 rather than 5 because the king still convoked, prorogued, and dissolved the Cortes at will, and Alfonso XI’s personal rule showed that the frequency of meetings depended on the king. |
| 1480–1520 | 3 | Reign of the Catholic Monarchs. Royal authority tightened and Cortes independence eroded. At the 1480 Cortes of Toledo, royal towns agreed to the appointment of corregidores. This gave the crown control over municipal elections and Cortes representation (Hause and Maltby 1999, 341). Elliott (1963, 66) notes Ferdinand and Isabella held a “patrimonial concept of the State” while maintaining constitutional forms. In Aragon, the crown remained constitutionally bound (Elliott 1963, 70). In Castile, the third estate increasingly followed the royal lead. Score 3 rather than 4 because actual constraint weakened once the crown captured the representation mechanism. Score 3 rather than 2 because the Cortes kept its formal powers intact. |
| 1521–1589 | 2 | Post-Comuneros Habsburg crown. In the post-Comuneros era, the Cortes met but lacked power to resist. During the Battle of Villalar in April 1521, Castilian nobles defeated the townsmen. “Thenceforward the towns had lost their power to resist the monarchy” (Myers 1975, 98). Elliott (1963, 142) observes the Comuneros were “a movement of angry reaction to a long period in which royal government... had eroded away many of the traditional powers and prerogatives of the Castilian towns.” The crown increasingly bypassed Cortes consent. It relied on external financing like American silver and Genoese loans, along with Church revenues (Thompson 1976, 71, 288). Score 2: the Cortes formally existed, but it could not effectively refuse the crown. |
| 1590–1640 | 3 | The millones revival. The millones revival temporarily restored Cortes fiscal leverage. Philip II faced a fiscal crisis after the 1588 Armada, which forced the crown to seek new grants. The new millones tax required explicit Cortes consent, and the assembly first granted it in 1590 (Thompson 1976, 68). The Castilian Cortes used these negotiations to extract concessions and expand its supervisory role over spending (Thompson 1976, 275–276). This made the seventeenth-century Cortes “far more important than before 1590” (Thompson 1976, 275). The Henriques et al. dataset codes 1600 as 3. Score 3: the millones system offered real but limited constraint. The Cortes participated in fiscal decisions. The crown kept executive initiative and could use alternative funds like Church revenues and silver. This flexibility limited the assembly’s effective veto. |
| 1641–1654 | 1 | Collapse of the Olivares system. Cortes leverage collapsed after the revolts. The simultaneous revolts of Catalonia and Portugal in 1640 and the financial exhaustion of the Olivares system destroyed the conditions supporting the millones arrangement. Elliott (1963, 326) documents how the centralizing “Union of Arms” directly triggered the revolts. The towns had already lost structural power after the Comuneros defeat (Myers 1975, 98). The mid-century crisis confirmed the Cortes lacked leverage. Score 1: the executive faced no regular limitations on its actions in practice. |
| 1655–1706 | 1 | The Diputación settlement. The state dismantled the fiscal role of the Cortes. A 1655 decree transferred this function to a permanent committee called the Diputación. This ended the assembly’s last substantive function (Henriques et al. 2026). The Henriques et al. dataset codes 1700 as 2 because the Cortes still existed. It notes the Diputación was extinguished in 1698 and the Cortes “only played a ceremonial role.” The Diputación never acted as an independent accountability group. Score 1: the executive faced no regular limitations on its actions. |
| 1707–1807 | 1 | Bourbon absolutism. Bourbon absolutism took over. The Nueva Planta decrees between 1707 and 1716 abolished the fueros and separate Cortes of Aragon and Valencia. This extended the Castilian fiscal system to all of Spain (Lynch 1989, 62–65). The Cortes became purely ceremonial and extra-parliamentary taxation turned routine. The Bourbon monarchy “moved towards greater absolutism” (Lynch 1989, 9), peaking during the “high season of enlightened absolutism,” which ran from 1767 to 1790 (Lynch 1989, 10). “[T]he king of France, who was bound by the conventions of the constitution, was a less absolute ruler than the kings of Spain, Denmark or Prussia” (Lindsay 1957, 5). Spain “had enjoyed no constitutional life since the sixteenth century” (Carr 1982, 94). The Henriques et al. dataset codes both 1750 and 1800 as 1. Score 1. |
| 1808–1813 | -88 | Transition. The French invasion of May 1808 collapsed the Bourbon state. The Cortes of Cádiz convened in 1810 and produced the Constitution of 1812. This framework created a unicameral legislature and made secretaries answerable to the Cortes. It also established indirect universal male suffrage and restricted the king to a suspensive veto. The constitution “embodied a radical fear of the executive” (Carr 1982, 97–98). It operated for only two years before Ferdinand VII returned. Interpolated from 1 (absolutism) to 6 (the 1812 Constitution), which operated until Ferdinand VII abolished it by the Manifesto of 4 May 1814 (Carr 1982, 81). |
| 1814–1819 | 1 | First restoration of Ferdinand VII. Ferdinand restored absolutism. Upon his return in May 1814, Ferdinand VII repudiated the 1812 constitution. He reinstated absolute institutions and purged liberals (Carr 1982, xvi). Fontana (1971, 263) documents the internal bankruptcy (“quiebra”) of the absolute monarchy that sparked the 1820 crisis. Score 1. |
| 1820–1822 | 6 | Liberal Triennium. The Liberal Triennium began. Riego’s January 1820 pronunciamiento forced Ferdinand VII to restore the 1812 constitution. The Cortes exercised full legislative authority and enacted major reforms. Members abolished seigneurial jurisdiction and initiated monastic disentailment. The king’s suspensive veto was its only formal constraint (on the restored constitutional regime, see Carr 1982, 127–145). The French invasion of April 1823 ended the regime. Score 6 rather than 7 because the king kept his suspensive veto and external intervention constantly threatened the regime. |
| 1823–1833 | 1 | The Ominous Decade. The Ominous Decade followed. French military intervention restored Ferdinand VII’s absolute rule. He abolished the constitution once more and intensified the repression of liberals (Carr 1982, xvii). Score 1. |
| 1834–1844 | 3 | Estatuto Real and the 1837 Constitution. Spain transitioned to a constitutional monarchy. The Royal Statute of 1834 created a bicameral Cortes with restricted suffrage and no legislative initiative. The crown granted this as a charter, not a constitution (Carr 1982, 155–169). After the Mutiny of La Granja, the state adopted the 1837 constitution. It allowed the Cortes to share sovereignty with the crown. The document provided legislative initiative and maintained a suspensive royal veto. Score 3 averages the weaker Estatuto Real (1834 to 1836) and the stronger 1837 constitution (1837 to 1844). |
| 1845–1851 | 4 | Narváez and the 1845 Constitution. A moderate constitution supported operative parliamentary life. The 1845 constitution gave the crown an appointed Senate and extensive prerogatives. It also restricted suffrage to just 0.8 percent of the population. Even so, Narváez governed through the Cortes rather than against it. He maintained a functioning parliamentary party system (Carr 1982, 227ff). The Cortes debated budgets, the opposition took their seats when not boycotting (retraimiento), and the formal constitutional constraints operated. Score 4: a functioning legislature provided constraints. The narrow franchise and appointed Senate prevent a higher score. |
| 1852–1854 | 2 | The Bravo Murillo ministry. Prime Minister Bravo Murillo took an authoritarian turn. He proposed a reform to replace parliamentary government with rule by decree. A “league of generals and politicians formed against Bravo Murillo’s proposed ‘Authoritarian’ constitutional reform” (Carr 1982, chronological table, May 1852). The attempt failed, but it showed that constraint had collapsed. The government openly tried to abolish it. Officials sidelined the Cortes while the crown ruled through favorite courtiers. Score 2: the formal constitutional framework persisted, but operative constraint was minimal. |
| 1854–1856 | 5 | Bienio Progresista. The Bienio Progresista began. The 1854 revolution (the Vicálvaro pronunciamiento) forced Isabella II to accept a Progressive government. Voters elected a Constituent Cortes under universal male suffrage. They drafted a progressive constitution that was never enacted. The assembly also passed major reforms like the Madoz disentailment and restored municipal democracy (Carr 1982, 246–256). The Bienio ended when O’Donnell broke with the Progressives in July 1856. Score 5: universal suffrage subjected the executive to substantial parliamentary constraints, even though the document was never formally enacted. |
| 1856–1858 | 2 | O’Donnell’s counter-revolution. O’Donnell launched a counter-revolution. He restored the 1845 constitution with an additional act in 1856 and dismissed the Progressive Cortes. The National Militia was dissolved in August 1856 (Carr 1982, chronological table, July and August 1856). Brief ministries then governed with minimal parliamentary constraint. The 1845 constitution was merely a cover for executive dominance. Score 2. |
| 1859–1868 | 1 | The Liberal Union. The Liberal Union oversaw a slide into absolutism. O’Donnell’s “long ministry” (1858 to 1863) consolidated executive control. The Liberal Union managed elections directly from the ministry. The Progressives withdrew into boycotts (retraimiento). This turned the Cortes into a mere ratifying body (Carr 1982, 257–290). After O’Donnell fell in 1863, the Moderates governed with increasingly open repression. Between 1866 and 1868, the Cortes lost all relevance and the government ruled entirely by decree. This became “the coming of the revolution” (Carr 1982, 290–305). Score 1: the executive faced no regular limitations on its actions. |
| 1868–1870 | -88 | Transition. The Glorious Revolution of September 1868 deposed Isabella II. A Provisional Government under Serrano and Prim took charge until voters elected a new Constituent Cortes. The 1869 constitution established universal male suffrage and Cortes sovereignty. It also mandated ministerial responsibility and severely limited the royal suspensive veto (Carr 1982, 305–325). Interpolated from 1 to 6. The 1869 constitution became operative by mid-1870 when Amadeo was elected king. |
| 1871–1872 | 6 | Reign of Amadeo I. Amadeo I ruled a democratic monarchy. The 1869 constitution operated under a new king, Amadeo of Savoy. The system featured universal male suffrage and a functioning parliamentary setup. It was “a true constitutional and democratic monarchy” (Carr 1982, 305–325). The unicameral Cortes held full legislative sovereignty over a subordinate executive. Amadeo abdicated in February 1873, but the constitutional constraint was genuine while it lasted. Score 6. |
| 1873 | 1 | The First Republic. The First Republic brought state breakdown rather than democratic constraint. The First Republic spanned February 1873 to January 1874 during an acute state crisis. The country faced the Carlist war and cantonalist risings. The army operated independently of the civilian government, and four presidents cycled through in just eleven months (Carr 1982, 325–335). Score 1 reflects state breakdown rather than absolutism. There simply was no functioning executive to constrain. |
| 1874–1875 | -88 | Transition. Pavía’s coup in January 1874 ended the First Republic. The military government under Serrano in 1874 soon gave way to the Bourbon restoration engineered by Cánovas. Alfonso XII was proclaimed king in December 1874. The state governed by decree the entire time as officials drafted the 1876 constitution. This was a transition regime with no functioning constitutional executive and no legislature. |
| 1876–1920 | 4 | Cánovas and the turno pacífico. The Restoration brought a constitutional monarchy. The 1876 constitution established shared sovereignty and a bicameral Cortes, alongside a bill of rights. It also introduced the turno pacífico, the peaceful alternation of Conservatives and Liberals. Dincecco and Katz (2016, 196) note that “[a] stable parliamentary regime was established in Spain in 1876.” However, systematic electoral manipulation by local bosses (caciquismo) made the machinery largely hollow. The state managed elections, and the king wielded substantial behind-the-scenes influence (Carr 1982, 347–366; Tortella 2000). Score 4 rather than 7 because of the systematic gap between formal architecture and operative constraint. A functioning parliament held real powers, which pushed the score above 3. The executive determined its composition through managed elections rather than relying on the electorate, which kept the score below 5. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1250 | 1 | Early Christian kingdom. Pre-parliamentary tribal and early Christian kingdom. Regional kingdoms (Svear, Götar) unified to form Sweden under Christian kings. Provincial things held local judicial functions but did not constrain the national executive. The king governed using personal authority and an armed retinue. Neither the Riksdag nor the Riksråd had a defined constitutional role. Van Zanden et al. record zero meetings for the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Roberts (1968a, 41) treats the council’s constitutional role as a development of the later fourteenth century. Score 1. |
| 1251–1389 | 2 | Folkung dynasty. The Riksråd operated as a standing body of magnates. Magnus Eriksson’s Land Law (c. 1350) codified the principle that the king is subject to law. It declared the monarchy elective and required a coronation oath. It also mandated that no new law be given to the commonalty “without their yea and consent” (Roberts 1968a, 40; Magnus Eriksson’s Land Law). In 1371, the Riksråd extracted a charter (konungaförsäkran) from Albert of Mecklenburg. This created a precedent for written limitations on royal power (Roberts 1968a, 41). Aristocrats provided this constraint rather than a parliament. The Riksråd represented only the high nobility. Score 2 rather than 3: the council offered moderate limitation. It lacked a regularized multi-estate constraint. |
| 1390–1523 | 2 | Kalmar Union. The Riksråd and an embryonic Riksdag. Union kings were often absent in Copenhagen. Swedish regents (riksföreståndare) from the Sture family exercised effective power and governed using the Riksråd. The Riksdag (four-estate parliament) first met at Arboga in 1435. However, “as yet, no doubt, these meetings of the Estates were for use only upon exceptional occasions” (Roberts 1968a, 43). They remained “a device of government, to be used or discarded as best might answer”. The Riksråd acted as the primary constraining body. In 1441, it forced King Kristoffer to promise he would not appoint new members without its consent (Roberts 1968a, 41). Score 2: the Riksråd and occasional Riksdag provided moderate constraint through aristocratic negotiation instead of an institutionalized process. |
| 1524–1611 | 2 | Vasa dynasty. The Riksdag functioned as an instrument of royal policy. Gustav Vasa was elected king in 1523. The 1544 Succession Pact made the monarchy hereditary while leaving it formally elective. The Riksdag became “the monarchy’s ally, and at times its tool” (Roberts 1986, 4). Van Zanden et al. count 19 meetings in the sixteenth century. Operative constraint was lower because the king summoned and dismissed the Riksdag at will and dominated its agenda. Score 2 rather than 3: the Riksdag held formal roles like taxation consent and legislation, but the Vasa kings dominated it. |
| 1612–1632 | 3 | Gustavus Adolphus. The Accession Charter and a regularized Riksdag. The 1611 Accession Charter represented “the acceptance by the monarchy of the constitutional and administrative programme of the aristocracy, the limitation of royal authority, the guarantee of the rule of law” (Roberts 1968b, 7). It promised no new law without “the approval, consent and participation of... the Council of the Realm, and all the Estates” and no war or peace without “the knowledge and consent of... the Council of the Realm, and the Estates” (Roberts 1968b, 9). The 1617 Riksdag Ordinance regularized procedures and fixed four Estates (Roberts 1968b, 11–13). Still, the partnership of Gustavus Adolphus and Oxenstierna “took the sting out of the Charter”. Score 3: regular parliamentary consultation with formal veto powers provided moderate limitation. |
| 1633–1680 | 4 | Regency and Riksråd dominance. The Riksdag advances. Christina’s minority and the 1634 Form of Government established council government. This made the Riksråd the effective executive (Roberts 1968b, 3–4, 18). The Riksdag pushed new claims. In 1634, the Nobility demanded the crown appoint great officers “with the agreement and consent of the Estates” (Roberts 1968b, 29). In 1650, the three lower Estates “for the first time seized the parliamentary initiative” (Roberts 1986, 4). In 1660, “the Diet secured acceptance of its position as the only body to make laws”. In 1675, Charles XI authorized the Estates to investigate the Regency. This established “ministerial responsibility to parliament which was to be a characteristic feature of the constitution during the Age of Liberty” (Roberts 1986, 4–5). Score 4: the Riksdag’s growing legislative and oversight powers imposed substantial limitations. |
| 1681–1718 | 1 | Caroline absolutism. The Riksdag subservient. The Diet of 1680 authorized prosecution of the Regency and began absolutism (Roberts 1968b, 69). The Diet of 1682 “consolidated the authority of the crown” (Roberts 1968b, 81). By 1693, the Riksdag “acquiesced in the Absolutism almost without resistance” and authorized taxation “without limitation of time” (Roberts 1986, 5). Charles XII never called the Riksdag between 1697 and 1718. The Council was “diminished in numbers, unable to influence the king” (Roberts 1986, 5). Score 1: unlimited executive authority. |
| 1719–1772 | 7 | The Age of Liberty. Executive subordination through the Riksdag. The revolution of 1719 and 1720 produced “shifts of power and constitutional changes so dramatic, so far-reaching, and so firmly maintained, that only another revolution could undo them” (Roberts 1986, 1). The king could not veto legislation, “since he had promised in his Accession Charter ‘always to agree with the Estates’.” “He could not dismiss a minister; he could appoint to the Council of State only from a list of three presented to him by the Estates; he could not dissolve parliament and appeal to the country” (Roberts 1986, 62–63). When Adolf Frederick refused to sign nominations in 1756, “they made a name-stamp to take the place of his signature” (Roberts 1986, 63). A two-party system (Hats and Caps) operated with real ministerial responsibility to the Riksdag. The Secret Committee dominated foreign policy. Score 7: the accountability group held effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in all major areas. The regime lasted 54 years until Gustav III’s coup. |
| 1773–1809 | 2 | Gustavian autocracy. Royal power restored. Gustav III’s coup on 19 August 1772, brought the Age of Liberty “to a sudden end” (Roberts 1986, 1). The 1772 Constitution restored royal executive power. The Riksdag retained formal legislative authority and taxation rights. The 1789 Act of Union and Security further strengthened the crown at the nobility’s expense (Roberts 1986, 214). The Riksdag met only at the king’s summons and could not act independently. Score 2 rather than 1: the king was dominant, but the formal principle of constitutional government remained intact, setting this apart from Caroline absolutism. |
| 1810–1907 | 4 | 1809 Instrument of Government. Constitutional monarchy under the 1809 Instrument of Government. The 1809 coup deposed Gustav IV Adolf. “[T]he preamble to the Constitution of 1809 annulled Gustav III’s Constitution of 1772, and his Act of Union and Security (1789)” (Roberts 1986, 211). The king shared legislative power with the Riksdag, with each holding a veto. The Riksdag had exclusive authority over taxation. The new rules established that “members of the Council of State were responsible and accountable for their advice”. The king retained the power to appoint the Council, command the military, and conduct foreign policy. A bicameral parliament replaced the four-estate Riksdag in 1866. Score 4: a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary control of taxation and legislation provided substantial limitations, even though the king kept real executive powers independent of the legislature. |
| 1908–1916 | -88 | Transition period. The government introduced universal male suffrage and proportional representation for the Second Chamber between 1907 and 1909. The Riksdag became more democratic, but the king still appointed the government. Interpolated from 4 (constitutional monarchy) to 7 (parliamentary government, 1917). |
| 1917–1920 | 7 | Parliamentary government established. The 1917 transition created the convention that the government must hold the confidence of the Riksdag. Score 7: parliamentary government subordinated the executive. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1290 | 1 | Pre-Confederation. Holy Roman Empire feudal structures. The territories that formed Switzerland were part of the Holy Roman Empire. Habsburg, ecclesiastical, and local nobles controlled the region (Reinhardt 2006, 13–14). Local lords governed with few constraints. Switzerland possessed no central institutions or representation beyond the local manor. Score 1. |
| 1291–1370 | 1 | The Federal Charter and the early Confederation. The Tagsatzung irregular. The 1291 Federal Charter among Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden created a defensive alliance. The communes made collective decisions. The Tagsatzung met only as needed. “Such meetings, called Tagsatzungen, took place in the second half of the 14th century on average once per year” (Reinhardt 2006, 31). They met less frequently before 1350. Cantons retained full sovereignty. The Confederation functioned as an alliance of equals without a central authority, leaving no confederal executive to constrain. Score 1. |
| 1371–1480 | 2 | Regular Tagsatzung. Loose confederal coordination. From the late fourteenth century, Tagsatzungen became regular annual events. Delegates attended “mostly with two representatives, with precise instructions on the agenda items — this ‘imperative mandate’ gave the delegates little room to maneuver” (Reinhardt 2006, 31–33). Decisions on shared territories used majority voting. All other matters required unanimity, “a rule that lasted until the end of the Old Confederacy in 1798” (Reinhardt 2006, 31). The Pfaffenbrief (1370) and Sempacherbrief (1393) codified confederal norms. The Tagsatzung acted as a confederal diet of sovereign cantons instead of a parliament constraining an executive. Score 2 instead of 1 because confederal coordination became regularized. Score 2 instead of 3 because the Tagsatzung was the central authority itself, not a body constraining a separate executive. |
| 1481–1798 | 3 | Stabilized confederation. The Tagsatzung as a continuous institution. The Stanser Verkommnis (1481) ended the post-Burgundian-Wars crisis by establishing non-interference in internal cantonal affairs and mutual assistance. The Peace of Basel (1499) secured de facto independence from the HRE, and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) confirmed it de jure. Reinhardt records 37 Tagsatzung meetings in 1520 alone. In the associated Rhaetian Freestate, “of the 480 identifiable meetings between 1500 and 1620, about one-fourth were Bundestage, while over half were specifically labeled as Beitage” (Head 1995, 98). These meetings covered legislation, alliances, war and peace, and the appointment of magistrates. Also, “the principle of majority rule actually increased in importance between 1520 and 1620” (Head 1995, 3). Six Landsgemeinde cantons held annual popular assemblies to elect magistrates and decide legislation. However, the Tagsatzung provided confederal coordination instead of executive constraint. As Reinhardt notes, “the convention could pass resolutions, but could not enforce their implementation locally — the political will of the respective authorities remained decisive” (Reinhardt 2006, 33). Score 3 instead of 2 because the confederation matured into a stable, continuous institution. Score 3 instead of 4 or 5 because the Tagsatzung functioned as the central authority and lacked enforcement power. |
| 1798–1803 | 2 | The Helvetic Republic (a French client state). The French invasion in 1798 ended the Old Confederacy. The Helvetic constitution of April 1798 created a unitary state with a strong five-member Directory and an indirectly elected Great Council, abolishing cantonal sovereignty. The Directory was “imposed from outside” and consequently, “the new Helvetia bore hardly any resemblance to the old Confederation, indeed in many respects became its sheer opposite” (Reinhardt 2006, 82–89). Four coups displaced the head of state between 1800 and 1802. The Republic survived only through French military support. Score 2: the constitution formally constrained a strong executive but left it unchecked in practice. Not 1 because a formal constitution with an elected chamber existed on paper. Not 3 because the chambers were largely notional under French enforcement. |
| 1803–1815 | 3 | The Act of Mediation. Napoleon’s mediation in February 1803 restored the federal structure as a league of 19 cantons with restored cantonal sovereignty. The Tagsatzung returned under the Mediation as the Confederation’s coordinating organ (Reinhardt 2006, 90). The new system abolished subject territories and dismantled the unitary state. Score 3: the restored Tagsatzung provided moderate constraint and elected the executive. Not 5 because French oversight and press censorship prevented full self-governance. |
| 1815–1848 | 2 | The Federal Pact (Restoration). The Federal Pact of August 1815 re-established a very loose confederation of 22 sovereign cantons. In this arrangement, “the main task of the federation was accordingly common defence against external threats... Beyond that, the competencies of the federation were modest; they fit into just fifteen articles” (Reinhardt 2006, 92–100). The Tagsatzung met rarely and decided little. Switzerland operated as part of Metternich’s restoration system. The Sonderbund War in November 1847 ended with the defeat of the seven Catholic cantons. Score 2: confederal authority remained very weak, and the cantons governed largely independently. |
| 1848–1874 | 7 | The Federal Constitution. Executive subordination. The 1848 constitution created a modern federal state. “The legislature consisted of two chambers. The National Council was determined on the basis of universal male suffrage... In the Council of States, by contrast, history remained alive — each canton had two representatives (half-cantons one)” (Reinhardt 2006, 101–103). The Federal Assembly elected the seven-member Federal Council. Also, “the results of National Council elections did not necessarily have immediate effects on the composition of the highest executive body” (Reinhardt 2006, 102). The executive could not dissolve the Assembly. Score 7: the accountability group chose the executive, held it accountable, and the executive lacked the power to dissolve the group. |
| 1874–1920 | 7 | Total revision. The optional referendum added; executive subordination unchanged. The 1874 revision introduced the optional referendum, allowing 30,000 citizens or eight cantons to demand a popular vote on federal laws. It created a permanent Federal Supreme Court and expanded federal powers. As Reinhardt notes, “the most consequential internal transformation was the establishment of the optional referendum... The political leadership was subjected to the control of plebiscites more strongly than in any other European country” (2006, 103–104). The Federal Assembly still elected the Federal Council, and the Council could not dissolve the Assembly. Parliament delegated wartime emergency powers in 1914 rather than the executive usurping them. The state introduced proportional representation in 1918. The first PR elections in 1919 ended the long majority of the Free Democrats. Score 7 throughout. |
| Period | XCONST | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 980–1299 | 1 | Seljuk and beylik Anatolia. Pre-Ottoman and Seljuk periods lacked representative institutions. The Seljuk Sultanate of Rum (c. 1077 to 1308) and various Turkish beyliks governed Anatolia before the Ottoman principality emerged under Osman I around 1300. Quataert (2005, 32) notes that early Ottoman rulers were “theoretically absolute monarch[s]” even in the early fourteenth century. Legal scholars argued that officials were “mere slaves of the sultan.” Score 1 reflects the lack of historical evidence for qualifying institutions. |
| 1299–1826 | 1 | Classical Ottoman sultanate. Sultanic autocracy defined the classical and post-classical Ottoman Empire. The sultan’s power was “immense; the governance of the empire was largely dependent on his personal discretion” (Findley 1980, 7). Quataert (2005, 32) states: “Thereafter, until the nineteenth century, the sultan possessed theoretically absolute power, with life and death control over his military and bureaucratic elites.” İnalcık and Quataert (1994, 1) characterize the classical period 1300 to 1600 as “an autocratic centralist government.” While the janissary corps occasionally rebelled and deposed sultans like Osman II in 1622, Ibrahim in 1648, and Mustafa II in 1703, these acts represented military interference rather than formal institutional checks. The janissaries operated outside any constitutional framework. Henriques et al. score all benchmarks from 1400 to 1850 at 1. |
| 1826–1839 | 1 | Mahmud II’s autocracy. Mahmud II governed as a supreme sultan. The Auspicious Incident in June 1826 destroyed the Janissary corps, eliminating the primary military check on the executive. “The sultan probably was supreme between 1826 and 1839” (Quataert 2005, 64). This period featured strict personal autocracy. Without the Janissaries, the sultan ruled free from informal opposition, and formal accountability councils remained absent. Score 1. |
| 1839–1876 | 1 | Tanzimat reforms. Bureaucratic authority rose during the Tanzimat reforms, though formal executive constraints remained absent. The Gülhane Edict in 1839 and the Imperial Rescript in 1856 promised equality under the law alongside regularized taxation and conscription. The sultan issued these decrees as self-limiting promises, lacking enforcement from an independent institution. Power shifted from the sultan to the civil bureaucracy, known as the Sublime Porte. This bureaucracy functioned as the executive body directly instead of checking the executive. Findley (1980, 167–218) characterizes the Tanzimat as creating a “civil-bureaucratic hegemony” without parliamentary oversight. Quataert (2005, 64) describes “bureaucratic ascendancy between 1839 and 1876” replacing sultanic personal rule. Score 1. |
| 1876–1878 | 3 | First Constitutional Era. Midhat Pasha’s constitution on 23 December 1876, initiated the First Constitutional Era by establishing a bicameral parliament with an elected Chamber of Deputies and an appointed Senate. This parliament met in two sessions between 1877 and 1878. It displayed “a level of independence, capability, and procedural orderliness that astounded contemporary observers” (Findley 1980, 226). Despite this activity, the sultan’s “sovereignty remained unrestricted and his powers only partially defined”. Article 113 allowed him to exile anyone he deemed a security threat, a provision he used against Midhat Pasha himself. He retained sweeping powers to dissolve the chamber, veto legislation, and govern by decree. He permanently suspended parliament in February 1878. Score 3 reflects this brief period of limited constitutional constraint. |
| 1878–1908 | 1 | Hamidian autocracy. During the Hamidian autocracy, the sultan suspended the constitution and governed without a parliament for thirty years. Abdülhamid II reversed the Tanzimat’s bureaucratic ascendancy and “took up the autocratic reins soon after his accession to the throne in 1876” (Quataert 2005, 65). This shift introduced a period of “resurgent sultanic despotism” (Findley 1980, 223). Although he was an “avid reformer and legislator” (Findley 1980, 227), he governed exclusively by sultanic decree. Score 1. |
| 1908–1913 | 4 | Young Turk Revolution. The Young Turk Revolution in July 1908 forced the restoration of the 1876 constitution, initiating the parliamentary phase of the Second Constitutional Era. Elections later that year produced a parliament heavily influenced by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). After an attempted counter-coup in April 1909, the government deposed Abdülhamid and passed constitutional amendments to empower the legislature. These changes subjected ministers to chamber oversight, allowed the grand vezir to form his own cabinet, and curtailed the sultan’s authority (Findley 1980, 294–295). Quataert (2005, 65) notes that the restored constitution “placed power in the hands of a parliamentary government.” Multi-party competition functioned alongside significant CUP interference, as they manipulated the 1912 elections, known as the sopalı seçim, the “election with the stick” (Zürcher 2004, 103). Score 4 captures this parliamentary constraint, adjusted for the CUP’s informal control and electoral management. |
| 1913–1918 | 2 | CUP dictatorship. The Sublime Porte raid on 23 January 1913, effectively ended parliamentary government. Following Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s assassination in June 1913, the CUP firmly consolidated power (Findley 1980, 303). Quataert (2005, 65) notes: “Civilian bureaucrats ran affairs until 1913 when a Young Turk military dictatorship took over.” The CUP triumvirate relied on emergency powers throughout the Balkan Wars and World War I. Parliament continued to convene strictly as a CUP-controlled body. Score 2 acknowledges that the regime maintained these parliamentary forms despite removing actual legislative checks. |
| 1918–1920 | 1 | Allied occupation and Mudros. The CUP military dictatorship ended with Ottoman defeat in the First World War and the Mudros armistice in October 1918. Allied forces subsequently occupied the territory. “Open political activity ended with the British occupation of Istanbul on 16 March 1920, which was intended both to stop collaboration with the nationalists from within the Ottoman government institutions and to put pressure on the nationalists” (Zürcher 2004, 139). The last Ottoman parliament prorogued itself in protest on 2 April 1920. Score 1 reflects the occupation and dismantlement of the Ottoman state, which left no operative institutions. |
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